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The Bulletin of Yerevan University is a four-month bulletin of social sciences has been published since 1967 in Yerevan. Since 2010, the Political Science Series of the Bulletin are published as special issues. It is published three times a year.

The ***Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University (JOPS)*** is the leading journal of contemporary political research, which is focused on the political science analysis of institutions, processes, political systems and regimes in the countries of the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions. Articles published in the Journal of Political Science are theoretically innovative and methodologically diverse and includes a variety of intellectual approaches.

The ***Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University (JOPS)*** publishes balanced scientific approaches by scholars from all over the world and in all fields of political science, including Armenian politics, comparative politics, international relations and geopolitics, political theory and methodology, political education and socialization.

The ***Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University (JOPS)*** is a peer-reviewed journal that publishes original results of fundamental and applied research of theoretical and practical significance in the field of political science, informing the domestic, regional and international political science community about the latest results of political science research. Manuscripts in all areas and methodologies of political research are welcome for consideration. The Journal is open to comparative research and especially welcomes those manuscripts that are based on interdisciplinary approaches to political science issues.

The ***Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University (JOPS)*** is a public platform for the consolidation and structuring of the Armenian and regional political science network, ensuring the integration of Armenian and regional political science into international political science, contributing to the development of university political science education in Armenia and the region. In each issue, scientific articles are published in the public domain.

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In this Issue

The modern world order, connected with the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations and the transformation of the balance of power on a global scale, is again facing the challenges of war and conflicts. Under the influence of globalization and European integration, the role of the nation state is being transformed, it has a tremendous impact on its ability to perform traditional functions of protecting its citizens, and the line between domestic and foreign policy is blurred. In this context, modern communication and information technologies that have connected the whole world also have a tremendous impact on civic culture and values, the interests of civil society organizations, encouraging them to actively participate in the political decision-making process. At the European level, these systemic changes were a gradual but clear change in the electoral preferences of the citizens of EU member states.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR led to the formation of new independent states and the advent of the era of globalization with cycles of the formation of a new world order. At the same time, the development of events at the beginning of the 21st century showed that wars and crises are becoming a challenge for the modern world order. Therefore, in modern conditions, the consideration of multipolarity, the preservation of the role of the UN as a universal international mechanism acquires civilized and humanitarian significance.

Step by step, the process of strengthening European security began with the support of NATO, taking into account the strengthening of the sovereignty and national interests of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. If the use of NATO military and political diplomacy tools in the post-Soviet space was supported by a significant number of these countries, then for Russia and Belarus all this was considered an interference that directly affects the national interests of Russia and Belarus, which have bilateral historical, economic, cultural ties. In connection with the fact that Euro-Atlantic integration was considered for the EaP countries as part of the official course towards European integration, issues of relations with NATO were given great attention in the foreign policy of the EaP countries.

In 'Why war won and negotiations lost? Is the absence of war the same as peace?', Gerard Libaridian analyzes the military, diplomatic and negotiation dimensions of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from 1988 to 2020. The author comparatively analyzes the main reasons for the transformation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, explaining the main reasons for the failure of the Armenian side to diversify the military victory at the diplomatic and negotiation levels. Based on a comparative analysis of the structure and dynamics of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from 1988 to 2020, the author identifies new possible ways of their diplomatic settlement, taking into account that the absence of war does not mean peace, and the absence of peace does not mean war. The author draws attention to the fact that when resolving international armed conflicts, international organizations and mediators do not go too deep into history without resorting to historical arguments. In this sense, the question naturally arises as to which historical facts have a constructive potential for involving them in the negotiation process. In a sense, the answer has already been given by the author of the article, defining the stages of conflict dynamics that have universal application.

In his article 'Influence of the relationship between the protector state and regional hegemon on the resilience of a non-recognised state: Lessons learned from the Nagorno-Karabakh war and non-peace', Konstantin Ghazaryan, based on a comparative analysis of the structure and dynamics of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, determines possible ways of its forceful solution or peaceful settlement. The author pays special attention to the fact that economic relations, which are completely absent between Azerbaijan and Armenia, not only leave their negative reflection in the economy of the two states, but, in general, in the entire region. The issue of resolving this multi-layered conflict is complicated by the fact that the positions of the parties involved in the conflict are completely opposite, especially after the Second Karabakh War in 2020, which dramatically changed the balance of power in the South Caucasus, increased the dynamics of diplomatic, military and political transformations, which leads to the need constant monitoring of the situation and the formation of analytical ideas about ongoing events. The author comes to the conclusion that none of the parties to the conflict at this post-war stage of negotiations is ready to make serious compromises and concessions. Added to this is the complex relationship of the parties involved in its settlement, which is in the sphere of interests of the EU, the US, Turkey, Iran and Russia

In 'Transformations of the ideology of nation-building and state-building in Armenia: phenomenon of integrity of nation and state', Ashot Yengoyan analyzes the main trends in the transformation of nation building and statehood in the political life of the Armenian people. The article examines the characteristic features of the current Armenian reality, which is largely determined by the characteristics of the Armenian statehood, as well as factors such as the scale of territoriality, historical and political heritage, social, cultural, ethnic and diverse factors of the Armenian society, the importance of researching the possibilities of nation-building and state-building at the regional level is increasing.

The author comes to the conclusion that this issue has become even more relevant in the era of globalization. The idea is argued that modern Armenian society is faced with difficulties, since there are different concepts of the political nation and the nation-state, both in terms of their essence and the time frame of these processes. Despite the fact that over the past decades Armenia has gone through an ambiguous, difficult path in resolving the ethnic and national issue, the regional content of the Armenian formula of nation-building in the context of dynamic social, economic and political changes still remains a little explored area of political research and critical reflection.

In the article 'Power to the Faculty Approach in the Bologna Process: How does the European Approach to accreditation of joint programs enhance innovation capacity? Lessons learned from the Western Balkans for projects in the Eastern neighbourhood', Franz Kok and Günter Wageneder discusses the problems of the Bologna process and the European approach to the accreditation of joint programs from the point of view of innovative potential. Based on the study of the experience of Joint MA Political Science - Integration and Governance (PoSIG) for the Western Balkan region, the authors analyze comparatively the mechanisms of European accreditation for joint programs as a new instrument of the Bologna process.

The article also touches on the effective participation of countries in the Bologna process, as this allows their higher education systems to maintain an appropriate level of integration and sustainable development. In this sense, the authors present views on the importance of internationally recognized institutions of higher education, because thanks to this they are becoming increasingly important for economic development in a globally competitive environment. This direction is also complemented by consideration of strengthening the role of the younger generation of scientists in the national and international labor market, since the Bologna process has formed a global understanding of the importance of academic freedom in research and teaching in universities. This shows that with the change in the structure and content of higher education based on the Bologna philosophy and European values, the key issue is the need to reform the mechanism for managing the higher education system: rethinking the goals, strategy, main functions, content and quality assessment of higher education. The formation of democratic traditions in approaches to the evaluation of the activities of higher educational institutions in the field of international accreditation is becoming obvious.

In 'The welfare state crisis and the strengthening of the far-right in Sweden as a result of increasing migration', Simona Chuguryan, Kristina Baculakova and Rudolf Kucharcik analyze the main causes of the crisis of the welfare state and the rise of far-right and populist parties in Sweden in the face of increased migration. The authors focus on the fact that modern Sweden is characterized by a high degree of cultural and social mobility, strengthening of intercultural interaction and contacts, a significant increase in migration flows. In this sense, powerful migration flows in Sweden and other European countries are a factor influencing the domestic politics of these countries and their international relations. The authors come to the conclusion that social and political tension is growing in Sweden, the activities of right-wing parties and movements are becoming more active, xenophobic sentiments are intensifying in society, which can lead to an aggravation of social conflicts and political instability in Swedish society. Sweden is faced with the task of maintaining unity and stability in the face of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity, so overcoming the migration crisis is the main task both in Sweden and in other European countries. In this regard, it is important to comprehend the structure of the official political discourse on migrants, which will make it possible to identify the features and trends of modern migration policy.

The article summarizes some of the results of the study, according to which Sweden has the potential to solve migration problems, since liberal democracy is able to form a social consensus between representatives of different cultures through public discussion and establishing effective interaction among civil society organizations.

In 'Immigration of Russian citizens to Armenia during the Russian-Ukrainian war 2022-2023: pull-push factors', Yuliana Melkumyan and Nvard Melkonyan analyze the impact of modern war and peace on the level of immigration, poses an important problem to develop a methodology for long-term forecasting of the evolution of political violence and ways to control it in world politics. Undoubtedly, the pull-pull factors of immigration largely determine the Armenian-Russian relations, as well as the development of the entire system of international relations and the geopolitical

situation. In the modern world, the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war is clearly manifested not only in the push-pool factors of immigration, but also in the transformation of political violence. Forced migration from Russia to Armenia during the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022-2023 is the most massive and protracted in post-Soviet Armenia.

The article deals with the importance of scientific understanding of this problem of immigration, especially in the context of the national interests and security of Armenia. The article clarifies the features of the new assessment, the development of new priorities in the formulation of migration policy, especially since this policy requires its documentary consolidation in the concept of state migration policy. This, in turn, is dictated by the demand for an open and reasonable migration policy in Armenia, which is experiencing unprecedentedly powerful migration pressure and is faced with mass forced migration of Russian citizens. In this context, this problem requires further research in order to answer the question about the causes and nature of the forced immigration of Russian citizens to Armenia, as well as evidence based on a systematic approach to migration as a response to threats to the human security of potential migrants, which has both scientific and and political significance. The authors give a generalized description that both in Armenia and Russia, researchers and politicians still cannot reach a consensus on the assessment of its role in the national security system and the national interests of the two countries.

This volume of the Journal includes three book reviews focusing on the securitization and democracy in Eurasia, systemic earthquake and the struggle for world order, as well as issues related to China's Digital Authoritarianism. In international political science, there is an urgent need for a deeper theoretical analysis of modern theories of world order and foreign policy strategies. The review of these books allows us to present both the evolution of ideas about the world order and the strategies for its formation, and the features of the modern foreign policy strategies of many countries. In addition, an understanding of modern theories of the world order will make it possible to more clearly define the foreign policy of Russia, Turkey, China, Iran and other countries in the field of interaction with the United States and EU member states.

Ashot Aleksanyan
Magda Arsenyan

WHY WAR WON AND NEGOTIATIONS LOST? IS THE ABSENCE OF WAR THE SAME AS PEACE?

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Abstract
The article comparatively analyzes the systemic dependence of military victory and negotiation defeat, which is manifested in a situation of absence of war and still unsettled peace. The article examines the negotiations on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, along with cooperation and struggle, which constitute the main form of expression of world and regional politics in the modern world.

Taking into account the genesis and changing nature of the Karabakh conflict, the author analyzes the main reasons why the negotiations on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict were not successful. In this context, the purpose of this article is to study the process of conducting international negotiations of the Karabakh conflict, its structural and functional components, to analyze the negotiation activity as a means of settling and resolving conflict situations in Nagorno-Karabakh, the implementation of international cooperation, as well as to study the main characteristics of the negotiation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The author focuses on the military, political and diplomatic dimensions of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from 1988 to its last phase in 2020. The negotiation process to resolve the conflict in this article is considered, both in terms of their content, results and positions of their participants, as well as in terms of the procedural side of the negotiation.

Introduction

To understand the reasons why negotiations to resolve the Karabakh conflict failed— the main issue addressed in the first part of this article—is a daunting task in view of

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the shifting grounds undergirding that conflict over three decades. From its onset in 1988 as a conflict between two member republics of the Soviet Union to the last installment in 2020 that ostensibly brough it to a close by war international order was transformed drastically, the modes of negotiations and of the mediation effort evolved significantly, and the perception of the nature of the conflict changed perceptibly.

To project the future and assess the prospects for peace based on the new realities created by the 2020 war—the subject of the second part of this article—may seem easier; yet enough uncertainties remain on all levels to view the task as a major challenge.

It is not all that obvious to this writer that one or more theories of conflict resolution can adequately answer these challenges. Considering the domestic, local, regional and international factors that have impacted past processes and are likely to impact future ones, it is best to approach this conflict with the assumption that each conflict has its unique characteristics and must be treated as such, although conflicts can share actors and factors affecting their progress.

The development of the modern system of international relations, the formation of which began after the end of the Cold War, has entered a new phase in the post-Soviet space (Ciută 2007; Della Sala 2018; Kilroy 2022). Regional conflicts on the territory of the states that are members of the EU's Eastern Partnership pose a serious threat to the security system of both these countries and the EU and NATO (DeBardeleben 2011; Kocamaz 2022). First of all, this is expressed in the growth of military escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the aggravation of the military and political situation in the zones of armed confrontation in Nagorno-Karabakh. In this context, the EU and NATO have always been interested in settling regional conflicts in the Eastern Partnership space, also due to the fact that the development of relations with the newly independent countries is officially called a priority in the foreign policy of the EU and NATO. At the same time, it must be recognized that after 1998, Armenian diplomacy, as an independent actor in international relations, failed to develop a clear and strategic policy aimed at interaction with Western European, as well as with post-Soviet states. The result of this was that even in recent years, Armenia's relations with a number of them have seriously deteriorated, while with others they are highly dependent on the political situation that is developing both in these countries and in the international arena (Cooper and Morris 2013, 89-100; Krüger 2010, 93-114; Cornell 2017, 1-21). This leads to the fact that there is a reduction in the political influence of Armenia in the South Caucasus, which, in turn, is a serious obstacle to integration processes both with Nagorno-Karabakh and in the regional and European ones. One of the manifestations of the miscalculations of the Armenian foreign policy in the space of the Eastern Partnership was the almost passive role that Armenia took in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh and other interstate conflicts that arose at the end of the existence of the USSR (Coyle 2018, 207-256). At the current stage of development, it is obvious that Armenia should take the diplomatic leadership in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in order to clear the way for its foreign policy initiatives aimed at strengthening the integration processes. In the South Caucasian direction, the solution of this problem would have been unattainable without the beginning of the

settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (Babayev and Spanger 2020, 277–320; Yavuz and Gunter 2023, 67-105).

After the second Karabakh war, this conflict again became the object of close study of the scientific and expert community not only in Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also far beyond their borders. At the same time, the features of the foreign policy of countries aimed at the peaceful settlement of the conflict remain outside the scope of research for a long time. It is obvious that Azerbaijan is building up its military potential and the military way of resolving the Karabakh conflict is still going on (Yavuz and Gunter 2023, 153-193; Avdaliani 2022, 225-234; Coyle 2021, 115-164), and this is despite the fact that the current political leadership of Armenia will pay great attention to finding ways to peacefully resolve the conflict. In turn, this approach to the problem is in the sphere of national interests of world and regional powers, which repeatedly declares that the conflict must and can be resolved peacefully within the framework of international law (Mihr 2021, 287-297, ANG 2020, 117-134).

Thus, a comparative study of the features of the foreign policy and diplomacy of Armenia to ensure a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict is in demand (Mitchell 2022, 1-28; Bellamy 2022, 83-101; Lebow 2020; Kertyzia 2022, 167-194), as this can help in developing new approaches to resolving the conflict with the active participation of world and regional powers, which will help strengthen the political image of Armenia in the South Caucasus.

I. Failures on multiple fronts

We could begin with four simple but important observations.

1. It was possible to avert war through negotiations and effective mediation.
2. Primary responsibility for the failure to resolve the conflict through peaceful means rests on the shoulders of the parties to the conflict but responsibility must be shared by all, including the powers that assumed the role of mediators and those with vested interests in who benefited from the different easy it could be resolved.
3. If the above is true, then someone(s), some parties are responsible for the failure. And yet no one, no party, local regional or international, has assumed any responsibility in this matter.
4. If that is true, than the parties may not be ready to reassess their roles and the manner in which they play that those roles, which does not bode well for the resolution of the remaining issues.

Now let us set the stage for the conflict:

A. **Who are the parties to the conflict?** Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, and Armenia. And now Turkey.
B. **What other actors have a direct interest in the outcome?** Russia, Iran, the US, China, Georgia and other countries with secessionist movements; the OSCE and EU, the UN,NATO, the Organization of Islamic States; British Petroleum and other major oil and gas companies that have invested in the exploration, exportation, transportation, and use of Azerbaijan's hydrocarbon resources. And the Diaspora.

C. **Who attempted to or otherwise got involved in negotiations at various times?** Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Turkey, Italy, Sweden, Finland, France, Germany, the US, (and other member countries of the OSCE Minsk Group), the UN, even, at one point, the International Olympic Committee, as odd as it may sound.

D. **What modes or forums of mediation were exercised: unilateral, multilateral, etc.) ?** Russia, Russia and Kazakhstan, Iran, the US, Turkey as direct intermediaries; Russia, the US, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia in secret negotiations in Geneva; advisors of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in confidential consultation. The winner has been the OSCE through its Minsk Conference, reduced to the 3-way co-chairmanship of the Minsk Group, the current Group of actors: Russia, France and the US.

E. **Why was this conflict important?**

Because of the intersection of conflicting geopolitical interests of regional and international players, and hydrocarbon resources,

F. **What were the elements of the conflict under negotiation?**

(1) The future status of Nagorno Karabakh or Artsakh

(2) Seven districts around the Soviet era NK Autonomous region, districts not populated by Armenians within the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan, districts that came under Armenian control by the summer of 1993 during the first Karabakh war, 1991-1994. This is one dimension of this conflict that is different from similar post-Soviet era conflicts.

(3) Security guarantees for any agreed upon status and for civilian populations impacted by any agreement

(4) The return of refugees and internally displaced persons largely from Nagorno Karabakh and the seven districts in general.

A. Failures on the Armenian side

It is possible to separate the time span from 1991 to 2020 into two distinct periods as far as negotiations on the Karabakh conflict are concerned.

The first is from 1991- to early 1998, during the administration of the first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian. During that period Armenia thought that the war had not ended with the cease-fire of 1994, that the balance of power was likely to change in favor of Azerbaijan, that all things considered time was not on our side, that if concessions had to be made they are better made when the Armenian side was in the stronger position. The Ter-Petrossian administration considered (a) the problem to be primarily its own and supported the work of the mediators with its own initiatives and ideas, (b) the conflict to be primarily an issue between neighbors without ascribing to it any symbolic global significance, (c) the problem one that must be resolved above all else, otherwise all other issues—democratization, economic reforms, strengthening of state institutions, normal relations with all neighbors as the best guarantee for Armenia's long term security—to be threatened if not impossible to achieve, and (d) that it was impossible to reach agreement on the status of Karabakh but peace could be achieved in two phased negotiations, and peace would be secured in the first phase.

The Ter-Petrosyan administration labored toward this goal intensely and as an urgency, at times facing the disagreement, even the active opposition, of the Karabakh leadership. On two or three occasions it brought Azerbaijan close to an agreement that would establish peace through mutual concessions. To do that this administration avoided many of the pitfall that would become problems in the second period, discussed below. On these occasions Azerbaijan balked at the end, hoping that it could get a better deal. The last such occasion when an agreement seemed very possible, was the September 1997 proposal offered by the Minsk Group. That document was likely to be accepted by Azerbaijan and Armenia as a basis for constructive negotiations. But this time it was a group within the Ter-Petrossian administration that vehemently opposed the proposal, and left no choice to the president but to resign. The group opposed the document because it did not think the Armenian side needed to make any concessions, regardless of what it received in return.

The second period extends from 1998 to the summer of 2020. The major difference with the first period is that successive administrations of Armenia and, of course, Artsakh, insisted that the occupied districts should ve restored to Azerbaijan in return for (a) Azerbaijan's recognition of Karabakh's independence, or (b) Azerbaijan's recognition of the right of the Armenians of Karabakh to self0detyermination which, for all practical purposes, meant the same thing. In general terms, the following problems stand out as factors that have made negotiations for the most part unproductive during this period:

1. The refusal of the Armenian side—Armenia, Karabakh and a good chunk of the Diaspora, political leaders and intellectuals and academics—to recognize the shifting power relations in favor of Azerbaijan,

2. the refusal of the Armenian side to properly assess the significance of the support of the international community, without exception, for Azerbaijan's position on the fundamentals of the conflict, especially for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the return of most of the districts to direct Azerbaijani control; the disregard for interim or step by step solutions offered by the mediators. Insisting, instead, that Azerbaijan recognize Karabakh's independence or, at the least, the right to self-determination, which amounted to the same, be recognized before any concession is made by the Armenian side.

3. the absence of any power, regional or otherwise, to support the Armenian position unconditionally, when Azerbaijan, in addition to its superior resources, had at least Turkey's unconditional support.

4. The Armenian side underestimated Azerbaijan's resolve to get back what they considered to be theirs. Armenians dismissed the patriotism of the other side as being manufactured, while believing that their own patriotism alone had integrity and legitimacy.

5. Armenians convinced themselves that all that was need for the world to recognize Karabakh's independence was a stronger diplomacy and more hard work.

6. Armenia thought being democratic would change the balance of power in our favor; that is, we wrongly assumed that our recent record on democracy and human rights matter to the West. Azerbaijan has been an autocracy since 1993 and that never stopped the international community and the West from supporting the Azerbaijani

position of denying NK independence and demanding that the 7 districts around it be returned.

7. Armenians confused the sympathy of some states and politicians in other countries with evidence that they will help us where it matters: in the diplomatic arena and in times of war, when all evidence showed that they had not given any reason for us to think or believe so.

8. The Armenian side assigned countries roles they **could not** and **would not** perform. It found many reasons why they should: because Armenians have a long history, because they had been subjected to a genocide, because they are Christians, or because, by and large, we are a nice people with a very ancient culture.

9. The Armenian side confused diplomacy with lobbying and lobbying with diplomacy. Lobbying is community and Diaspora based activism; diplomacy is state-based decision making and pursuit of national, vital interests in the real world, where targets are not congresspeople but powerful neighbors that think the Armenian side have done something wrong.

10. Armenians wanted to believe principles matter. They did not care to know how these principles were created, by whom, why and when and why they are applied or ignored. They thought principles could act to compensate for the allies they did not have

In other words, the Armenian side was making policy based on maximizing assets, which were diminishing in relation to those of Azerbaijan, and minimizing dangers and threats and thus justifying maximum demands that were essentially unattainable. This criticism does not constitute a judgment on whether Armenians' demands and expectations, such as the recognition of Karabakh's independence, were justified or not. It simply indicates that the assumptions and calculations underlying policy were either faulty or completely false.

B. Failures on the Azerbaijani side

The Azerbaijani position on how to resolve the conflict has shifted too but far less than that of the Armenian side. Azerbaijan has always had two foundational policies: What matters is that Karabakh remain within Azerbaijan; and, war is a clear option to achieve that goal[1]. Such consistency may have had its advantages but it presents problems too.

1. The contemporary phase of this conflict started in 1988 as a political campaign in Stepanakert and then in Yerevan to be united with Armenia. Azerbaijan bears the responsibility for the brutalization and then militarization of the conflict.

2. The Azerbaijani side saw the Karabakh problem as one of territory that it must bring under its control, with or without its Armenian population. The human dimension enters only with regard to the Azerbaijanis in Karabakh and surrounding areas that became displaced persons and refugees as a result of Armenian military actions in

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[1] There is one exception to this statement. President Heydar Aliyev briefly considered, some would insist accepted, a solution based on a territorial swap with Armenia: Karabakh exchanged with Armenia for the Meghri district of Armenia, the southernmost part that constitutes Armenia's border with Iran and the shortest link between mainland Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan.

those areas. Azerbaijan does not even recognize grievances of Armenians of Karabakh under Azerbaijani domination as legitimate or anything to be concerned with. This position fueled Armenian fears that Azerbaijan was pursuing a policy of ethnic cleansing with regard to Armenians in Karabakh. For Azerbaijan the war was about Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan and there was nothing to talk about with the Armenians of Karabakh.

3. As a consequence Azerbaijan failed to even enter into any political discussions with the Armenians of Karabakh, when it insisted on their being its citizens.

4. Although at times willing to consider tactical adjustments, Azerbaijan's negotiating tactics were based on the considerations above. Baku saw no need to make compromises on issues, since the war option was not only present but also absolutely legitimate.

5. Additionally, Baku's intransigence was fed by its belief that it was the duty of the international community, and specifically the mediators, to compel Armenia to deliver the occupied districts and Karabakh to it. By not doing so, Azerbaijan promoted the grievance that it was a victim of Western bias toward it as a Muslim country[2].

C. Failures common to both sides

Beyond then failures particular to each of the warring sides, we need to mention a few of which both sides are guilty to various degrees:

1. The parties to the conflict saw this conflict as the continuation of previous episodes of armed hostilities going back to 1905-1907 and as integral to their state and national identity formation, especially in the case of Azeris.

Thus, they have invested their identities, historical perspectives, and cultural sensibilities in the conflict and not just interests that are more often than not easier to negotiate. Concessions became equivalent to loss of identity, and each case of rhetorical explosion by one side as the equivalent of denial of identity by the other.

2. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the two peoples tended to replace the so-called socialist ideology with nationalism, and the Politburo Moscow with Republican Moscow, Brussels, and Washington. That left no room for the development of a sense of regionalism and common regional interests beyond their differences on the conflict.

3. The conflict, the fortunes of war on the ground, and possibilities of resolutions have been instrumental in the domestic politics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, legitimizing or delegitimizing leaders of governments, a process that has pushed populations toward more nationalistic and maximalist positions, making concession more difficult and providing leaders excuses for not making any concessions.

4. Each side developed its own narrative of events, where it focused on its own victimization, ignoring totally the narrative of the other, the pain it caused the other. The righteousness of one's cause made it caused the other legitimate, therefore natural, therefore not worth mentioning.

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[2] Since the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia the "West" has used forced twice to support a population. One was a Muslim state against another Muslim state, the first Iraq war; the second was Kosovo against Serbia, a Muslim entity against a Christian state.

Also, as a consequence, societies have become alien to each other, unwilling to understand each other, each seeing the other as completely untrustworthy, to say the least. In the case of Azerbaijan, the loser of the first major round of battles, this alienation has become outright hatred with racist overtones. The Armenian side has manifested a parallel process, by ascribing Azerbaijanis with genocidal instincts. Although the Armenian side has increasingly equated Azeris with Turks, hence genocidal by nature, the Armenian side has not imitated the Azerbaijani campaign.

Both societies thus became vulnerable to manipulations of public opinion in favor of extreme negotiating positions and supportive of "no concessions" positions.

5. Furthermore, when considering ideas, proposals, possible solutions, each side imagined the worst possible scenarios that would follow, not having grounds, each believed, to trust the other. And ascribing the worst possible intentions to the other.

6. For the most part, the parties to the conflict defined their maximum demands but not their minimum ones, making negotiations slippery. Thus, they went after what they wanted and not what they needed. When one party was ready to be flexible the other was not. Thus, they both missed opportunities to benefit from each other's flexibility. In doing so each party to the conflict relied on their version of history, on their sense of victimhood, but above all on principles of international law, each highlighting the ones that support their demands. Each wanted to believe, mistakenly, that international principles were adopted to protect the interests of small nations, when in fact they are formulated by big countries, they serve the interests of the big countries, and they can be used or discarded at will by them.

7. The parties ignored the fact that modern communications technologies do not allow for distinctions between words and rhetoric intended for domestic consumption and those uttered for an international audience. More often than not, each side found comfort in the populist and extremist public utterances of the other's leader to justify their lack of readiness to make concessions and to invest the necessary energy, imagination, patience and political capital on negotiations.

8. Each party to the conflict imagined that time was on its side. Each side convinced itself of the validity of its argument. The Azerbaijani side was certain time was on its side; the Armenian was sure time was not against it and that time could be made into a factor for its side.

Azerbaijan was confident time would deliver the benefits of its oil diplomacy and oil income to secure continued international support for its position and to prepare for the next war.

The Armenian side thought of the Diaspora as the equivalent resource that countered the Azerbaijan's assets. The Armenian Diaspora did nothing to disabuse Armenia and Artsakh of their illusions.

Evidently, some arguments were obviously more valid than others. Meanwhile opportunities were lost.

9. the reliance by the parties on international principles which are largely subservient to other interests, essentially to those of the international community that formulates, amends, and enforces them. On a more strategic level, Azerbaijan's insistence on the principle of territorial integrity exclusively at the expense of many other principles cannot be explained by the primacy of that principle over other

relevant principles, such as the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the right of peoples to self-determination. The 10th OSCE principle, mandates that all principles be considered as a whole when addressing conflicts. The OSCE principles matter since that is the organization that was mandated to resolve the conflict in 1992 with the support of the UN.

Thus For the most part of the post 1994 ceasefire negotiations, the parties themselves undermined the negotiations, while declaring themselves willing to achieve peace. Meanwhile Azerbaijan prepared for the second war and the Armenian side believed it could repeat its success in the first war.

D. Failures on the part of mediators and the international community

The international community, with particular reference to the mediators that were entrusted with the resolution of the conflict, have argued that it was up to the parties to agree on a solution and they did their best. The validity of this argument is limited, considering all the tools available to the mediators and the international community, tools that have been used unilaterally, as a group, or as the international community, to compel parties to come to an agreement or to impose a solution. The importance of this point becomes clearer especially when the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia, France, and the US, are three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the UN Security Council, in turn, has entrusted the resolution of the conflict to the OSCE Minsk Group.

The OSCE took upon the task of mediating the Karabakh conflict in March 1992, at a time when hopes were high that the demise of the USSR would open an era of international cooperation rather than rivalries. US president George Bush declared that a New World Order would be established, modeled after the 1991 joint action against Iraq that had invaded Kuwait. This new order would assume the end of the Cold War. It also offered a consensus on how to resolve conflicts that had arisen on the heels of the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia.

The consensus was based on the premise that the international community would recognize the independence of constituent republics of the two federations: 15 in the former USSR and six in the former Yugoslavia. All other entities, such as autonomous republics and regions within these former constituent republics would have to remain part of that republics; the international community would not recognize their independence. In return the international community would ensure that all 21 republics transitioned into a market based economic systems and democracies that respect minorities' human, cultural, and political rights and market-based economies that would ensure the economic development. The market-based economies and democratic systems would thus address any grievances minorities may have had under the former systems and the need for independence would be obviated.

The fact is, a few years after the New World Order was declared, it was obvious that:

1. The dissolution of the Soviet Union did put an end to the ideological underpinnings of the Cold War but not to the geopolitical rivalries. The dissolution of the Soviet Union had opened new areas for contention and control. The South Caucasus was one of them.

2. The newly independent republics did not uniformly move toward becoming democracies and their transition to market-based economies, to the extent that it was undertaken, did not prove to benefit all elements of society equally.

3. In 2008 the last of the fundamental premises of the consensus regarding recognition of independence of secessionist states was reneged by the West that recognized the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. The West remained oblivious to warnings from Russia and pleas of the president of Georgia that if the West actually recognized the independence of Kosovo, Russia would recognize the independence of Abkhazia and Georgia in Georgia.

There is no doubt that, despite officials to the contrary, many on the Armenian side, but certainly the Karabakh leadership, became convinced that that if it can happen to Kosovo, with hard work Karabakh's independence too can be recognized.

4. Beyond the already complex issue itself, the Karabakh conflict became a tool in the hands of the mediators to resolve their own issues.

We are faced with an interesting paradox: The Minsk Group mediators, Russia, the US and France, had conflicting interests and pursued opposing goals with regard to a variety of global and regional issues; but they achieved a rare unanimity on the basics regarding the two most important issues of the Karabakh conflict: withdrawal of Armenian forces from the seven districts accompanied by measures to provide for the security of the population of Artsakh, with the understanding that negotiations on the future status of the region would follow, with the understanding that all three accepted the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan as the dominant principle.

Yet the US and Russia often checked each other when it came to the details and practical aspects of a plan. Each wanted to make sure that any plan would maximize their interests and influence in the region and minimize those of the other. In other words, the mediators tried to resolve their own issues, beyond the Karabakh conflict itself.

The questions then became: Whose peace was it going to be: a Pax Russica or a Pax American?

The result was an ineffective mediation. It became impossible for them to bring about the equivalent of the Dayton Accords, that settled the conflict of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this case the mediator, the US used all of its influence and resources to force the parties to make concessions in order to reach an agreement. Thus in the case of Karabakh the three mediators, one superpower and two major powers, did not perform any better than any set of three other states might have since their major or super power status was not used. Each mediator was concerned that exerting pressure on one of the parties might drive that party to the other.

What we witnessed during the recent war was a repetition of that pattern. The three Minsk group Co-Chairmen tried hard to bring about an effective cease-fire. All three thought that the first order of business should be a cessation of military operations on the ground. On this, they agreed with Armenia, while Azerbaijan and Turkey disagreed.

Up until the last minute the Minsk Group mediators were declaring that there was no military solution to the conflict, when it was obvious that there was and Azerbaijan was preparing for war with the active support of Turkey. It is possible to interpret that

dissonance as sign of the Group's impotence or the fact that it had been reduced to a chat forum. And while the Minsk group mediators had agreed that in case of a resolution of the conflict peace-keepers could not be from any of the mediating countries, obviously aimed at Russia, at the end it was Russia that managed to mediate a ceasefire, working alone, and stationed its own peacekeepers in a region that has considerable geopolitical significance to them. This is not an insignificant point, because the post-war management of the situation is now a new arena for rivalry and competition.

It is possible to argue that to the extent that the success of negotiations depended on the role of the international community as played by the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, international, multi-party mediation did not contribute to the resolution of the conflict. On the contrary, it interjected international rivalries into an already complex issue. The failure of negotiations highlighted the failure of the New World Order liberal framework which the international community developed and followed subsequent to the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia.

II. What did the 2020 war resolve?
The Azerbaijani victory in the 2020 Karabakh war seems to have resolved some issues but left others unresolved, at least in the minds of some of the players.

1. The seven districts around Artsakh previously under Armenian control.
Azerbaijan has either conquered militarily or received as part of the ceasefire agreement all seven districts around Karabakh, previously under Armenian control. De facto control of lachin has been trusted by Azerbaijan to Russia, as a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh. While some on the Armenian side insist otherwise, there is no longer any doubt that these seven districts are, de jure as well, part of Azerbaijan.

2. The future status of Nagorno Karabakh or Artsakh, the central issue, and the security of Armenians there.
In addition to the seven districts, Azerbaijani forces took possession of the southern part of the Soviet era NKAO, including the city of Shushi/Shusha.

What remains of the self-proclaimed Artsakh Republic is the capital of Stepanakert and the northern sector. Here an Armenian government and its defense forces continue to function under the protection of Russian peacekeeping troops, whose mandate remains to be defined.

For Azerbaijan, the status of Karabakh is resolved: it is now de facto under control of Baku, although the Armenian controlled sector is *temporarily* assigned to the Russian peacekeepers. At some point in the future, state Azerbaijani authorities, the Russian troops will leave and Armenians will live as Azerbaijani citizens, enjoy the benefits of economic development Baku is bringing to the region, and be granted certain rights as an extraterritorial ethno/religious minority. There will also not be any need for Armenian defense forces, since Armenians, as Azerbaijani citizens and like other Azerbaijani citizens, will be protected by the forces of order of that republic.

For the leadership of the Artsakh Armenians, the future lies with some kind of association with or protectorate of Russia, while still insisting on international

recognition of their republic. The southern part of Artsakh must be reunited with the north they insist. But under no circumstances do they accept or can imagine living under Azerbaijani sovereignty and without the protection of Russian troops.

The leadership of Armenia is less clear on a number of issues and is now more inclined toward generalities, as the field of issues with Azerbaijan now includes the question of Armenia's borders with Azerbaijan. The fact is that Azerbaijan is continuing the use of its military to stake claims on border areas Armenian considers its own. Nonetheless, it has insisted that the status of Karabakh remains to be negotiated.

3. The November 10, 2020, Ceasefire Statement has raised a new issue: some kind of communication route between western Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan with a special status, also under Russian control, going through Armenia, in general projected to go through Meghri, the southernmost district of Armenia.

The Ceasefire Statement is a hybrid document: more than an agreement to cease military operations but much less than a treaty. It also has the imprint of Russian document writing: many constructive imprecise provisions and some planted time bombs that will require Russian intervention to be diffused.

III. Prospects for peace
Let us begin with some basic considerations.

The absence of war is not peace; besides, a mini-war is continuing on the yet to be determined Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Azerbaijani victory has not settled all the issues, Baku's assertions notwithstanding. Had that been the case, Azerbaijan would have ceased military operations.

Additionally, each side, Azerbaijan and Armenia, have failed to implement all the provisions of the Ceasefire Statement relevant to it, accusing the other of non-compliance and justifying its own on that basis. The uncertainties of the document have not helped.

It is also possible to argue that the 2020 war changed the character of the conflict in many ways but certainly with respect to international involvement. For all practical purposes, the conflict is now regionalized. Turkey has replaced the West, and Iran has assumed a larger presence. The West, though, is not yet ready to concede. The uncertainties and issues yet to be resolved have become the window through which the West is trying to get back into the process.

Finally, it is doubtful that Armenia can now actually play the role of guarantor of Karabakh's security.

In order to visualize the future and the prospects for long term peace, we need to consider the following factors with uncertain developments:

1. There is a fundamental discrepancy between the two sides on whether the status of Karabakh is settled or not. In addition to the opposing views discussed above, Baku has questioned whether a special status is justified for the small number of Armenians who have returned after the war. Baku insists that number is no more than 25,000; the Armenian side insists that number is at least twice that, and that is increasing every day.

2. There is a discrepancy on the future of the southern part of NKAO that is now under Azerbaijani control.

3. The mandate and rules of engagement of Russian peacekeeping troops is yet to be defined; Russia has offered to work with Azerbaijan to do so, Azerbaijan does not seem to be in a hurry.

4. The future of Russian peacekeepers itself is in uncertain; the Ceasefire Statement provides for a five-year stay, renewable for subsequent five-year intervals. Russia, and the Armenian side, would certainly want to have unending renewals. Baku has hinted that there may not be any need to do have such forces at some point. In principle all that Baku needs to do to end the Russian presence is not to renew the agreement.

5. Baku has indicated it sees no need for Karabakh Armenian defense forces. The Armenian leadership disagrees. With strict Russian and indirect Azerbaijani control over traffic through the Lachin corridor, the defense forces may have difficulty with supplies.

6. Baku has linked the release of Armenian POWs and hostages to the Armenian side willingness to provide maps for mines placed by them in the former occupied districts and possibly other expectations.

7. Azerbaijan is certain that Paragraph 9 of the Ceasefire Statement that provides a communications link between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan through Armenia means, for all practical purposes, a corridor equivalent to that of Lachin. Armenia insists that open, normal communications should satisfy the requirements of Paragraph 9.

8. A January 11, 2021, document agreed upon by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia provided for the formation of a trilateral commission that would engage in the demarcation of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. That Commission hit obstacles soon after it started its work. It is not clear under what circumstances the Commission will resume its work.

These contentious areas are related to the interpretation and application of the Ceasefire Statement and related, subsequent agreements. There are other factors that add to the increasing unpredictability of the situation.

For one thing, who will determine the future of what remains of Karabakh? As suggested above, Armenia's role has decreased tremendously; so has the role of the Karabakh leadership. The latter will depend on how and to what extent Russia may use that factor in continuing its presence. Baku had insisted that the problem of Karabakh was Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani territory and refused to have a political dialog with the Karabakh leadership. And now that it has reinstated de facto control over those lands, there is nothing to discuss. Nonetheless it still addresses Yerevan on the issue and expects Armenia to agree to its interpretation. Except for the fact that there are still Armenians in Karabakh and they do not accept Baku's position.

Then there is the role Turkey will play in the resolution of the issues, with particular reference to any conditionality Ankara may place in normalizing relations with Armenia, a goal it has said it wishes to do, " now that the Karabakh issue is resolved."

Equally important is the position of the West, especially the US and France, that were relegated to the role of observers as Russia and Turkey drove the process

immediately before, during and after the war. The US and France have argued that there are too many issues that remain unresolved and which require their expertise and contribution and that the Minsk Group format should be revived as the venue for future negotiations. While still paying lip service to the Minsk group Russia, joined by Azerbaijan and Turkey, do not seem to change the current configuration of problem solvers based on the formula of a regionalized conflict.

The first question to be asked, at this point is, which party to the conflict is capable and likely to restart a war? Armenia's capabilities are greatly diminished; they were no match to the Azerbaijani capabilities to start with. The current government of Armenia has indicated that essentially it accepts the result of the war, although it may want to negotiate some of the remaining issues. Even if the current government is, for any reason, replaced by another one that is more belligerent, more inclined to change the consequences of the defeat, it will still be unable to resort to war to do so for a long time to come, if ever. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has and will continue to have that capability.

And this last observation bring us to the second question: If the absence of war is not the same as peace, which party is likely to engage in limited or full-scale war? Currently Azerbaijan seems to be using its military advantage to push the Armenia to accept all of its interpretations and understandings by creating instability and insecurity for the Armenian side through border skirmishes and incursions.

In order for the absence of war to be transformed into genuine peace, Baku must recognize that the Armenian side has legitimate concerns that must be dealt with through negotiations based on fairness for all concerned.

Azerbaijan is now in a position to dictate its own terms regarding most of the issues that remain to be resolved by further engaging Armenia's military and depleting is remaining capabilities through constant low-level warfare or more drastic ,military action. But that will not produce peace.

Azerbaijan also cannot presume to know what is best for Armenians in Karabakh or in Armenia, and what their priorities are. The prospect of an economically prosperous Azerbaijan that will share its wealth with Armenians is not a recipe for the successful achievement of good neighborly relations. To think that Azerbaijan has resolved its problem and now will, unliterally, impose its own peace on the Armenian side is more characteristic of a conquering colonial power rather than a country that wants to build regional security and stability. Genuine peace cannot be established by the delegitimation of Armenians' concerns and replacing them with Baku's defining of what interests Armenians must have.

For the absence of war to become peace, the two parties must

1. Recognize each other's legitimate interests, fears and concerns
2. Where applicable, begin to de-essentialize and re-humanize the other party by ending the rhetoric of hatred and culture wars and move history wars into scholarly and dignified arenas
3. Move away from the reliance on victimization to advance their interests, and distinguish between catering to maximalist public opinions within their citizenry that the governments themselves have helped shape and develop constructive and diplomatic language to address issues

4. Begin discussions that would include Georgia, on long term security and foreign policy agendas common to the states of the South Caucasus.

As the party with the upper hand, much will depend on Azerbaijan which should

5. End its strategy of military operations to dictate the terms of what remains to be resolved and, instead, negotiate

6. begin a political dialog with the leadership of Armenians in Karabakh

As for the Armenian side,

7. Yerevan should, finally, adopt a clear policy, even if an ostensibly an unpopular one, of reconciling its words and actions with its ultimate goal of normalizing its relations with all its neighbors. To achieve this difficult task, Armenia must first decide not to repeat the mistakes of the past: It must assess regional and international realities and pursue what is possible rather than demanding the impossible and losing everything.

8. This also applies to the Karabakh, which should develop a second plan for the continued presence of its citizens on their ancestral lands, in case Russian protection is no longer available.

And, finally, with regard to the international community:

9. The West should limit its geostrategic re-entry in the region in areas where it can contribute to ongoing discussions and negotiations rather than attempt to reassume the level of responsibility it had for them prior to the 2020 war. This could be done by distinguishing between policies aimed at securing their own interests over the interests of the peoples of the region.

10. Major regional powers too, must not equate their interests with those of the peoples of the region.

These are some policy consideration that might give the South Caucasus a chance to come out of its long nightmare. The alternative is not necessarily a return to full scale war, although that cannot be precluded; rather, it is continued low level military operations that will certainly intensify animosity, hatred and hopelessness. Regional and state level politics in the republics will be more deeply securitized, a situation that will have a negative impact on all other aspects of social, political, and even economic development.

Conclusion and discussion

A comparative analysis of the strategy of diplomatic negotiations around Nagorno-Karabakh shows that in the context of globalization, modern international relations go beyond the framework of a purely regional problem and acquire a global character. Obviously, by the beginning of the 21st century, international organizations faced the global dilemma of unrecognized states.

The situation 'war won - negotiations lost' and the main factors largely confirm the idea that the global realities that have developed in the South Caucasus have been ignored. At the same time, it must be recognized that the security of Nagorno-Karabakh and its people is deprived of solid foundations as long as the entire range of

Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish relations remains unsettled, of which the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an integral part.

The situation 'the absence of war is the same as peace' led to the fact that the settlement of the conflict with seemed not only impossible, but even expedient. At that time, despite the complexity and apparent insolubility of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the settlement of the conflict before the Second Karabakh War in 2020 seemed possible.

The formation of common interests on security issues is one of the most important components of the system of regional security and cooperation in post-war Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Such a system in the South Caucasus can expect to be effective if it is truly comprehensive, based on taking into account the interests of geopolitical actors. At the same time, the formation of a regional security architecture is possible only through regional cooperation.

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INFLUENCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROTECTOR STATE AND REGIONAL HEGEMON ON THE RESILIENCE OF A NON-RECOGNISED STATE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR AND NON-PEACE

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Abstract

This article examines the factors of influence of relations between the protector state and the regional hegemon in terms of the resilience of the unrecognized state. The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the lessons learned from the Nagorno-Karabakh war and non-peace.

Since the end of the Second World War new states have repeatedly emerged, secessions have occurred, and with them new conflicts. While some non-recognised states enjoy higher stability, others have great struggles in order to survive. Most of the literature focuses on the non-recognised states themselves and domestic factor, thus neglecting the role of global players as the regional hegemonn. The main objective of this paper is to find out whether hegemons (through the protector states) have an influence on the stability of the non-recognised states. A second alternative explanation emphasises the importance of the internal legitimacy of non-recognised states. Using the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, the study attempts to answer these questions through a qualitative analysis. The analysis of Armenia's foreign policy between 1991-1992 and 2020 and the resilience around Nagorno-Karabakh is the core of the empirical part.

The results suggest that indeed relations between the hegemon and the protector state have an effect on the stability of the non-recognised state. A connection between the internal legitimacy of the non-recognised state and stability, on the other hand, cannot be concluded from the work. Despite the analytical function, the paper gives a good overview on the stability of non-recognised states, security policy and some of the post-communist conflicts.

Keywords: protector state, regional hegemon, non-recognised states, stability, resilience, security policy, Nagorno-Karabakh war, Nagorno-Karabakh peace, Armenia.

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Introduction

On February 21, 2008, as cheering crowds celebrate independence in Pristina, chants of 'God Bless America' and American flags can be seen as angry Serbian demonstrators storm the USA Embassy chanting 'Stop the USA terror'. Two worlds that could not disagree more on the Kosovo issue do agree on one thing: without the role of the USA, Kosovo's declaration of independence would either not happen at all or it would be much more difficult (Mohammed 2022a, 47-81; Mohammed 2022b, 83-111; Ejdus 2020a, 7-37; Ejdus 2020b, 97-125).

Nevertheless, the political debate is more difficult. Thirteen years after the declaration of independence, Kosovo is still one of the few partially-recognised states that has achieved comparative success in the independence process. While some would argue, that domestic political factors, norms and international institutions have played the major role in this process, others would lie the focus on power politics (Radoman, 2021, 25-48).

The debate around the process of becoming independent and the stability of non-recognised states is not only young within political science, but also particularly difficult. In many debates – no matter if based on liberal or realist assumptions – the focuse lies on the non-recognised states themselves underestimating the role of the protector states and hegemons.

Yet the issue of Kosovo and the role of the USA is not an isolated issue, as there is much more at stake here. In my opinion, it is important to deal ourselves with the topic of non-recognised states not least because after the collapse of the Soviet Union the number of non- or partially recognized states has increased rapidly. About a dozen of non- or partially recognised de facto states are struggling for their survival. It is about the role of hegemons, great powers in regional politics in the broader sense, and about the stability of non-recognised states in particular. To rephrase it: Why are some de facto states more successful in the secession process and more stable than others, and what role do the hegemons play in this?

I believe one of the major factors, if not the most important one determining the stability of a non-recognised state is power politics and the shift in balance of power. Without neglecting or underestimating the domestic factors, the role of institutions in this issue, I argue that only militarily influential players can guarantee the stability of and shift the power in favor of the de facto state through the protector state. The relations between the hegemon and the protector of the non-recognised state in turn have a direct influence on stability. I argue that good relations between the hegemon and the protector of the non-recognised state should lead to more stability. In contrary, deteriorating relations should make (military) incidents more likely to happen. Thus, the varying changes in stability of the non-recognised state can be explained by varying relations between the hegemon and the protector. Power politics, the perspective of neorealism remain among the essential theories to explain conflicts, their outbreak or the non-occurrence of these wars and thus can give us a plausible answers.

Besides my neorealist explanation, I am going to take into account a second alternative argument, focusing on internal factors. One of the prominent arguments underlines the importance of the internal legitimacy/democratisation of the non-

recognised states. Not least we witness non-recognised states with more improved democracy standards and higher internal legitimacy than their parent states. The proponents of this – I would say more liberal-dominated – approach would thus argue, that higher internal legitimacy and democratisation standards should lead to a higher stability.

Using the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia the study attempts to answer these questions through a qualitative analysis. Qualitative methods give us the possibility to take into account contextual circumstances, the historical background and agreements and are characterised by greater flexibility than quantitative methods. The partly greater openness and flexibility brings the advantage of deepening, but the disadvantage of interpretivism.

The analysis of Armenia's and Albania's foreign policy from 1991-1992 to 2020 and the stability as well as the internal legitimacy around Nagorno-Karabakh/Kosovo in the same period will be the core of the empirical part. For the purpose of more variation and deeper analysis, I divide the Nagorno-Karabakh case into four time periods. In order to measure my main variables – relationship between the hegemon and the protector state, stability and internal legitimacy – many indicators ranging from agreements, cooperation, negotiations to political stability, military clashes and referendums are to be examined.

Despite the analytical function, the article gives a good overview on the stability of non-recognised states, security policy and some of the post-communist conflicts. The empirical analyses and the results support are in line with the main argument, namely the effect of the relationship between the hegemon and the protector state on the stability of the non-recognised state. More concrete, indeed both the relations between Armenia and Russia have had an impact on stability in Nagorno-Karabakh, and those between Albania and the USA on Kosovo. Jumping back to the debate on the USA role in the Kosovo conflict, I can state, that USA played a crucial role both in the stability and independence process. And having a look on the low stability of Nagorno-Karabakh (especially since 2020), I can state that the tensed relations between Armenia and Russia were one of the major factors for such an outcome. While the main argument is supported by our findings, the results do not support the alternative explanation: A connection between the internal legitimacy of the non-recognised state and stability, on the other hand, cannot be concluded from the article.

The results show that power politics and neorealist arguments provide a good explanatory basis for the stability (and subsequently independence) of non- or partially-recognised states. They also show that in cases of conflict, which is what we are dealing with in secessions, domestic factors, on the other hand, offer a weak explanation (if at all). Moreover, I am going to discuss why hegemons are at all interested in non-recognised states and how those states are instrumentalised for power politics. In the second step I am going to provide a theoretical fundament based on the neorealist theory in the first place and alternative theories emphasising the role of domestic actors.

Dimensions of political analysis and policy analysis

The issue of non-recognised states is a very complex and multifaceted topic in both international politics and science. The literature, which has only gained in popularity in recent years, deals with many questions in this context. The controversial nature of the topicis evident in the mere fact that there are no concrete terms for 'non-recognised states' and/or there is no consensual definition for these territorial units/'states'. This is related not only to science per se, but also to the social and political environment in which science finds itself. The following is intended to provide an overview of current research.

Why do secessions happen and what are the consequences?

One of the basic questions in the context of non-recognised states should be why territorial subjects break away in the first place, why this happens and what costs secessions entail. Non-recognised states basically emerge through wars of secession, whereby they seek to break away from the parent state. Those states that do not resolve themselves peacefully through wars, but through referendums, are usually recognised internationally as a result. Apart from this, we know of only a few cases of peaceful secessions or state separations in modern history in Europe - specifically Czechoslovakia on the one hand and Serbia and Montenegro on the other.

Much more exciting for us and the literature in general are the non-recognised states. The dilemma of non-recognised states is often that while they are militarily strong enough to be de facto released from the parent state either through their own resources or protectors, they are too weak to seek legal recognition from the parent state. The parent/mother state is that state, to which the non-recognised state de jure belongs. In case of Transnistria the 'mother state' would be Moldova, in case of South Ossetia or Abkhazia the 'mother state' would be Georgia, and in case of Nagorno-Karabakh would be Azerbaijan.

In the literature or political science itself, non-recognised states have for a long time been regarded either as statuses of transition or as the failure of recognition. However, Buzard et al argue that non-recognised states are per se a result of a 'form of state' and can exist over a longer period of time. Thus, non-recognised states can be kept alive over a longer period oftime despite high costs and the need for resources, for example with the help of protectors and international organisations (Buzard, Graham, and Horne 2017, 579). The protector state is the state backing the non-recognised state. In the most cases the protector state is whether a hegemon as in case of Russia (on Transnistria, Luhansk, Donezk, South Ossetia, Abkhazia) or a state that is ethnically connected to the non-recognised states as in case of Armenia (on Nagorno-Karabakh) or to some extent Albania (on Kosovo). It should be borne in mind, however, that the parent states also bear high costs if the conflict is not resolved. However, these costs are not nearly as high as the costs of the non- recognised state. For the parent states, it is often a challenge to control their own state borders due to territorial conflicts and to apply sanctions against the non-recognised state inorder to avoid precedents (Buzard, Graham, and Horne 2017, 580).

Why non-recognised states are not recognised?

Before talking about the non-recognition, we have to state, that non-recognised states in many respects fulfil the same functions as recognised states: This is especially true of foreign policy. Non-recognised states also have a foreign policy, whereby the highest and permanent goal of such states is the recognition issue. Non-recognition, and with it the almost non-existent access to international organisations, poses great challenges to non-recognised states (Kopeček 2017; Jakša 2017, 35-40; Caspersen 2017).

The reason why non-recognised states are not recognised has less to do with the functioning of the states per se than with the global political situation. More precisely, it is a deadlock when it comes to the recognition of new states. The difficulty lies not least in the fact that more than 190 states have already established themselves and are taking a negative stance towards new states out of fear of motivating secessions in their own countries. The countries of the Soviet Union and the original policy of the Soviet leadership have pre-programmed these problem areas – often for tactical reasons (Riegl and Doboš 2017; Iskandaryan 2015).

Generally speaking, the question recognition of non-recognised states can be approached from two perspectives: From the legal and from the political perspective. The political perspective focuses on numerous domestic mechanisms by which non-recognised states survive, but also on the strategies of the 'parent states' to prevent recognition. Non-recognised states may be fully functional and meet all the criteria of a state, but they may still not be recognised. In other ways, states may be recognised, but they may not fulfil all the criteria of a functioning state. Here, one can take the example of Somalia, which is recognised but is considered a failed state, and Somaliland, which is not recognised but is more functional.

In some cases, the non-recognised states are institutionally and democratically even better developed and more stable than their parent states. Among other things, this has to do with the fact that the non-recognised states develop more stable and democratic structures despite and because of their isolation and internal legitimacy (Laoutides 2014; Tataryn and Ertürk 2021). That is manifested on the one hand in the example of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is classified as partly free by the Freedom House Index, and Azerbaijan, which is classified as not free.

We should not forget that basically many of today's recognised states themselves broke away from other states or were unrecognised at a certain point in time. Many of the examples also point directly to European countries - from the successor states of the Habsburg Monarchy and Czechoslovakia to the new states from the Balkans. For this reason, there are two ways of thinking about the status of non-recognised states: One approach considers non-recognised states to be a phenomenon, an exceptional case, while the other perspective perceives temporary non-recognition as part of the state development process (Jeifets and Dobronravin 2020; Iskandaryan 2015, 211; Chechi 2017).

Parts of the literature make concrete assumptions. Buzard et al addresses the main assumptions of the recent literature: First, the status quo of non-recognised countries is something that economic and political elites benefit from. Second, secessionists have enough military capacity to make reconquest, while not impossible, costly - to this

end, secessionists often receive support from foreign actors. And last but not least, the governments of non-recognised states are at least partially legitimate - through intra-state civic participation processes (Buzard, Graham, and Horne 2017, 583).

The approach that non-recognition per se can be seen as a separate outcome and is not an intermediate stage is supported in some literature by several arguments: On the one hand, it is said to be a question of resources, which neither allows for a reconquest of the non- recognised country, but at the same time also makes recognition impossible. This is roughly how the more recent examples of Ukraine are discussed. The areas around Donetsk and Luhansk, for example, could retain their de facto status as a long-term solution because, on the one hand, they are supported by Russia, but at the same time a direct confrontation with the West would be too costly. On the other hand, the Ukrainian side could provoke a possible annexation by Russia through a planned reconquest. In other words: Due to a kind of balance of terror, a solidification of the de facto states occurs. The protectors are also willing to support the status quo through various forms of assistance. If this support by the protector falls away, a military reconquest of the non-recognised state is a possible outcome. Another alternative to solving the problem lies in the international community.

Whether and how a conflict is resolved depends on whether the international community 1) has the will to do so, and 2) whether it is in the interest of the individual states. While this statement does not assume that a de jure achievement of independence is undesirable, but rather that the states, including the non-recognised state itself, partially accept a stable de facto independence in the long run. Nevertheless, I would like to point out one important circumstance: It may be that in those cases where the protector is the hegemon, accepting the de facto status also makes sense for security policy reasons. If, on the other hand, we look at those non-recognised states whose protectors are weaker, a proactive pursuit of independence status should be realistic, since in such cases de jure recognition is one of the few security guarantees.

Non-recognised states as geopolitical chump change

Non-recognised states are also an important instrument for global and regional hegemons to consolidate their position of power. The (regional) hegemon is that power, which is militarily, politically and to some extent financially by far stronger than all the actors in the region are. Due to the fact, one could argue that we live in a multipolar world without a clear hegemon, I would define regional hegemons rather than global. The regional hegemon in the Caucasus region and post-Soviet region is the Russian Federation.

The cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia), Transnistria (Moldova) and Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia/Azerbaijan) are three prominent examples how non-recognised states are used as an instrument by hegemons. This instrument is primarily - but not only - used by the Russian Federation as a means of exerting pressure to better control its immediate sphere of influence. Three main political tools are used here: Russia has consolidated its influence in these two non-recognised states through

the deployment of peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and its military presence on the ground has given it leverage over Georgia (Souleimanov, Abrahamyan and Aliyev 2018, 77-79).

A further instrument is the so-called passportization of the population: citizens of the non-recognised states can obtain Russian citizenship through facilitated conditions. As a result, Russia can argue on an international level that the majority of Russian citizens live in these areas and feel obliged to ensure their protection. This brings us to the third point: protecting the Russian population abroad is part of Russia's foreign policy doctrine. The argument also enjoys a certain legitimacy under international law and international law (Souleimanov, Abrahamyan and Aliyev 2018, 80-82).

Non-recognised states and the international community

Another circumstance follows from the fact that, on the one hand, there are states that enjoy greater recognition but are exposed to a perpetual existential crisis, while other states, which have been recognised by very few states, enjoy greater stability. The example of Israel on the one hand and the two partially recognised states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are good examples of this assumption.

The 'parent states' try to present the often more stable non-recognised states as an international, regional risk that needs to be combated (Irujo 2023; Heritage and Lee 2020). When it comes to the viability of the non-recognised state, the dependence on the protector, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, Armenia, is quite evident. By becoming dependent on or linked to the 'protector', non-recognised states avoid international isolation and can thus gain greater international acceptance. Another aspect is the fact that in some cases the non-recognised states are more democratic and stable than their 'parent states'. This is not least due to the fact that the non-recognised states develop more stable and democratic structures despite and because of their isolation, also because of their internal legitimacy (Caspersen 2012, 353; Freizer 2017). This is expressed on the one hand by the example of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is classified as partially free by the Freedom House Index, and Azerbaijan, which is classified as not free. Another example is Somaliland and Somalia.

Although non-recognized or only partially recognized states are not directly recognized by the international community, there are interactions between non-recognized states and international actors and organizations. Non-recognition is not an ultimate obstacle to 'intergovernmental' relations. In this context, the examples around Israel come to mind - Israel is not recognised by a number of Arab states, but de facto these states have relations with the State of Israel. One could argue in a similar way in the case of Taiwan - although it is not recognised by many states, these states have other forms of relations with Taiwan.

The role of foreign influence

Although domestic political factors and the focus on the non-recognised state dominate in the literature, there are some remarkable papers on the foreign policy, international role of both the non-recognised state itself, the 'parent country' and the 'protector country', and the international community. Thus, the protector plays an important role for the unrecognised state. In many cases, the 'patronage' countries provide political, financial and military support to the non-recognised state in order to maintain the status quo (Ó Beacháin, Comai and Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili 2016, 447-448; Krüger 2010). If one assumes a large and strong protector, such as 'Russia', the probability is high that de facto independence will be consolidated. However, if there is no protecting power for the non-recognised state, the probability is higher that the 'mother country' will 'reintegrate' the territories through military intervention.

The gap between humanism and legitimacy: the phenomenon of non-recognition

The phenomenon of non-recognised states, which has been present since the Second World War, has occupied political science for several years. To sum up, we can say that a large part of the focus is on the non-recognised states per se or the domestic political processes of these states. Political science attempts to examine domestic political aspects and strategies, but also to compare non-recognised states with recognised ones. The aspect of international politics is the second - in my view less dominant - aspect of the research area on non-recognised states. In this sub-area, too, attention is directed either at non-recognised states and the relationship to the 'mother country' per se, or focuses on major powers.

In my view, a smaller focus (yes, there is, nevertheless) is on the protector countries on the one hand and various international actors directly involved in the conflict, including international organisations and regional powers. We have to distinguish between cases, where the protector state is a regional or global hegemon and in those cases where the protector is much weaker. We should take into account the strength of the protector state and it makes more sense to focus on those non-recognised states with 'weak protector' states. Only in those cases it will make sense and possible to test the effect of the relationship between the protector and the hegemon on the stability of the non-recognised states. After we found our gap, we can formulate the following research question: *What influence does the relationship between the 'protector' state and the regional hegemon have on the stability of non-recognised state?*

In the theoretical part, a common thread for the work is to be developed. This includes, among other things, the elaboration of theories of international politics, which are primarily applied in this work. It is important to work out a bundle of factors whose influence will be analysed in more detail in the empirical part. In this context, two questions in particular arise: *How can the survivability and international policy of non-recognised states be explained? What role does contact with the protecting power play in this? How can weak (protector) states per se survive?*

Unrecognised states: The support from abroad

Although the non-recognised states have a foreign policy as well as the recognised states, the highest priority is given to two issues: The question of recognition and the question of survival. According to neorealism, the question of survival is the guiding principle for states and accordingly applies in principle to all states. Nevertheless, the question of survival plays a heightened role for non-recognised states, as they are usually small, weak and cut off from the international system (Tancredi 2018; Muhindo and Calenzo 2011, 149). In this context, non-recognised states - as already mentioned in the literature - are dependent on the protector. The protector usually guarantees the security of the non-recognised state - in military, financial as well as political matters. For instance, the residents of the non-recognised states are granted citizenship of the protector state so that they can travel freely (Ó Beacháin, Comai and Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili 2016, 444). More important for our work, however, is the security policy aspect.

The intensity of the non-recognised state's contacts depends on various factors, including and above all its geographical location. A look at the partially recognised states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia underlines that without a protector, these states will have a hard time surviving in the long run. The Russian Federation has considered itself a protector of these territories only since the 2000s, and increasingly so only since 2008. Before that, Russia even imposed an embargo on the non-recognised state of Abkhazia between 1994 and 1999, partly because of fears of separatism in its own country (Ó Beacháin, Comai and Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili 2016, 448). In fact, without a protecting power, Abkhazia was initially dependent on itself and international organisations, which drastically complicated the survival of the young partially recognised state. Only with Russia as a protecting power did the situation stabilise for Abkhazia.

Relations between the protector state and the non-recognised state can be loose, strong, or there can even be a process of integration into the protector state. On the one hand, this may be for security reasons, as in the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, or in addition to security reasons, for identity reasons, as in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh with reference to Armenia. Factors such as a weak diaspora, demographic problems can be a contributory reason for greater rapprochement or even integration into the protector state (Ó Beacháin, Comai and Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili 2016, 449-450). But here, too, it is important to distinguish between non-recognised states, which are all constituted differently in terms of ethnicity than their protector state and do not have a large diaspora, and non-recognised states, which are predominantly similar in ethnicity as their protector state and have a large diaspora, on the other side. After all, the diaspora is another instrument used by the non-recognised states to avoid international isolation. The diaspora often functions not only as a voice on the international stage, but also as a financial source.

Neorealism: How small states survive within the international system

While we first noted that the relationship between the non-recognised states and the protector states is important for the survivability of the non-recognised state, we are now concerned with the protector states per se. While in the case of hegemons like Russia, the question of their own security and survival is not superficial because of their military, political and financial strength, the situation is different for small states.

The theory of neorealism assumes that states coexist in an anarchic system and have to fight for their survival due to the lack of mutual trust. However, while classical realism focuses on wars as a result of human striving for power, neorealism focuses on the survival of the state. Neorealism assumes that states, for reasons of their own security and existence, tend to maximise their (military) power or ensure a balance of power (Mearsheimer 2001, 30-31).

Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism is often countered with the criticism that neorealism describes the actions of large players well, but does not do well enough in describing the behaviour of small states. This is because small and weak states are not always in a position to expand their power to such an extent as to fully secure their own survival. Therefore, if we assume that the protector state is not a hegemon but a small state, it is particularly important for the state to create a balance of power - for example through alliances, through stronger diplomatic relations with the important (regional) players. Alliances and blocs of political power are important in international politics in order to be able to protect against common threats (Mearsheimer 2001, 33). In the process, small states in particular benefit from larger ones and thus place themselves in a security policy dependency. If one takes a look at the NATO countries, the Eastern European and Baltic states, in particular, benefit because of the threat from Russia from the NATO alliance, and especially from the good relations with the United States. In turn, good relations between the regional hegemon and the protector state make the status of the non-recognised state more stable. Thus, we can formulate the following hypothesis: *H1: The stronger the relations between the protector state and the (regional) hegemon, the more stable the status of the non-recognised state.*

But if we take up the main argument of striving for power or military strength in addition to the argument of alliance-building, we can draw a second explanation from this: Namely, the relative strength of the protector compared to the parent-state. Even small states whose security is under threat do not rely purely on alliances, but seek to expand their military power. A militarily and financially strong protector state makes it quite unattractive for the parent state to invade the unrecognised states due to the high costs. Thus, we are going to take into account the military and financially status of the protector state in comparison to the parent state.

Another aspect we are going to include into our analyses – is the relationship between the protector state and the neighbourhood. Despite the dominance of the neorealist theory regarding the security of states, the theory was criticised by various scholar and alternative explanations have emerged. As mentioned before, neorealism is partly challenged in terms of small states. A study on Sub-Saharan Africa states, that constructivist views and the internal structure may play a more important role when it comes to the behaviour of small and weak states. However, one should distinguish

between small/weak states located in a friendly neighbourhood and small/weak states surrounded by rivals.

Alternative Explanation: Internal legitimacy

While we have focused on external factors in the first to hypotheses, there are also some arguments for domestic factors. In many cases, the non-recognised states may not enjoy external legitimacy by the international community, but the internal legitimacy might be very high. Moreover, in some cases the non-recognised states have a higher internal political stability, legitimacy, transparency and democracy than the parent-state. As discussed in the literature part, the non-recognition is not an obstacle when it comes to the democratisation process. In contrary, due to the isolation, non-recognised states try to strengthen their internal legitimacy.

One could argue that internal legitimacy might also lead to some extent to a higher external acceptance and thus a more stable status of the non-recognised state. Thus, we can formulate the following alternative hypothesis: *H2: The higher the internal legitimacy of a non-recognised state, the more stable thestatus of the state.*

Research method

In this article, first of all, it concerns the influence of the diplomatic relations of the protector state on the stability of the non-recognised state. Due to the small number of cases, it makes sense to use a case study approach and to divide the cases into different time periods for the purpose of variation (Campbell and Gabriele 2022; Ruhe, Schneider and Spilker 2022, 1-12). Non-recognised states are seen, on the one hand,as a phenomenon and, on the other, as a natural process in the formation of a state. The reasoning behind the case selection is explored in the following section. The nature of the small n/case study based on the Most Similar System Design, the topic and the research question make it possible to work on the basis of qualitative methods and to look at the cases more deeply. Moreover, while on the one hand it is not a completely new topic, as there are already studies and some literature on non-recognised states, it is a deepening and a niche. More precisely, the focus is not on the domestic structure as usual, or on the parent state, but on the protector state. The qualitative research method makes it possible to go much deeper and describe individual contexts in more detail - for example by analysing contracts, statements between the protector and other players. Qualitative methods are characterised by non-standardised or only partially standardised data as well as greater flexibility than quantitative methods. The partly greater openness and flexibility brings the advantage of deepening, but the disadvantage of interpretivism.

Contextualisation comes more to the fore, subjective evaluation becomes necessary. This disadvantage of partial loss of objectivity (due to interpretivism) is countered by the advantage that qualitative methods do not only rely on numbers, but the underlying background. This is particularly important in a subject area where inter-state relations are atstake. Although interstate relations and factors such as stability can

also be determined quantitatively (e.g. through trade volume, number of treaties, etc.), these indicators are too superficial and greater depth is needed in our example. It should be mentioned that qualitative methods are not exclusively used. For example, in terms of *external stability* (Y), and *internal legitimacy* (X2), it makes sense to use partially standardised data for the sake of better comparability and to supplement this with additional qualitative information.

Protector states

After defining the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo, we have to identify the protector states of the non-recognised state because we are going to measure the relations between the protector states and the regional hegemon. Armenia, which mostly consists of Armenians is the de facto protector state of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both entities/states are sharing the same major ethnicity, language and culture. When it comes to Kosovo, I consider Albania being the protector state of Kosovo. Both Albania and Kosovo share the same language, major ethnicity and culture. It should be also underlined, that not only Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo are similar to eachother, but also their protector states. Both states share have insofar the same area, population and GDP[1]. Both states have a communist past and they are considered parliamentary republics. The similarities of both states in most of the characteristics makes the cases ideal for our Most Similar System Design approach.

Time periods for research

Once the states have been selected, time periods are established, allowing for temporal variance to be created. The general time frame for Armenia is between 1991 and 2020, with four temporal sections being useful: 1991 to 1998, 1998 to 2008, 2008 to 2018 and 2018 to 2020. The time frame for Albania ranges from 1992 to 2020 with four temporal sections: 1992 to 1999, 1999 to 2008, 2008 to 2013 and 2013 to 2020 (see Table 1). Due to historical events it is impossible to divide the temporal sections of Armenia/Karabakh and Albania/Kosovo into the same periods.

Table 1. General time frames

Armenia/Karabakh 1991-1998	Albania/Kosovo 1992-1999
Armenia/Karabakh 1998-2008	Albania/Kosovo 1999-2008
Armenia/Karabakh 2008-2018	Albania/Kosovo 2008-2013
Armenia/Karabakh 2018-2020	Albania/Kosovo 2013-2020

In terms of Armenia, the division into these time periods follows the terms of the three presidents from 1991 to 2018 and the prime minister since 2018 (due to a

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[1] The World Bank Group. 2023. "Armenia: overview." Accessed January 17, 2023. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/armenia/overview; The World Bank Group. 2023. "Albania: overview." Accessed January 17, 2023. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/albania/overview.

Constitutional reform, political power has been unified to the prime minister since 2018) (see Table 1):

- The period from 1991 to 1998 marks the presidency of the first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan: This period was marked first and foremost by the armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the years of economic challenges. 1994 also marks the ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan and the de facto establishment of the non-recognised state of Nagorno-Karabakh.
- The second and third periods, from 1998 to 2008 and 2008 to 2018, mark the terms of office of Presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. With reference to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, this period can be described as a more or less stable timeuntil 2016. However, this period also includes increased autocratic tendencies and regression in terms of democracy.
- The last period between 2018 and 2020 is very different from the second and third periods and can be seen as a turning point in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. In the course of the Velvet Revolution of 2018 and the constitutional changes, there was a strong democratisation process, a fight against corruption and, in terms of foreign policy, an intensified orientation towards the West.

Regarding Albania, the time division marks on the one side the beginning of the independence movement (1992), the ending of the Kosovo war (1999), the Declaration of Independence (2008) and the last office change of the prime minister (2013) (see Table 1):

- One main difference between Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo is the starting point of the wars and the independence. However, 1992 marks an important point for Kosovo and Albania – namely a secessionist referendum in Kosovo, which was not recognisedby any other country.
- The second period between 1999 and 2008 marks to important events: On the one side, the end of the Kosovo war and the declaration of independence. Furthermore,in 2009 the protector state of Kosovo, Albania became a member of NATO.
- The last two periods between 2008 and 2013 on the one side and 2013 and 2020 on the other side mark a change of the prime minister. While Sali Berisha from the conservative party was the prime minister until 2013, the Socialist Edi Arama won theelections in 2013.

Although the separation of the time periods is not ideal, it is important to find a balance: Onthe one side, the time periods between both cases should if possible have a similar range. However, on the same time the time periods should also mark important events or a changeof the government.

Operationalization for research

Operationalization should make the defined variables concrete, i.e. translate them into indicators.

X1: Relations of the protector state with international actors.

The independent, the explanatory variable is the relations of the protector state with international actors. In a qualitative study, the relations, individual actions between the protector state and international actors, specifically states in the neighbourhood, hegemon and important international organisations, are to be examined and compared over a longer period of time.

How can the actions or relations be put into concrete terms?

In concrete terms, *agreements, cooperation, (financial, military) support, negotiations* between the protector state and the above-mentioned actors are to be examined. Since this is a qualitative work, the actions and relations can be examined in greater depth. The primary sources, such as agreements or the official sites of the individual states or organisations can be used for this.

X2: Internal legitimacy of the non-recognised state.

The third, alternative explanatory variable relates to the internal legitimacy of states. In order to better define and measure internal legitimacy, we will limit ourselves to the following factors: The *standards of democracy*, if possible *referendums on independence, popular trust in the government* and possible ongoing *surveys on the status of independence.*

Y: Stability of the non-recognised state.

The dependent variable to be explained is the stability or status of the non-recognised state. This should not be a dichotomous measurement in the sense of the status under international law (recognised, non-recognised). Rather, stability refers to a number of factors. According to the literature, non-recognised states also maintain relations and trade relations with some countries.

How can stability be measured in concrete terms?

In concrete terms, military stability in the border area between the non-recognised state and the parent state, (trade) relations, cooperation with other states, political (provocative) statements by the parent state and political stability should be taken into account. Besides our two independent variables there are two more aspects we should at least take into account in our qualitative analyses. Factors which could somehow influence our main independent variable. More specifically, military and financial strength of the protector state on the one side and the relations with the neighbouring countries. The data on military strength are based on international rankings, the *GDP of the country* on the one hand, *military expenditure* and the *military ranking* on the other.

Empirical approach

In the empirical part, a systematic approach is necessary: since we are dealing with two states, we are going to increase our case number by separation. Thus, we are able not only to compare the two states with each other but also the time periods with each other. Due to the division into four different time periods of two similar states, many factors remain the same, but there is nevertheless a variance in terms of diplomatic conditions or internal legitimacy. This enables us to compare periods in which diplomatic relations between the protector and the regional hegemon were better with other periods in which these relations were worse (or vice versa). For this purpose,

contracts, agreements, cooperation, (financial) aid and statements by the actors will be used.

For the second hypothesis, the internal legitimacy of the non-recognised state itself is used as a factor and also here the individual time periods are compared with each other.

Finally yet importantly I am going to analyse the stability of the non-recognised state during the whole period (Y). After doing so, it will be possible to measure the effect of the relations between the protector state (Armenia, Albania) and the hegemon on the stability of the non- or partially recognised state (Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo).

The regional hegemon and the neighbouring states

As mentioned before, the regional hegemon - not least because of the region's history - is Russia. Russia is a relevant military, political and financial power in the post-Soviet space. Especially the Caucasus is seen by Russia as part of its sphere of influence, also due to its history. Past military conflicts between Turkey, Russia and Iran underline the interests of the larger players. As will become clear later in the detailed analysis, Turkey's presence in the Caucasus has been growing stronger, especially in recent years - partly due to its excellent relations with Azerbaijan. After the regional hegemon has been classified - namely Russia - the relationship between the protector, i.e. Armenia, and the hegemon is analysed in detail. Before that, however, a brief overview of Armenia's relations with neighbouring states should be given. Relations with neighbouring states, namely Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia and Iran, are of course not to be neglected and play an important role in the stability question of the region as a whole and Nagorno-Karabakh in particular.

First of all, it should be mentioned that de facto and de jure relations with two of the four neighbouring states are almost non-existent. Armenia has no diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the one hand, Armenia sees itself as a protector of Nagorno-Karabakh, while Azerbaijan sees it as a threat to its own territorial integrity. The domestic political climate towards the respective other country continues to inflame the entire situation. Especially since Ilham Aliyev came to power, heightened war rhetoric and anti-Armenian resentment have become the order of the day. The USA Department of Justice warned in a report of cultural genocide and discrimination. The Guardian published a report highlighting the destruction of dozens of Armenian churches, thousands of tombs and other cultural assets (Sawa 2019).

Relations with the western neighbouring state of Turkey are similarly complicated. There are no diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, the borders are closed. This is due to a number of historical, but also geopolitical reasons. The Armenian genocide, which Turkey (the successor state of the Ottoman Empire) still does not recognise today, is a major contributory reason for this development (Libaridian 2022; Linstroth 2022; Mollica and Hakobyan 2021). Furthermore, Turkey and Azerbaijan see themselves as related nations in two different states (Galip 2020). Both states support each other in the conflicts around Nagorno-Karabakh or, for example,

Northern Cyprus. Past attempts to establish diplomatic relations and open borders have failed (Avdaliani 2022; Davidzon 2022; Schrodt 2014).

The relationship with the northern neighbouring state of Georgia plays an important role for Armenia. Georgia is an important transport artery with access to the sea for landlocked Armenia. Relations between the two states are very changeable. The reason for this is the regional alliances of convenience of both countries. Armenia maintains relatively good relations with Russia, which in turn is in open conflict with Georgia. Georgia, in turn, is strengthening its relations with the neighbouring states of Azerbaijan and Turkey - for example, through joint train routes and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey.This is partly due to economic policy considerations, but also to escape regional isolation (Maass 2019; Ditel 2023). The different alliances of convenience in the region are an obstacle to relations between Armenia and Georgia, and therefore, from my point of view, the relations could be described as pragmatic and based on neutrality. Furthermore, Georgia would not support Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh, simply because of its own problems with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Limiting the alliances to religious or cultural factors, loosely based on Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations", would be wrong and does not apply in this way (Huntington 1993, 1997). Iran, which like Azerbaijan is Shiite, has the best relationship with its neighbour Armenia. This can be attributed to several factors. On the one hand, Azerbaijan maintains very good diplomatic relations with Israel and good ones with the USA. Turkish membership in the Western Alliance is also a major concern for Iran. In addition, Iran has a large Azerbaijani minority in its own country. These are some of the reasons why Iran tends to be pro-Armenian or pragmatic. While in earlier years (for example, in the first Karabakh war) Iran's pro-Armenian position was clearer, today it is somewhat blurred due to political considerations (Poghosyan 2022). Nevertheless, in relative terms, Armenia maintains the closest economic, security policycontacts with Iran compared to other neighbouring states.

Dynamic relationship between Armenia and the regional hegemon from 1991 to 1998

Armenia's foreign policy between 1991 and 1998 was shaped by the first president of the independent republic, Levon Ter-Petrossian. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was decisive forthe foreign policy orientation during this period, but especially for the time between 1991 and 1994. It should be mentioned that the doctrine of Armenian foreign policy in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union was survival in the region and security guarantees, especially in view of the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh. The fundamental considerationof any foreign policy action for this period was to guarantee the security of the young state in a not very well-meaning environment. In view of the war between 1991 and 1994 and the fragile state of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, statehood, including national defence and foreign policy, had to be completely reorganised.

Above all, it should not be forgotten that many Armenian but also Azerbaijani officers were primarily Soviet officers before 1991 and that some of them took up service in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Armenia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as early as 1992. The CIS is considered a loose successor organisation in the post-Soviet space, primarily dominated by Russia. By joining the CIS, Armenia cemented its pro-Russian orientation for the first time. Many Soviet officers of Armenian descent then volunteered for the Nagorno-Karabakh war. This detail may seem insignificant at first glance, but it is relevant in that it underlines once again the entanglement created by the Soviet Union (Papazian 2006, 238).

The frozen situation around Nagorno-Karabakh and the conquest of a security zone around Nagorno-Karabakh triggered a protest note in Azerbaijan in the direction of Armenia, with the demand to clear the security belt. The constant existential threat cemented a pragmatic and realistic approach to foreign policy. Both leaders of the time, President Levon Ter-Petrossian and Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan, spoke of a balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan that needed to be established in the region (Papazian 2006, 238 -240). Based on this realistic approach, Armenia entered into a military alliance with Russia in order to shift the balance of power in its own favour. In my view, the alliance with Russia, the regional hegemon, should therefore be seen primarily from a geostrategic, realistic point of view and not from an ideological one. After all, to take the Russian-Armenian alliance as a given is not correct. The discussion of Armenian foreign policy orientation was not set in stone, especially in view of a loss of confidence on the part of Armenians towards Russia.

The loss of trust was due to the fact that the Soviet Army did not intervene in massacres of Armenians in Azerbaijan between 1988 and 1991. After it became clear that Soviet forces even knowingly or unknowingly supported the Azerbaijani side during the massacres, scepticism grew among the population and politicians (Papazian 2006, 239). However, the historical friction and loss of trust were replaced by a clear realpolitik based on security interests after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The personal relationship between the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Armenian counterpart was able to create an appropriate foundation for bilateral relations. Based on these relations, a number of treaties were signed between Armenia and Russia in the following years. The strong rapprochement with Russia had two main effects: A security guarantee in the region, but also Armenia's dependence on Russia (first and foremost militarily) (Papazian 2006, 238-239).

Thus, the friendship agreement between Armenia and Russia was already signed in 1991. In the following year, Armenia joined important organisations that still exist today: CIS and the Collective Security Treaty signed in 1992. In 1997, the Friendship Agreement for Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed (Papazian 2006, 239).

In 1995, the agreement on the stationing of the Russian military in Gyumri along the Turkish-Armenian border was signed. While Armenia could be a counterweight to Azerbaijan from the perspective of the time, it would need a stronger ally against Turkey. If one takes a look at Russian history in the Caucasus, the Russian protector role of the Christian peoples in the Caucasus stands out. The Russian protector role for

Armenia against the Muslim neighbouring countries was taken up again, which is why a military alliance was also obvious from a historical perspective (Shirinyan 2019, 7).

It should be mentioned, however, that Armenia tried to build good relations with other states in the region in addition to the alliance with Russia for reasons of risk. Armenian foreign policy in the 1990s was very much characterised by a lack of alternatives. Both presidents, Levon Ter-Petrossian, who held office until 1998 and was persuaded to resign, and his successor Robert Kocharyan, implemented the same policy - which they saw as having no alternative. What was and is essential is the decoupling of historical, normative points of view from purely foreign policy benefits.

The hard realpolitik alignment with Russia was also continued by his successor in office due to Armenia's limited manoeuvrability and dependence on the regional hegemon. A key difference between the Ter-Petrossian and Kocharyan administrations was Ter-Petrossian's harder realism and rejection of national romanticism and ideologies. By not focusing on the issue of the Armenian Genocide, which is one of the essential national issues for Armenians, the Ter-Petrossian administration wanted to at least normalise relations with Turkey from a realpolitik point of view. The successor Kocharyan also wanted to start talks with Turkey without preconditions, but prioritised the issue of the genocide more strongly, which led to greater disagreement between Armenia and Turkey.

The fact that the rapprochement with Russia did not necessarily happen for normative but, as already mentioned, for realistic reasons, can also be seen in various currents within Armenian decision-makers: The lines of conflict are lost not least in the Foreign Ministry itself, since after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in Armenia primarily Western diplomats, i.e. people from the Armenian diaspora who come from Western countries, were put in the service of the Foreign Ministry. The Western orientation of the diplomatic squad on the one hand and the hard pragmatism and political lack of alternatives on the other led to a dilemma situation with a rapprochement with Russia (Papazian 2006, 248).

New stability and framework internal legitimacy

The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh itself - both of internal legitimacy and stability is clearer in the 1990s than in the years following. Internal legitimacy can largely be traced back to an important referendum in December 1991. This is because the Soviet Constitution provided the right for autonomous territorial units to leave the respective republic (in this case the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic) through a referendum. In the case of a republic (such as Azerbaijan itself), the Soviet constitution provided for the right to leave the Soviet Union only through the consent of all autonomous regions. In other words: According to the constitution, Nagorno-Karabakh had to hold a referendum to leave Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan itself would have to obtain the consent of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan to leave the Soviet Union. In accordance with the Soviet Constitution, a referendum was held in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991. The independence referendum itself took place and out of 82% of the participants, 99% voted for the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite the constitutional

procedure, the referendum was not accepted by the government in Baku, which in turn led to a military conflict (Yavuz and Gunter 2023; Novikova 2012; Engel 2013).

The 1991 referendum can be seen as an indication of great trust, of a high degree of internal legitimacy within Nagorno-Karabakh. However, apart from the referendum, which we use for internal legitimacy, there is a second essential method: the Freedom House Index reports, whereby Nagorno-Karabakh has been specifically listed among the disputed territories since 1994. If we look at the 1994-1995 Report, Nagorno-Karabakh is classified as 'non-free'. The de facto non-inclusion of political rights in Nagorno-Karabakh are mainly attributed to the state of war, the martial law. Although a president is elected in 1994 who appoints a prime minister and the legislature is also partially empowered, de facto Nagorno-Karabakh suffers from martial law in 1994. This leads to extensive restrictions in the press (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

After the referendum, Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1992 and elected Artur Mkrtchyan as president, who was shot dead in April of the same year. The armed conflicts between 1991 and 1994 can be categorised as large-scale military conflicts. In 1992, Azerbaijani forces attacked the capital of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. This was followed by a counter-offensive, in the course of which Armenia was able to conquer a corridor between Karabakh and Armenia in order to establish a connection to the 'protector', on the one hand, and to bring large parts of Nagorno-Karabakh under its control in 1993, on the other. Of particular interest is the fact that political opinion between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh itself diverged in 1993 and 1994. While the fighting was going on, there were several attempts at mediation in 1993, for example through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

In the course of several meetings, the Russian, American and Turkish sides presented a peace plan that provided for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from some areas. It is worth mentioning that this proposal was made to all three sides - not only to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh was perceived as a separate side in the negotiations in the 1990s. While Armenia and Azerbaijan accepted the peace plan, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians rejected it - citing a lack of security guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian President Ter-Petrossian travelled to Nagorno-Karabakh in an attempt to convince the government there of the new agreements, but failed. Although a ceasefire was subsequently reached, it was immediately interrupted by an incident with the Afghan Mujahideen (who were fighting on the Azerbaijani side) (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b). Only after renewed attempts at negotiations with the help of Russia and the USA could rapprochements begin. Prisoners of war were exchanged and a ceasefire was agreed at the climax of the negotiations - but without a status for Nagorno-Karabakh. The stationing of international peacekeeping troops was rejected by Russia. In general, it can be said that Russia was given a leading role in the conflict resolution - also by the international community (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

In the following years, the tense situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is assessed in the same way, with few improvements. Individual border areas could not be governed by the central office in Nagorno-Karabakh, and martial law is in force in some areas. However, there have been some improvements in terms of civil liberties. The

parliamentary elections in 1995 and the presidential elections in 1996 and 1997 are described by the Freedom House Index as free and fair in principle (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b). Between 1994 and 1998, however, there were far-reaching improvements in political and civil rights despite the state of emergency, according to the Freedom House Index (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

In 1998, there were renewed OSCE demands to place Nagorno-Karabakh under Azerbaijani administration. The de facto independent state of Nagorno-Karabakh rejected these proposals. However, a demilitarisation of important zones was achieved between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Nagorno-Karabakh status issue was postponed and general 'package solutions' were sought (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

Strengthening relations between Armenia and the regional hegemon from 1998 to 2008

The presidency of Robert Kocharyan, the successor of Levon Ter-Petrossian, was structurally marked above all by one essential circumstance: The strengthening of presidential power at the expense of the judiciary and parliament. Kocharyan's presidential power was largely consolidated, especially after the assassinations of the then Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and the Speaker of Parliament Karen Demirchyan in 1999. Both of the aforementioned politicians were in opposition to the incumbent president on some foreign policy issues (Brady and Thorhallsson 2021).

Through the assassinations of the aforementioned politicians, Robert Kocharyan was able to expand his own power base to a large extent. His style of government is generally considered more authoritarian than his predecessor's government (Aberg and Terzyan 2018, 157-160). While the style of government and hyper-presidentialism may not have a direct influence on Armenia's foreign policy, it does have an indirect one. Similar to the case of the predecessor, it is not possible to clearly identify a Western or Eastern orientation, but a tendency can very well be identified over the years. In Kocharyan's early years, a stronger orientation towards the West was pushing through, although maintaining relations with Russia was still considered a priority. Nevertheless, the motto of Armenian foreign policy was to develop a multi-vectoral foreign policy, which is why Kocharyan pushed Armenia in the direction of European integration. Armenia's admission (2001) to the Council of Europe, for example, can be seen as a major achievement. The symbolic rapprochement with NATO - for example, during a visit to a jubilee - also points to Kocharyan's balance policy. However, the stronger orientation towards the West, the 'European way', was increasingly displaced by a rapprochement with Russia in the following years (Brunnbauer 2021; Aberg and Terzyan 2018, 157-160).

This has not least to do with a change in Russian foreign policy: Russian foreign policy in the 2000s again tried to focus on Russia's claim to power in the region. Above all, Russia's sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space had to be restored. In doing so, the Kremlin resorted to a range of instruments, including the creation of a financial and economic dependency, but also a dependency in the security sector.

Through pro-Russian organisations such as the CIS, Moscow tried to gather a belt of pro-Russian states around itself (Aberg and Terzyan 2018, 157-160).

A rapprochement with the West was followed by a rapprochement with Russia, which subsequently led Armenia into economic dependence. Unlike his predecessor, Kocharyan also prioritised the question of the recognition of the genocide, which led to disagreementswith Turkey, and the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which put Armenia in a further security dilemma (Aberg and Terzyan 2018, 158).

In order to obtain security guarantees from Russia, Armenia positioned itself as 'the best ally' in the South Caucasus and attempted to sign a series of military-related agreements under Robert Kocharyan between 2000 and 2008. The culmination of one of these agreements was the creation of the CSTO in 2002, a Russian NATO counterpart, with Armenia also being part of the CSTO to this day. By creating and reactivating the CIS and the CSTO, Russia was able to tie the post-Soviet space more closely to itself politically and militarily. It is worth mentioning that the CSTO hosts other post-Soviet states in addition toArmenia and Russia, which in turn maintain good relations not only with Armenia, but alsowith Azerbaijan (Halbach 2013; Brunnbauer 2021).

A possible rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan/Turkey was observed with suspicion in Armenia, as it could shift the balance of power in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflictin favour of Azerbaijan. Not least, this idea led Armenia increasingly away from the pro-Western path and pushed the country more into the Russian sphere of influence. Whether a rapprochement with Russia was without alternative is another question: in neighbouring Georgia, revolutions led to a rapprochement with the West and in 2008 to a final break with Russia. However, the security situation is not the same either.

Thus, it can be said that the Russian doctrine of the 2000s, Armenia's security concerns andthe reactivation of post-Soviet organisations increasingly pushed Armenia from a pro-Western course to a pro-Russian one. On the one hand, the period was marked by milestones in European integration, but at the same time important military agreements were signed between Armenia and Russia, which still have an important significance today (Shirinyan 2019, 7-14; Harutyunyan 2017).

Armenia's increased dependency on Russia since the 2000s pushed Armenia into a dilemma: due to the increased dependency, other relations could not be developed equally and the alliance between Armenia and Russia became increasingly asymmetrical.

The 2000s, especially 2002, were also marked by economic dependence on the part of Russia. In 2002, Russia cancelled Armenia's debts for shares in state-owned enterprises. Due to the increasing economic dependence, Armenia has been increasingly tied to Russia in terms of energy policy since 2002. The strong ties narrowed the state's manoeuvrability in terms of independent economic and energy policy. For example, contracts with Iran on other terms could not be concluded due to Russia's monopoly position in Armenia (Shirinyan 2019, 8; Pegolo 2021).

A special role in the Armenian-Russian relationship of the 2000s is played by the relationship between Turkey and Russia on the one hand and Azerbaijan and Russia on the other. Due tothe strategic and pragmatic partnership between Russia and Turkey,

partnerships of convenience developed between Russia and Turkey despite conflicts of interest. The partnership of convenience between Turkey and Russia challenges, first and foremost, the Armenian foreign policy doctrine that sees Russia as a protective power vis-à-vis Turkey. The strengthened partnership between Azerbaijan and Russia - for example in the economic sphere - can also be seen as a threat to Armenian foreign policy. Nevertheless, despite pro-Western ambitions, Armenia's foreign policy is essentially without alternative with regard to Russia (Shirinyan 2019, 9; Pegolo 2021).

The relationship of proximity and dependence during this period can also be illustrated by the military cooperation between Armenia and Russia (Brunnbauer 2021). For example, between 2007 and 2011, 96% of Armenia's military purchases were made through Russia. At the same time, it should be mentioned that at the same time more than half of Azerbaijan's military imports came from Russia (Shirinyan 2019, 9).

Stability and internal legitimacy

In the period from 1999 to 2000, the political elite and the military leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh were actively redistributing resources. After the assassination attempt in 2000, a wave of arrests swept the then President of Nagorno-Karabakh. Internal political power struggles have weakened the reputation of the de facto republic. The assassinations of high-ranking politicians in Armenia itself on October 27, 1999, when the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament were killed, also weakened the entire negotiation process on Nagorno-Karabakh. The subsequent elections until 2004 were described as fair by the international community, and key international institutions called for the elections to be cancelled. Thus, the elections were deemed illegal by many organisations, including the EU, as Nagorno-Karabakh was considered part of Azerbaijan (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

The military situation escalated briefly in 2003 when small-scale clashes and mutual accusations took place. It is worth mentioning that no 'major' shootings took place at the border between 1994 and 2003. After the aforementioned warnings to hold the elections in 2004 and 2005 - although the elections themselves were basically considered fair - several talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan took place in 2005. While no substantive successes can be identified during these meetings, the fact of these meetings themselves testifies to at least a modicum of stability (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

2003 also marks another important domestic political turning point for Nagorno-Karabakh. Unlike its de jure parent state Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh is for the first time classified not 'not free' but 'partly free' by Freedom House Index, making it one of the few partly free territorial entities in the region (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

In 2007, there was a peaceful transfer of power in Nagorno-Karabakh in new elections, with Bako Sahakyan being elected. More important for the period around 2007, however, is the fact that while the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents announced convergence in their positions during talks, Azerbaijan reached the billion mark in military spending for the first time in 2007. If we take a look at internal

legitimacy, there was a constitutional referendum in Karabakh in 2006. The referendum can be used as an indicator of 'internal legitimacy' for two main reasons: Firstly, because of the content of the referendum itself and secondly, because of the turnout.

The core content of the referendum was the definition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent, self-governing, democratic republic based on the rule of law. The referendum was primarily intended to underline the independence of the non-recognised republic.

The stability issue within Karabakh became increasingly difficult, with isolated military clashes with few fatalities in 1999. The political situation itself is also classified by Freedom House Index as unfree or not very free for the years after 1997-1998. During this period, the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Karabakh sides tried to find a solution to settle the conflict. Common solutions were a large autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan. Some solutions - for example, by some OSCE Chairmen - even referred to a joint state between Azerbaijan and Karabakh, which in turn would enhance Karabakh's position. Azerbaijan rejected these proposals on the grounds that this would not give it sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. Instead, the Azerbaijani side demanded the withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh troops and the demilitarisation of the border areas. Only then could the status issue be discussed, according to the Azerbaijani side (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

The advanced age of the Azerbaijani president and the desire to solve the problem during hisown term of office, so that his intended successor (his son) does not have to inherit the conflict, increased the time pressure for a possible solution. Although the many meetings between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents underline the willingness to talk, the negotiations failed each time to find a compromise (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

Turbulent relations between Armenia and regional hegemon from 2008 to 2018

In the period between 2008 and 2018, President Serzh Sargsyan succeeded Robert Kocharyan in Armenia. Apart from 2020, the period between 2008 and 2018 can be considered the most turbulent in Armenian foreign policy - especially with the turning point in 2013 from amore pro-European course to a strongly pro-Russian one.

As mentioned before, the substantive level of Armenian foreign policy cannot be clearly described as pro-Russian. Both presidents before Serzh Sargsyan had a partly pro-European agenda, but this was overshadowed by political realities and, due to the lack of alternatives, pushed the country into the Russian sphere of influence. The term of office of Sargsian can be described similarly, who on the one hand wanted to advance the European integration process, but at the same time became more closely tied to Russia.

A number of foreign policy decisions can be evaluated during this period. The most important decisions relate to the Association Agreement with the EU and accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In 2013, despite previous efforts to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, a turnaround occurred due to pressure from

Moscow. The agreement with the EU was not signed, and at the same time Armenia joined the Russian-led EAEU (Shirinyan 2019, 3).

In the field of military policy, too, the agreement on the military base in Gyumri was extended in 2010 for another 35 years until 2044. As previously mentioned, the Russian military base in Gyumri on the border with Turkey fulfils a strategically important role in the region and is partly regarded by Armenia as a 'guarantor' on the Armenian-Turkish border (Shirinyan 2019, 10).

The strong division of countries into pro-Western and pro-Russian has become a bane especially for Armenia. The non-signing of the Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 confirmed Armenia's pro-Russian position, as seen by some European representatives. In the process, the political context of the decision was not, or hardly, taken into account. The 'Armenian turn' was largely perceived by the EU as unreliable and disappointing. From the Armenian perspective, the EU's unwillingness to compromise by signing only part of the treaty was perceived as unfair. Only months later, the EU agreed to sign only certain parts of the agreement on Ukraine (Shirinyan 2019, 14-15).

Between 2010 and 2013, Armenia underwent a process of Europeanisation - not only in the preparations for the signing of the Association Agreement, but also in other reforms. However, despite stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO, Armenia - in contrast to Georgia - never expressed interest in joining either the EU or NATO, in line with the balance policy. The passive engagement with the EU and NATO and parallel pro-Russian orientation allowed the country to establish at least basic cooperation with the West without leaving the Russian sphere of influence (Shirinyan 2019, 16-17).

Another turning point in the relations between Armenia and Russia and Armenia and Azerbaijan may be 2016 and the Four-Day war in the same year. The war in April 2016 is considered the largest military conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh since the ceasefire in 1994. The war had a negative effect on Armenian-Russian relations due to the seemingly passive behaviour from the Russian side. However, the anti-Russian sentiment and the cooling of relations were already consolidated by several incidents in 2015: After the murder of a family by a Russian soldier from the military base in Armenia, the Russian authorities refused to hand over the suspect. In another example from 2015, the so-called 'Electric Yerevan' demonstrations, which started as protests against rising electricity prices and increasingly turned against the political establishment and corruption, took place. As Russia was/is the owner of the respective electricity utilities in Armenia, it played a central role, but considered the demonstrations to be an 'Armenian Maidan'. Both incidents at least cooled the relationship and made the Armenian public increasingly critical of Russia (Shirinyan 2019, 20).

The Association Agreement, which was not signed in 2013, was resumed from 2015 and signed in a slightly different form as CEPA in 2017 and is considered a milestone in EU-Armenia relations. This allowed Armenia to expand its own manoeuvrability between the two parties and deepen integration with the EU, while remaining a member of Russian-led organisations (Shirinyan 2019, 22).

The Armenian dilemma in foreign policy is not least the West's perception that Armenia is too pro-Russian and Russia's perception that Armenia is too pro-Western. Thus, while Armenia is a member of the EU, it also has an 'association agreement' with the EU. Thus, while Armenia is a member of the Russian defence alliance CSTO, it also maintains close relations with NATO countries and participates in individual NATO-led peacekeeping missions. Armenia's manoeuvring and above all its relationship with NATO is observed with suspicion, not least by Russia (Shirinyan 2019, 23).

The year 2018 and the associated turbulence within Armenian domestic politics, as a result of which Serzh Sargsyan had to resign, are also significant. In 2018, Armenia underwent controversial constitutional changes, in the course of which Armenia was transformed from a presidential republic into a parliamentary one. The purpose of the constitutional change was to bypass term limits, which meant that Serzh Sargsyan could now continue to govern even further as prime minister (previously state president). The constitutional changes and the associated lack of transparency triggered mass unrest in Armenia, with demands for Serzh Sargsyan's resignation. The leader of the mass movement was the opposition member Nikol Pashinyan, who is considered pro-Western in general outline. Despite Nikol Pashinyan, there were no foreign policy demands during the mass unrest - unlike in Ukraine or Georgia, for example. The Russian media have described Armenia as a kind of 'Maidan', although it is significant that Russia did not support the incumbent head of government, Serzh Sargsyan. The absence of active Russian intervention to prevent a more 'pro-Western' oppositionist is not very characteristic for Russian foreign policy in the region (Shirinyan 2019, 21-24).

Fragmented stability and internal legitimacy

Although 2008 is not a turning point in three respects, it is an important year for Nagorno-Karabakh's (in)stability and status. First, in 2008 there were skirmishes and new waves of escalation in the border zone. While this may not seem like much compared to more recent clashes, in this respect it is an important indicator, since from 1994 to 2008, with rare exceptions, the level of military clashes was rare. In the same year, the UN General Assembly called for the withdrawal of all Armenian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh (UNGA 2008).

However, the year is particularly important because three partial recognitions took place in other regions of the world - namely the recognition of Kosovo by the West and the partial recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia. It should be mentioned that the recognition of the de facto republics mentioned is not due to a conviction about their content, but took place for geostrategic reasons. This is indicated by the fact that Russia recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia but protested against the recognition of Kosovo. The same applies to the Western community with regard to Kosovo's recognition and the criticism of the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On the one hand, these partial recognitions set precedents on which Nagorno-Karabakh could rely, while at the same time Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh

and Russia announced that they would not put the question of Nagorno-Karabakh's independence on the political agenda. Despite peace talks, 2008 also saw increased military spending on both sides (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

A historic agreement between Armenia and Turkey, signed in 2009, was not ratified in 2010 and failed because of Ankara's precondition to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Talks between Baku and Yerevan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region also failed after military clashes with Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh itself, which left six people dead (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

The wave of military friction continued in the following years, with major clashes in 2012, but especially in 2014 and 2016. In 2014, even before 2008, the highest level of escalation since the end of the 1994 war. The military clashes put immense strain on the peace and negotiation process of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan and placed Nagorno-Karabakh under a military threat. 2012 also saw elections in Nagorno-Karabakh similar to 2010, with the incumbent Bako Sahakyan winning in both cases (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

A new dimension of military clashes occurred in 2016, when more than 100 people on each side - both in Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan - died in the so-called Four-Day war. For the first time since the 1994 ceasefire, there were not only direct military clashes but territorial changes as Azerbaijan was able to conquer a few square kilometres. After the Kremlin's interference, the conflict was settled and military clashes ceased (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

In the same year, amendments were proposed and a new constitution was drafted. The intention was to switch from a semi-presidential to a presidential system. The referendum itself was proposed in 2016 due to security considerations and approved by a majority of voters in 2017. The holding of a corresponding referendum underlines the internal legitimacy of the de facto Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

Non-resilient responses to geopolitical challenges: restrictions for regional hegemon

The years 2018 to 2020 must be viewed in a special light, as they are seen in the public perception as a domestic and foreign policy turnaround. To what extent this applies to foreign policy orientation can be determined in the course of the following evaluation. First of all, it should be mentioned that the Velvet Revolution took place in 2018, in the course of which Nikol Pashinyan, who is regarded as pro-Western, became prime minister.

Regarding the revolution itself, it is interesting to note that Russia, which views such revolutions in its immediate neighbourhood with great scepticism, has been relatively passive. The first steps of the new government were to underline the importance of relations with Russia and the West alike. Thus, instead of 'pro-Russian', 'pro-European' or 'pro-American', the term 'pro-Armenian' or 'Armenia-centric' became established in political language. With this, the newly elected government partly wanted to appease the Russian government (Kopalyan 2018).

This can also be reflected in the foreign policy statements. Although Pashinyan, as an opposition politician, sharply criticised the EAEU, calling it inefficient, he became a supporter of the project during his term in office. He spoke out against an exit. In 2019, Pashinyan even initiated a free trade agreement between Singapore, Vietnam and the EAEU after visiting these countries. Similar to other heads of government, this underlines the tight manoeuvrability of Armenia's foreign policy and illustrates that despite symbolic and presumably election-related guests, even politicians who are considered more pro-Western are pushed into the Russian sphere of influence (Kucera 2019a). In this context, another event from 2019 is interesting for Armenian-Russian relations. Russia requested assistance in the Syrian conflict from its own allies in 2019. The Armenian side was the first to respond, offering the deployment of deminers and medics for a mission in Syria. The background, similar to the case of the position towards the EAEU, is appeasement towards Russia. The deployment of Armenian forces to Syria had a relatively damaging effect on the otherwise good Armenian-American relations. The USA side sharply criticised the decision, stating that it would not tolerate any support - military or civilian - for Assad (Kucera 2019b).

Russia's gas price increases to Armenia for 2019 from \$150 to \$165 per thousand cubic metres also led to strained relations. Dependence on Russia in the energy sector is part of Armenia's energy reality (Giragossian 2019).

Another tension that lasted for a longer period of time was the anti-corruption struggle of the Armenian government against old rulers, military officers and oligarchs. In particular, the arrest of Robert Kocharyan, the second president, as well as some other former officials/politicians led to disgruntlement between Moscow and Armenia. The arrest and trial of Robert Kocharyan is special in that the relationship between Robert Kocharyan and Vladimir Putin is characterised by a long-standing friendship. Russia, among other things, protested - albeit indirectly - against these trials via political talk shows on state broadcasters and perceived them to be conditionally Russophobic (Berglund 2012).

Despite Armenia's policy of appeasement, there have been major disagreements with Russia, especially over anti-corruption measures against former pro-Russian politicians, including former President Robert Kocharyan. In the Russian media, such arrests and trials were sometimes presented as politically, even geopolitically motivated trials. It is worth mentioning that Robert Kocharyan, Armenia's second president, has friendly relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin. While Russia criticized Armenia during the first arrest, there was surprisingly silence during the second arrest of Kocharyan.

In the same year, there was a turnaround in Armenia's Nagorno-Karabakh policy. Although socially Nagorno-Karabakh is de facto considered part of the Armenian world, for political reasons all previous heads of government did not refer to it as part of Armenia but as a separate and self-governing or independent republic. On August 5, the Armenian Prime Minister said at a rally 'Artsakh is Armenia, that's it'. With this he initiated a paradigm shift, which was criticised domestically by large parts of the opposition and perceived as a provocation abroad, especially in Azerbaijan. In the following subchapter on Nagorno-Karabakh, we will discuss in more detail the reaction on the part of Azerbaijan (Kucera 2019c).

The year 2020 marks the low point of Armenia's security and foreign policy. Two main conflicts can be identified. On the one hand, the conflicts in July between Armenia and Azerbaijan and, on the other hand, the second Nagorno-Karabakh war between September and November 2020. The former conflict has a special status in that it is not a military conflict in or around Nagorno-Karabakh, but for the first time in history a conflict on the internationally recognised Armenian-Azerbaijani borders. In July, there was mutual firing inthe Tavush region that lasted several days and resulted in several deaths. Although the conflict was brought to an end under pressure from Russia, Russia itself and the CSTO reacted little or not at all, even though a member country of the alliance was attacked (Davidzon 2022, 153-183; Lukin and Novikov 2021; Sakwa 2021).

The escalation in the July conflict reached its peak when the Azerbaijani side indirectly threatened a possible military strike on the nuclear power plant in Armenia. The July 2020 conflict, as mentioned above, is interesting not only because of the fact that it is taking placein the Armenian-Azerbaijani border area. A much more important aspect for this work is Russia's non-intervention on the Armenian side despite a military alliance. Although Armenia did not submit a corresponding request to the CSTO or Russia, Russia's political reaction was also rather neutral and mediatory.

On September 27, 2020, the war started by Azerbaijan against Nagorno-Karabakh with the support of Turkey and the involvement of terrorist groups lasted 44 days (The Government of the RA 2021). The Second Karabakh War lasted 44 days and most of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh was forced to leave the escalation zone and the area of military operations (The Government of the RA 2021; Pashinyan 2021). This conflict is not a small-scale military conflict, but a large-scale war with the use of all heavy guns, tanks as well as drones. Different positions were formed at the international level.

Pakistan and Turkey, traditionally very friendly to Azerbaijan, took a clearly pro-Azerbaijani position. Several states (Russia, France and the USA) confirmed the presence of Syrian jihadists in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the Azerbaijani side. The French side assumed that these were Syrian jihadists close to Turkey. According to media reports, at least high-ranking Turkish officers were involved in the conflict.

A more pro-Armenian role can be identified in the case of Cyprus, Greece and France. It should be mentioned that these states have traditionally maintained very good relations with Armenia and are opposed to Turkey. As a sign of solidarity, Greece withdrew its own ambassador from Azerbaijan, Cyprus condemned the Azerbaijani aggression and in France,Nagorno-Karabakh's right to self-determination was voted on in both chambers as a proposal to the government.

A more mediating, neutral role was played primarily by the United States on the one hand and Russia and to some extent Iran on the other. In the course of the war, ceasefire agreements were signed on the initiative of both Russia and the United States. In all these cases, these agreements were broken - both sides accused each other of not abiding by the agreement (Zolyan 2020).

The situation only calmed down on 10-11 November when a ceasefire agreement was signed and the Armenian side had to accept a de facto military victory of Azerbaijan. In the course of the war, the Azerbaijani side was able to bring large parts of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas under its own control by using military drones. Several points were set out in the new ceasefire agreement, the most

important being the following: Ceasefire between both sides, the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in those areas of Nagorno-Karabakh that remained under the control of Armenian militants. It was also decided to return several territories captured by Armenian troops in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War as a 'security belt'. Another essential point was the creation of a corridor between Nakhichevan (an exclave of Azerbaijan) and the core area of Azerbaijan via Armenian territory, as well as a route to connect Armenia with Russia (via Azerbaijan).

Revolutionary factors of stability and internal legitimacy

In and around Nagorno-Karabakh itself, the events in Armenia had a major impact. The Velvet Revolution in Armenia also led to revolutionary sentiments and demonstrations in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2018. Many protesters wanted changes in Nagorno-Karabakh as well because of the revolutionary successes in Armenia. However, even the Armenian prime minister mediated so that the demonstrations stopped. The background for this attitude are and were security concerns in Nagorno-Karabakh. Due to the external danger, the society tried to consolidate itself domestically - partly at the expense of democracy. Several high-ranking government and security officials resigned in the wake of the demonstrations. The incumbent president Bako Sahakyan promised not to run again in 2020. It is also important to mention in this context that Nagorno-Karabakh's elites were linked to Armenia's old pre-revolutionary elites, which led to political tensions between Armenia's new leadership and Nagorno-Karabakh's leadership (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

Far-reaching consequences for tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the security of Nagorno-Karabakh were the aforementioned statement of the Armenian Prime Minister in 2019 'Artsakh is Armenia, that's it'. This phrase and paradigm shift were perceived very negatively by the Azerbaijani side. Azerbaijani news sites commented that with this position the Armenian prime minister had a more radical approach than his predecessors. A prompt, condemnatory reaction followed from the Azerbaijani government side, saying that Armeniawas occupying Azerbaijani territory and that the prime minister's statement was damaging to the peace process. This reaction, in turn, was softened to some extent in Armenia after it was stated that the statement was to be understood in an election-related context.

The Armenian Prime Minister's statement was strongly condemned by many politicians within Armenia, as a paradigm shift from 'Artsakh is independent' to 'Arstakh belongs toArmenia' would damage the entire negotiation process.

Nagorno-Karabakh itself is classified as 'partly free' during this period, similar to previous years, and thus freer than the de jure mother state Azerbaijan. Freedom House Index rates the freedom/democracy situation in Nagorno-Karabakh at 31/100 points for 2018, 34/100 points for 2019 and 35/100 points for 2020. In comparison, Azerbaijan is rated as unfree and given a score of 10/100 (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

Conclusion and discussion

In the following step, let us take a look at Armenia, the four subordinate time periods and examine the relationship between our two x variables and the y variable. In other words: We assume that better relations between Armenia and Russia lead to a more stable situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, we assume that the internal legitimacy or the standard of democracy of Nagorno-Karabakh itself should also have a contribution to the stability of the non-recognised state. Of the four time periods, however, the period between 1991 and 1998 must be considered separately. Including and classifying this war as an indicator of 'poor stability' in Nagorno-Karabakh would lead to false causal relationships, as this military conflict is not the result of good or bad relations between Russia and Armenia. For this reason, the first Nagorno-Karabakh war is not included in the category of stability between 1991 and 1998.

If we look away from the Nagorno-Karabakh war at the situation in the 1990s, we can make a fundamental observation: Between 1991 and 1998, a pro-Russian course was established in Armenia for geostrategic-real-political reasons, despite pro-Western diplomats within the administration. The 1992 accession to the CIS, the 1995 agreement on the stationing of Russian troops in Gyumri, the military alliance with Russia as well as the friendship agreement and the mutual assistance agreement of 1997 are clear indications of this. Despite individual agreements with the EU (PCA) and NATO (PfP), no disgruntlements can be detected in Russian-Armenian relations.

The situation of democratic standards and internal legitimacy, on the other hand, is more difficult to classify. The independence referendum of 1991 and the very high voter turnout are clear indicators of high internal legitimacy. The classification of the elections between 1995 and 1997 as basically fair and free as well as the improvements in civil and political rights between 1994 and 1998 speak for internal legitimacy. The classification of Nagorno-Karabakh as 'unfree' according to the Freedom House Index speaks against this - among the reasons given is the state of war emergency**.** For these reasons, the situation of internal legitimacy for this period can be described as medium, also in view of the historical context, since on the one hand the referendums and elections speak in favour, and the FHI categorisation against. If we look at the situation around stability, we can see the following for this period: If we were to include the military conflict between 1991 and 1994 in its entirety, it would greatly distort the results as already mentioned and lead to a false conclusion.

Leaving aside the military conflict, it can be said that a more or less stable peace was concluded between the two sides in 1994. For the stability of Nagorno-Karabakh, the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh co- signed the Bishkek ceasefire as a party to the conflict is particularly noteworthy. While it may seem a minor detail, it is nevertheless an indication that the Azerbaijani side at least recognised Nagorno-Karabakh as a separate party to the conflict at that time. Between 1994 and 1998, no significant potential dangers can be identified between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan - not even military incidents. Since 1994, the conflict can be described as frozen. Thus, it can be said that the external stability of Nagorno-Karabakh can be classified as comparatively high due to the lack of conflicts after 1994 and the signed ceasefire. For the period between 1991 and 1998, it can thus be stated that relations between

Armenia and Russia were very good on the one hand, internal legitimacy can be described as medium and stability was comparatively high in this period around Nagorno-Karabakh (see Table 2).

Table 2. Relations between Armenia and Russia from 1991 to 1998

	X1 Relations Protector/Hegemon	*X2 Internal legitimacy*	*Y Stability*
1991-1998	• 1992: CIS membership • Military alliance with Russia • 1995: Agreement on the stationing of Russian military in Gyumri • 1997: Friendship Agreement for Cooperation and Mutual Assistance	• 1991: Independence referendum • 1994/1995: 'non free' partially due to martial law • 1995-1997: Elections described as free and fair in principle • 1994-1998: Improvements in political and civil rights	• Military conflict between 1991- 1994 • 1994: Bishkek-Protocols • Frozen conflict since 1994 • No (major) military clashes since 1994

The period between 1998 and 2008 can be divided into two time spans - on the one hand, the period up to 2002 and, on the other hand, between 2002 and 2008. It is important to say that until 2002 Armenia attempted a balance course with a pro-Western bias: This includes membership in the Council of Europe and symbolic guests as well as rapprochement with NATO. At the same time, it should be mentioned that a partial rapprochement with the Westwas not perceived as an anti-Russian act per se in Russia during this period. Apart from the disagreement between Armenia and Russia over the visit of the Armenian President to a NATO anniversary event, no other headlines or major problems in the mutual relations can be identified.

The period from 2002 onwards, on the other hand, can be seen as a clearly pro-Russian period. The main reasons for this are the deepening of military relations and Armenia's greater economic dependence on Russia. This period includes the establishment and membership of the Russian-led CSTO in 2002, the transfer of numerous state shares in the energy sector in exchange for partial debt relief, and the strong economic and military dependence (especially since the 2007 arms build-up). Between 2007 and 2011, 96% of the weapons were purchased from Russia, which speaks for a very high level of dependence, andin some cases a monopoly position, on the part of Russia. For the period between 1998 and 2008, very good relations between Russia and Armenia can be observed on the whole. On the one hand, the rather pro-Western course up to 2002 did not lead to an anti-Russian course, and on the other hand, the rapprochement and dependence from 2002 onwards wasall the greater.

The internal legitimacy issue can also be divided into two sub-sections. On the one hand, theinternal power struggles, assassination attempts and arrests until 2000 and the period thereafter. With regard to the Freedom House Index, it can also be said that Nagorno-Karabakh was classified as 'unfree' until 2003 and as 'partly free' throughout the period since 2003 (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b). The 2004 elections were classified as free and fair, and the transfer of power from the old to the new ruler in

2007 can be classified as peaceful. An important indicator of high internal legitimacy is the 2006 and 2007 referendum, which should be considered separately due to its content, turnout and outcome. The referendum, which was intended to underline, among other things, the independence of the non-recognised state, was held with a turnout of 87%, with 99% of voters in favour of the reforms. In this case, too, I would classify the situation with regard to internal legitimacy as high, similar to the situation between 1991 and 1998, due to the power struggles on the one hand, categorisations of FHI as well as the referendum (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b). A major difference between the first and the second period might be that between 2003 and 2008 Nagorno-Karabakh was categorised as 'partly free' (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

   The period between 1998 and 2008 can be described as broadly stable and secure in terms of Nagorno-Karabakh's external security, with two turning points. On the one hand, more intensive negotiations took place until 2002. In 2003, the first military escalation occurred between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this military escalation remained the exception rather than the rule for this period. No significant results were achieved in the negotiation process between 1998 and 2008. However, Nagorno-Karabakh lost its de facto status as a separate party to the conflict, and Azerbaijan now negotiated directly with Armenia. This can be seen as an - albeit indirect - weakening of external stability. From 2007 onwards, a massive increase in military spending by Azerbaijan can be observed. The period between 1998 and 2008 would be classified as stable both purely from the perspective of military conflicts, but the non-recognition as a party to the conflict and the increased military spending by Azerbaijan exclude very high stability. Thus, I would classify this period as high compared to other periods. For the period between 1998 and 2008 (see Table 3), it can thus be said that relations between Armenia and Russia can be classified as good, the internal legitimacy of Nagorno-Karabakh as high and the stability of the non-recognised republic as high.

Table 3. Relations between Armenia and Russia from 1998 to 2008

		X1 Relations Protector/Hegemon	*X2 Internal legitimacy*	*Y Stability*
1998-2008		• Until 2002: Balanced but more pro-Western approach • 2001: Admission to the Council of Europe • Symbolic rapprochement with the NATO • Since 2002: Rapprochement with Russia • 2002: the CSTO membership • 2002: Transfer of most of energy sector to Russia in exchange of debt release • Since 2002: Stronger economic dependence on Russia 2007-2011: Dependence on	• 1999-2000: Power struggles within the government, assassination attempt on president • 2004: Elections described as fair • Until 2003: Classified as 'unfree' • Since 2003: Classified as 'partly free' by FHI • 2007: Peaceful transfer of power • 2006-2007: Referendum to underline the independence - 87%	• 2003: Escalation of the military situation, small-scale clashes; first serious clashes since 1994 Since 2007: Massive increase of military expenditures by Azerbaijan

	military cooperation; 96% of Armenia's military purchases through Russia	turnout, 99% support for the referendum	

The period between 2008 and 2018 is one of the most turbulent periods - both in terms of Russia-Armenia relations and the stability issue. The extension of the contract for the Russian military base in 2010 is an indicator of the maintenance of good relations. On the other hand, Armenia underwent a Europeanisation process between 2010 and 2013. The break-off of the EU Association Agreement in 2013 and Armenia's subsequent accession to the EAEU happened for political reasons from Moscow, especially since Armenia had criticised the EAEU as inefficient. The signing of a 'light association agreement' in 2017 and the omission of political passages also happened under pressure from Moscow. During this period, the Russian side perceived Armenia to be on a pro-Western course. The anti-Russian sentiments of 2015 and 2018 during demonstrations were seen in Russia as a kind of 'Maidan'. Although relations can be described as stable on a formal level, they are still characterised by many frictions and a mutual loss of trust. Therefore, relations between Armenia and Russia between 2008 and 2018 can be described as medium. Internal legitimacy, aside from the usual power struggles, can be described as high due to the Freedom House Index rating of 'partly free' between 2008 and 2018 and a 2016-2017 referendum (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b).

The highest frequency of military escalations occurred between 2008 and 2018. In 2008, 2010 and 2014, there were military incidents with deaths on both sides. In 2016, there was even a Four-Day war. In addition, there were difficulties in the negotiation process due to the incidents. External stability can therefore be assessed as unstable. Thus, we can say, that in the period between 2008 and 2018 the relations between Armenia and Russia can be described as medium (see Table 4), the internal legitimacy of Nagorno-Karabakh as high and the external stability as 'unstable'.

Table 4. Relations between Armenia and Russia from 2008 to 2018

	X1 Relations Protector/Hegemon	*X2 Internal legitimacy*	*Y Stability*
2008-2018	• 2010: Agreement on the Russian military base extended until 2045 • 2010-2013: Process of Europeanisation • 2013: Cancellation of the signing-process of the Association Agreement with the EU • 2013: EAEU membership • 2015: 'Electric Yerevan' demonstrations considered in Russia as "Armenian maidan" • 2015: anti-Russian sentiments in Armenia because Russian authorities refused to hand over a Russian	• 2008-2018: Karabakh classified as 'partly free' by FHI • 2016-2017: New constitution draft through referendum establishing a presidential system	• 2008: The first serious border clashes since 1994 (and 2003) • Despite the partial recognition of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it had no effect on Karabakh • 2010: Military clashes with 6 dead people • 2014: Military

soldier in Armenia who murdered a family • 2017: Signation of a lightversion of the EU Association Agreement CEPA • 2018: Large anti-government protests led to the resignition of the government - described as 'Armenian Maidan' by the Russian media		clash • 2016: Four-Days-war with more than 100 dead people on both sides 2012-2016: Immense strain on the peace process due to military escalation

The short period between 2018 and 2020 led to a series of foreign policy actions and escalations. First of all, it is worth mentioning that the 2018 revolution and the subsequent election of Nikol Pashinyan, who was considered pro-Western, was viewed with scepticism from the Russian side. Despite previous strong pro-Western orientation, the new prime minister spoke out in favour of the Eurasian Union, even acting as a mediator between this union and other countries. In addition, Armenia supported - albeit as a symbolic gesture - the Russian military operation in Syria. The increase in the price of gas, but above all the arrest of President Kocharyan, who was close to Russia, led to strong upsets in relations.

Russia's subsequent non-reaction to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in July 2020 can be seen as a breach of trust. Relations during this period can be considered goodat the official level, but medium at the unofficial level.

On the issue of democracy and legitimacy, mass protests against corruption and the government associated with the old elites in Armenia also took place in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2018. In 2020, there was a peaceful transfer of government. In the two/three years, Nagorno-Karabakh was classified as 'partly free', with the situation improving every year - even in the year of war. The internal legitimacy and democracy issue can nevertheless be classified as medium due to the mass protests.

Together with the period between 2008 and 2018 (see Table 5), this initially rather calm period can also be determined as highly unstable. Reasons for this are, on the one hand, the paradigm shift of the Armenian side in Nagorno-Karabakh policy and the negative reaction of the Azerbaijani side, as well as the full-fledged 44-Day War in 2020. External stability can be assessed as highly unstable apart from 2018. Thus, it can be said that relations between Russia and Armenia should be rated as medium (tense), internal legitimacy as medium and external stability as highly unstable.

Table 5. Relations between Armenia and Russia from 2018 to 2020

	X1 Relations Protector/Hegemon	X2 Internal legitimacy	Y Stability
2018-2020	• 2018: After the Velvet Revolution Nikol Pashinyan, who is considered pro-Western, became prime minister • Despite the pro-Western perception the government appeased the Russian	• 2018: Large protest movements againstthe government • 2020: New	• 2019: Negative perception of Azerbaijani side on Pashinyan's "Artsakh is

government • 2018-2019: Armenia deepened its role in the EAEU and initiated trade agreements • 2019: Armenia deployed forces to Syria on Russian request; this had a damaging effect on theUS-Armenian relations • 2019: Russia's gas priceincrease led to strained relations • 2019: Arrest of former president Robert Kocharyan led to serious tensions with Russia • 2020: Little or no reaction from the Russian side on the July 2020 conflict • 2020: Only mediating Russian role during the war in September - despite the CSTO membership 2020: Russian brokered peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, deployment of Russian peacekeepers	government, peaceful transfer of power 2018-2020: Karabakh described as 'partly free' – rating improvement between 2018 and 2020	Armenia, that's it" 2020: the 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh

H1: Relation between protector-hegemon-relations and the stability of the non-recognisedstate.

The individual hypotheses formulated at the beginning are now discussed on the basis of the analyses and conclusions of the individual sections. Corresponding assessments have already been made in the partial conclusions of Armenia/Karabakh and Albania/Kosovo. In addition to the general results, which are presented in tabular form for better illustration, it is important to include the respective historical context of the two cases in the conclusion. In our first hypothesis, we first asked ourselves whether and how the relations between the protector and the hegemon affect the stability of the non-recognised state. If we take a look at our two country examples and the eight case studies that follow from them, we can see the following: Especially in the Armenian case, it suggests that good relations tend to lead to higher stability and comparatively worse relations to comparative instability. In fact, in the Armenian case study we see that relations between Armenia and Russia were very good between 1991 and 1998 and good between 1998 and 2008. In the same period, we see - apart from the Nagorno-Karabakh war, which has not been included for reasons of bias (see the respective chapter for more details) - a high level of stability around Nagorno-Karabakh. Between 2008 and 2018 and 2018 and 2020, on the other hand, we find only 'medium' relations between Armenia and Russia - this correlates with low or very low stability between 2008 and 2020 (see Table 6).

Table 6. Armenia/Nagorno-Karabakh

	X1 Relations Protector/Hegemon	*Y Stability*
1991-1998	Very good	High
1998-2008	Good	High
2008-2018	Medium	Low
2018-2020	Medium	Very low

If we look at the Albanian-Kosovar example, however, a correlation is not directly evident, or if so, then only weakly. In fact, between the periods 1992 to 1999 and 1999 to 2008 there was an improvement in relations from good to very good and at the same time there was also an improvement in stability from medium to high (see Table 6). Between the periods from 2008 to 2013 and 2013 to 2020, on the other hand, there has been a constant (very high) stability, but between the same periods the relations have 'deteriorated' from very good to good (see Table 6).

Thus, at first glance, one would rather find a weak (if any) correlation in the Albanian case. However, in this context it is important to include two contextual issues: On the one hand, the variation in terms of the variable of relationships in the Albanian-American case is rather small, since it only distinguishes between 'very good' and 'good'. Moreover, it is much more difficult per se to make a categorisation between 'very good' and 'good' - here the subjective evaluation of the author plays a certain role. Secondly, especially in the Albanian-Kosovan example, it must be borne in mind that good relations with the USA played an immense role and that our analysis shows that without good USA-Albanian relations, Kosovo's status (both in the military, de facto and de jure sense) would at least be delayed for a very long time. Based on these two arguments and the contextuality, I tend to see a connection between the good Albanian-American relations and the stability issue of Kosovo.

We can thus state that the relations between the protector and the hegemon have an influence on the stability issue of the non-recognised state. At the same time, it should be noted that this influence varies depending on the case. In our study, this effect is more pronounced in the Armenian case than in the Albanian case. Thus, the main hypothesis can be confirmed.

H2: Relation between internal legitimacy and stability of the non-recognised state.

A look at the second hypothesis, namely whether internal legitimacy, such as internal standards of democracy, have an influence on the stability of the non-recognised state, shows a clearer picture. Both in the example of Nagorno-Karabakh and in the example of Kosovo we see that there is no correlation. In addition, it is worth mentioning that in the Kosovo example, medium internal legitimacy was classified in all four cases. But also in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, where internal legitimacy varies between time periods, we cannot find any correlation (see Table 7).

Table 7. Armenia/Nagorno-Karabakh

	X2 Internal legitimacy	**Y Stability**
1991-1998	Medium	High
1998-2008	High	High
2008-2018	High	Low
2018-2020	Medium	Very low

Thus, the alternative hypothesis can be rejected. Thus, there is no influence of the internal legitimacy of the non-recognised state on stability. In addition to the analyses of the two hypotheses to be confirmed or rejected, the article also offers a detailed summary, time analysis and background analysis of the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo and compares these cases and the associated factors with each other. The selection of the two case studies may not correspond to the ideal image of the Most Similar System Design, but it comes closest to it and also offers good comparability when viewed retrospectively.

Through the reports of the Freedom House Index, both case studies could be examined with regard to internal legitimacy and external stability (Freedom House 2023a, 2023b). The use of the same sources for both case studies provides a better basis for subsequent comparability. At the same time, it is important to mention challenges and inconsistencies in the analysis and results of this work. First of all, there are the indicators of the variables: For all three variables, there are many indicators that could be used in the work. Depending on the definition of these variables and the choice of indicators, the results may be different. Of course, it should be mentioned that the limitation of the variables to a few indicators was necessary in order not to go beyond the scope of the work and to be able to guarantee comparability at all. Especially in the case of the variable 'internal legitimacy', different indicators can be used depending on the definition - from democratic standards, referendums, the work of the institutions to statements by leading politicians. The limitation to democratic values and referendums was made for reasons of comparability and the range of sources.

Another challenge of the analysis lies in the conclusions of the two sub-sections or the evaluation of the individual variables in the individual time periods broken down into 'very good/very high', 'good/high', 'medium', 'low', and 'very low'. This was done for reasons of comparability, not only to better illustrate the analyses, but also to make them more tangible for the final results. It is important to mention that such evaluations always entail a subjective character of the researcher or the author and such evaluations can turn out differently depending on the person. For this very reason, contextuality and other information were taken into account in addition to the tabulated results themselves.

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TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE IDEOLOGY OF NATION-BUILDING AND STATE-BUILDING IN ARMENIA: PHENOMENON OF INTEGRITY OF NATION AND STATE

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Abstract

The article deals with the issues of creating a new national ideology in the conditions of state-building in modern Armenia. The discourse of political actors on the role of national ideology, which is divided, is analyzed comparatively. This article attempts to reveal the main reasons why some believe that in modern Armenian society, based on the principles of political and ideological pluralism, there should be no ideology that claims to be national. On the contrary, the adherents of the creation of a national ideology see it as an important tool for the consolidation of the Armenian society.

The author comes to the conclusion that the collapse of the USSR and the Soviet ideology led to the fact that the role of ideology was criticized. The article touches upon the topic that since 1991, the process of de-ideologization of society and public institutions began in Armenia. However, in reality, the ideological confrontation between the various actors of the Armenian transit society intensified. Since 1988, the topic of the national ideology of Armenia has been one of the key topics of interdisciplinary research.

Keywords: new national ideology, ideological confrontation, ideological renaissance, political pluralism, nationalism, Armenian transit society, political struggle.

Introduction

The complication of social life leads to a variety of different manifestations of ideology, when it appears before us in the form of peculiar, but resilient formations that

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reflect the new needs of social development. The constitution of national ideology as a real force in modern social and political transformations is quite logical, since in connection with the aggravation of geopolitical conflicts, a true ideological renaissance is observed, which is expressed not so much in the emergence of new ideological systems, but in the growth of the influence of old ideologies. This circumstance is connected with the rapid growth of the national self-consciousness of the peoples involved not only in the process of democratization of their societies, but also in the deepening globalization processes, as well as the ethnic paradoxes of our time (Cox 2021, 39-45; Kellas 1998, 27-32).

Nationalism prepares the necessary ground for the formation of a national ideology. It acts as a political doctrine that requires ideological justification. National ideology, just like nationalism, is aimed at creating the necessary conditions for the political self-determination of the nation. This is the main similarity between both phenomena (Cox 2021, 46-48; Kellas 1998, 189-208). The presence of a national movement of its own ideology greatly facilitates and accelerates the process of successful national and political mobilization and is often its necessary prerequisite. Ideology helps to delineate and define the politicized sphere of national identity, reinforce national demands with moral justification, give the political activity of the movement a meaning and purpose that take on a special meaning that transcends the needs of everyday existence. In general, the national ideology is designed to form the beliefs of the representatives of this national community and orient them in the social and political space (Zajda and Vissing 2022, 1-8; Rodrigues and Cabete 2022, 55-63).

At the same time, it should be noted that a certain difference remains between nationalism and national ideology, which is expressed both in the content and in the functional understanding of these phenomena. The first of them is, although meaningful, but still a political action, the second is a conceptual and theoretical substantiation of this action. The national ideology is a kind of reflection on nationalism, on national and patriotic feelings and on the desire for political action of the representatives of this nation (Kellas 1998, 129-151; Hutchinson 2003, 71-92).

Nationalism manifests itself mainly at the level of consciousness of the nation, while the national ideology at the level of self-consciousness of the nation (Zartman 2019, 379-382). At the same time, these phenomena are closely interconnected and influence each other. Thus, the national ideology is formed on the basis of nationalism and, at the same time, directs it. Nationalism and national ideology coexist as it happens in general between political practice and ideology. Despite the fact that they enjoy some independence, neither politics nor ideology can exist in isolation. Nationalism and national ideology, being multi-level phenomena, may undergo some self-correction as a result of changes in the social situation (Steber 2012, 25-31; Schoch 2007, 42-50). However, this does not mean that the process of mutual enrichment of these phenomena stops. On the contrary, they continue to interact and improve, adapting to the surrounding social and political reality, to its urgent tasks.

Relationship between national ideology and political orientation

The concept of national ideology is sometimes identified with the concept of nationalism. The national ideology, being determined by social existence, often acquires independence, which is essentially associated with the position of the actor and carrier of this ideology of the nation, with the essence of the problems and tasks facing it, and its ability to realize its social and political guidelines (Paić 2022; Riabchuk 2023; Cushing 2022). In this regard, if classical ideologies focus on the problems of social content, then the national ideology focuses primarily on resolving national problems. At certain historical stages, it has more opportunities to objectively reflect the interests of a particular community than classical ideologies. For them, society, sometimes identified with public authority, is considered a priority, while for a national ideology, the nation is a priority.

Since the end of the 19th century, after the completion of the stage of creating nation-states, the West entered a new phase of development. Having significantly strengthened economically, the West presents its ideological system as the only possible way of progress, as well as a general civilizational political ideal (Kymlicka 2003, 145-151; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009, 189-205). Moreover, using various financial, economic, ideological, political and other means of pressure, the West seeks to spread its values among the developing nations. This is facilitated by the issues of the emergence of a national ideology with the modernization processes taking place in Europe in the 18th-19th centuries.

Eurocentrism in the scientific research of Western researchers prevents them from giving an objective assessment of the history of many countries and peoples that fall out of this context and follow their own special path. Thus, according to Francois Furet, the emergence of an ideology is inextricably linked, firstly, with revolutionary consciousness or the process of modernization; secondly, with the politicization of all moral and intellectual issues; thirdly, with education as propaganda; fourthly, with the activities of the revolutionaries in European countries. According to Furet, it was the French who discovered democratic politics used as a national ideology. He argues that it is a matter of national ideology. And he connects this with the fact that the already formed nation acted as the referent of ideology in France (Furet 1998, 34; Scott 1991). Under these conditions, the desire of economically developed countries to spread their political ideals in various regions of the planet is understandable. However, it should be noted that such actions, taking place without taking into account the interests of the so-called uncivilized nations, become the reason for the reverse processes of rejection of all Western values, which is also inappropriate for national progress (Arthur 2022, 1-9; Cooley 2020).

The movement from the sacralization of national characteristics through the ideologization and politicization of the nation to the mobilization of its bearers is largely the result of the activities of national elites and is mainly manifested during periods of social stress and aggravation of intergroup rivalry. In such situations, national leaders very easily manage to convince members of their national community to perceive their destiny in national dimensions, and not in individual or social class ones. Leaders seek to convince the masses that, without national solidarity, their

special group values and interests, as well as their individual aspirations, will be seriously threatened (Malešević 2006, 204-226; Behrma 1988, 129-131).

The intellectual elite is ideologically activated even in the case when ideological stereotypes that are unusual for a given nation are imposed from outside. However, in the context of globalization, the national elite is obliged to carefully study the imposed values, but not in order to substantiate their inconsistency, and even more so negativity, but to identify significant positive elements of this value system. Only as a result of a creative approach to values that have been proving their viability in Western countries for centuries, as well as their application, taking into account the interests and traditions of the nation, it will be possible to ensure the stability of national progress.

Applied knowledge of theories and assimilation of the experience of other countries is necessary, but only as general ideological and political guidelines, and not as realpolitik, a tool for change. Such a concept can act as such, which proceeds both from general patterns and from the known mechanism of their refraction in specific reality, which appeals not to consciousness in general, but to national consciousness (Blanksten 1967, 3-11). And this, as a research prerequisite, implies a deep theoretical understanding of both national and historical, and cultural and historical development.

The essence, structure, stages of formation and development of the national ideology, as well as the ways and forms of its functioning are directly related to the entire traditional culture. Historical experience, way of life, traditions and customs transmitted by a given culture are the main regulators of the relationship between members of society (Milačić 2022, 7-12; Burrin 2000, 135-140). The very same traditional culture of the people functions through various social institutions, which are entirely dependent on the characteristics of the social organization.

The initial basis for the formation of a national ideology is national consciousness and self-consciousness, which gradually leads to understanding, awareness of the inherent value of a given people or ethnic community. That is why the national ideology acts as the main factor of national self-consciousness and is updated during the period of aggravation of the political struggle, economic and social crisis (Tirtosudarmo 2018, 102-105). Like any ideology, a national ideology begins with knowledge of processes that are of public or group interest.

In the national ideology, along with values, the feelings and expectations of the nation, its worldview in relation to their expediency and the possibilities of preserving spirituality and its further existence are closely intertwined. The functioning of the national ideology is strongly influenced by religious values, or rather, their rooting in national self-consciousness. All this allows us to conclude that the national ideology is an important factor in national identification, the highest form of national self-consciousness and a means of integrating the representatives of the nation into a single viable integrity that exists in specific historical conditions (Linz 1993).

According to some researchers, the national ideology performs a number of fundamentally important functions for the process of ethnopolitical mobilization. *First*, it is a systematized set of articulated beliefs that define collective identity and membership criteria, emphasize the common interests of group members, and identify outsiders who challenge or hinder the exercise of the nation's legitimate rights. As a rule, the ideologists of national movements emphasize the common interests of all

members of the group and, consequently, the need for the unity of their thoughts and actions. At the same time, social differences existing within the nation are obscured in the face of a common threat perceived by all members of the group and ideas about the commonality of their destinies. *Secondly*, the national ideology explains and justifies the need for the movement, substantiates the significance of the political struggle waged by the movement, and interprets participation in it as a national value. *Thirdly*, the national ideology sets the vision of the final successful result of the movement, which justifies the price of participation in it. *Fourth*, the external function of the national ideology is to create and project a certain image of the movement and its demands to outsiders, including the government and foreign audiences.

Obviously, the definition of the essence of national ideology through its connection with a particular society does not always sound convincing. At the same time, many researchers focus on the existence of statehood as an institution that regulates the functioning of society, that is, in practice, they equate society with the state. From the point of view of the historical past of European countries, such a formulation of the question certainly has the right to exist, since it logically substantiates the processes of the emergence of national ideologies in Europe (Connor 1972). However, in this case, not only the multifaceted nature and versatility of ideology is significantly narrowed, but also the social and group essence of this phenomenon is relegated to the background.

The possibilities of such an approach are clearly insufficient when considering the history of those countries and peoples that have been deprived of political independence for hundreds of years. In such conditions, not social and historical, but historical, national and cultural characteristics come to the fore in the study of ideology (Doli 2019, 3-7; Jüde 2020, 92-100). This circumstance in no way testifies to the opposition of the public to the national. Both of these phenomena always act as different sides, or even levels or beginnings, of a single historical process. Here we can only talk about the predominance of one or another of the principles within the framework of a single whole, and then under certain historical conditions (social, political crises, loss of statehood, etc.). If we proceed from the position according to which the understanding of the public is correlated with the understanding of the state, then in the absence of a state, one can only conditionally assert the existence of society (Takagi, Kanchoochat and Sonobe 2019, 3-9).

The presence of a society among nations and peoples deprived of statehood is most often mentioned in ethnographic and cultural literature. However, many researchers, using the concept of society, invest in it a completely different content. In most cases, this concept includes a sociological component, and it is used to characterize social or specific ethnic communities. However, the concept of society implies the existence of state and political structures, a system of legal norms that establish social relations within the state and ensure its functional integrity.

The situation changes radically when a certain people is included in some foreign state. Having lost statehood, this nation becomes part of a foreign society, subject to the existing order, social, political, public and economic relations, legal and legislative systems, and others. It is clear that the military and political seizure of the country does not directly lead to the destruction of all types of traditionally formalized relations

(Myerson 2014, 175-180). It depends on many factors, such as the strength of the traditions of the subject peoples, the level of development of their spiritual culture, the degree of rootedness in the national consciousness and self-awareness of ideas about the significance of state and political entities in ensuring the self-preservation of the nation, the level of its spiritual and political maturity and activity. An example is, for example, the history of the Armenian people, which over the centuries has proved its ability to survive by enriching its spiritual culture and launching a national liberation struggle under conditions of the most severe exploitation by foreign conquerors. In such cases, it would be more correct to speak not about the existence of a society or a social community, but about a nation or a national community. It is these concepts that can be considered as initial in the process of studying the historical past of such peoples as the Armenian. It is known that in certain periods of history (Ayrarat Kingdom, Artashesians, Arshakuni, Bagratuni, Cilician Armenian Kingdom) Armenia was a strong centralized state (Payaslian 2007, 53-75, 77-100). It is clear that in this case I can confidently assert the existence of the Armenian society from the point of view of the sociological approach. In addition, it is known that after the loss of statehood, being part of the Roman, Byzantine empires, the Iranian kingdom and the Arab Caliphate, various parts of the former Armenia often enjoyed autonomy, and in some cases, complete independence. In a number of cases, these autonomies even acquired the features of statehood (as happened during the existence of the Zakarian principality). However, it is clear that in such cases, only with a high degree of conventionality one has to speak about the presence of an Armenian society and unequivocally use this concept to characterize the true situation of the Armenians.

In the development of all spheres of spiritual life, church, religious, politics and ideological activities of the Armenians, national life acquired great importance. However, at different stages of history, its significance was defined in different ways. In the period from the second century BC to 428, the concept of national existence, with some reservations, coincides with the concept of social existence, which is due to the presence of a centralized state. After the loss of statehood, national existence becomes decisive in the ideological activity of Armenian thinkers. In the first case, the main task and the prevailing idea was to preserve the integrity of the state. In the second, ensuring national unity as a necessary condition for the restoration of their statehood in the future.

The liquidation of the Armenian state forced the Armenian secular and religious figures to think about the preservation in the national consciousness of the desire to doom the new statehood and political independence. They associated the solution of this problem primarily with the assertion of linguistic, ideological and cultural independence and unity. Spiritual identification has become an indirect, and in some cases a direct factor in substantiating the idea of creating an independent state. In the works of Armenian thinkers of the early Middle Ages, for obvious reasons, the general philosophical system is not directly linked to the national existence of Armenians. It only indirectly contributed to the formation of social, philosophical and political views, which were already directly approaching national existence. The development of culture was perceived as an integral part of the general political program of national progress. Armenian thinkers and ideologists successfully used the spiritual factor to

resolve the cardinal problems of national existence, subordinating it to the fundamental national interests. Thanks to such a strategy, many national ideas were fixed in the national consciousness of the Armenian people for a long time.

The cultural and historical existence of each individual nation reflects both the general laws of the development of world culture and the national characteristics of the spiritual sphere. The history of the nation as a carrier of universal human values is likened to the process of enrichment, transformation and concretization of universal historical patterns. Each nation comprehends universal human values in its own way, which determines its place and role in the history of civilizations.

The role and significance of culture in the history of various peoples is immensely great. In the history of some peoples, the cultural factor can also perform such functions as political and ideological. We are talking about the transformation of the cultural factor into a state and political factor, and in the absence of statehood, into a national and political factor. What has been said primarily applies to those nations that have lost their statehood, and not to those who were generally deprived of the opportunity to enjoy political independence by creating their own state.

However, this circumstance is not decisive for the transformation of the cultural factor into a political and ideological one. It is necessary that a nation that has lost its statehood has a powerful spiritual potential that allows not only to fill the vacuum that has arisen after the liquidation of the state, but also to create values that enrich world culture. In this case, we are not talking about cultural policy, but about the political concept of culture. To develop such a concept, a nation must have a high level of social, cultural and political development, as well as a well-formed spectrum of forms of national and social consciousness. The emergence of the political concept of culture, in fact, means the creation of an appropriate national ideology. For a nation that has lost statehood, this means finding ways to give spiritual processes a political content, subordinating the spiritual sphere to the fundamental interests and goals of the nation.

The main goal in this case is to ensure the process of national identification and the assertion of political independence. Any ideology is an ideological system, which is a reflection and theoretical substantiation of reality. Therefore, there can be no eternally unchanging ideologies that, in different periods of history, must measure and update their basic provisions, based on the corresponding changes in real life. This statement also applies to national ideology. Without creative development and self-correction, it can cease to fulfill its main function and thereby lose its relevance or, worse, simply die. In such cases, the functions of ensuring the self-preservation and development of the nation in different historical periods are taken over by religion, or, in general, the culture of the people, with an emphasis on its political component. The thousand-year history of the Armenian people, filled with numerous ups and downs in the social and political life of the people, created the preconditions for such a spasmodic development of the national ideology.

When determining the essence of national ideology, one should also take into account the fact that each community, in the process of crystallization of self-consciousness, forms its own ideas about reality and its own system of values. Such an ideological system in the early stages of its formation cannot yet be identified with ideology. In the early stages of development, the community forms only its own vision

of the world and finds its own distinctive features and characteristics. Such representations are still static in nature, as they are based on the reflection of already established realities. However, in the end, they become constituent elements of the consciousness and self-awareness of the community and can later be transformed into constituent ideologies.

At the beginning of the process of national identification of Armenians, the first ideological ideas appeared, which divided the surrounding communities into friends and foes, and also substantiated the originality, distinctive features and characteristics of the Armenians. This can be judged from ancient Armenian literary sources, such as the legends about Hayk and Bel, Artashes and Artavazd, Ara the Handsome and Shamiram and others. However, this circumstance is not enough to assert the existence of a national ideology. Some researchers, taking into account the ethnic orientation of such works, unreasonably talk about the appearance of such an ideology even at the stage of tribal associations of people. This system, in our opinion, can only be defined as a static value system, emphasizing only the features of the Armenian community and contributing to the formation of the national consciousness of Armenians (Panossian 2006).

Tigran II Artashesyan made the first attempt to formulate a political concept of culture, designed to ensure the progressive development of the Armenian people. During the years of his reign, Armenia faced the following task: being in the area of the Hellenistic world and borrowing a lot from the culture of the Hellenistic countries, to preserve the spiritual and cultural identity of its people. In addition, it was necessary to unite on a single spiritual basis the various peoples and tribes of the sovereign kingdom and form on this basis a single ethno-social community. The way out was found in the creation of such a political concept of culture, which elevated the Hellenization of public life to the rank of state policy. Thus, not only the issue of uniting all the peoples of the kingdom around a strong centralized state was resolved, but also the social and economic progress inherent in all Hellenistic countries was ensured. Common lines of contact between the Armenian and Roman cultures were outlined, which should have contributed to the peaceful political coexistence of the two powers. In general, the policy of protecting Hellenism pursued by Tigran II became a political counterbalance to the expansionist policy of Rome, Romanization. But the main achievement lies in the fact that through the spread of Hellenism, Tigran sought to preserve the Armenian elements of spiritual culture. After all, the process of Hellenization also has the other side of the coin: the peoples involuntarily accentuate their features and differences with the epicenters of Hellenism. Something similar is observed at the present time in the modern world, which is undergoing the processes of globalization.

Unfortunately, Tigran II, like his followers, did not manage to fully realize the intended grandiose program. However, even what he did ensured the inclusion of the country in a number of developed Hellenistic states and completed the process of the formation of Hellenistic traditions in Armenia, which, in one form or another, survived over the following centuries, acting as one of the main cultural, educational and theoretical directions.

The confrontation between two neighboring powerful powers (Rome and Sasanian Iran) that began in the 3rd century AD for dominance in Armenia, which was

strategically important for them, the rooting of feudalism and its attendant fragmentation, the civil strife of the Armenian nakharars, etc. shattered the foundations of statehood. The only real force capable of deterring external aggression was national unity, which could be achieved through a single idea that protected national interests. Such a function could be performed by that ideological system that would combine the ideas of centralized power, state integrity and national identity. Christianity became a similar system for the Armenian people.

The adoption of Christianity in Armenia as the state religion created theoretical prerequisites for ideological distancing from both Iran and Rome, which was pagan at that time. This ensured the ideological and, indirectly, political independence of Armenia, such important conditions for maintaining an independent statehood. The political concept of the Christianization of Armenia was intended to strengthen the shattering state integrity on a single ideological basis and preserve the national identity of the Armenians in a hostile environment.

The political situation in Armenia changed dramatically in 387 after the partition of the country between Iran and Byzantium. Nominally, the kingdom existed in Eastern Armenia until 428. However, it was during this period that the threat of loss of state integrity became a reality. The problems associated with the strengthening of the central government gave way to the more difficult and fateful problem of preserving the identity of the national life, which was aggravated by the growing religious and ideological expansion from outside. The existing ideological system in the form of monotheistic Christianity has not yet had time to fully reveal its potential and has not become a national religion, a single spiritual and ideological force. The main obstacle to the fulfillment of this historical mission was that worship and even propaganda of Christian ideas were not conducted in their native language. In addition, after the division of Armenia, both Iran and Christian Byzantium resumed the policy of ideological and religious assimilation, and above all in the sphere of language policy (Ustyan 2009). Only the creation of national letters could strengthen the position of the Armenian Church. On the one hand, this would create a barrier to the ideological and religious expansion of Iran through the Syriac-speaking Church, on the other hand, it would strengthen the national character of the Armenian Church, providing an opportunity to draw a line on a linguistic basis that separates it from the Greek Church, supported by Byzantium (Ustyan 2009).

This task was brilliantly accomplished by the great educator Mesrop Mashtots in 405. When creating the alphabet, he took into account not only the phonetic features of the Armenian language, but also the ideological and political situation in the country. The alphabet created by Mashtots cannot be reduced to any of the used alphabets either in terms of paradigmatics, or in the sequence of sound units and alphabetic characters, or in the form of writing, or in the names of letters, or in numerical values. He synthesized various principles for constructing the alphabet and writing, creating a qualitatively new alphabet. The invention of the Armenian alphabet created a powerful foundation for the ongoing struggle for spiritual and cultural identity, and through this the struggle for the preservation or restoration of national or state independence (Arevshatyan 1973, 33-34). This cultural and historical act was mediated by the needs of the church and religion, which in turn were the product of a specific political and

ideological situation in the country, being, ultimately, subordinate to the national interests.

The creation of national scripts made it possible to get rid of the dominance of the Greek and Syriac languages, the spiritual, political and ideological influence of the respective Christian churches, which also meant the creation of a kind of cultural barrier to the political and ideological aggression of the powers of Byzantium and Iran behind them. Thanks to this, Christianity in a short historical period has become the dominant national religion, and the church has become the spokesman and defender of national interests. As a result, the further struggle of the Armenian people for the faith and the Christian church was rightfully identified with the struggle for national, state and political independence.

Since the time of Tigran II, the political concepts of Armenian culture have been completely subordinated to the solution of national problems, which, based on the existing realities, have undergone a significant transformation from an imperial orientation to the desire to recreate their statehood and preserve national identity. The significance of these concepts, from the point of view of the formation of a national ideology, comes down to the fact that for a long time they managed to solve a very important problem - to form the national consciousness of the Armenian people. The subsequent development of Armenian culture made it possible to formalize the national identity of the people, one of the manifestations of which is the national ideology.

With the appearance in the 5th century of the works of great Armenian historiographers such as Movses Khorenatsi, Pavstos Byuzand, Agatangeghos, as well as philosophers (Yeznik Koghbatsi and others), the foundation is laid for putting forward a more dynamic value system than the political concept of the culture of national ideology. A special merit in this matter belongs to Khorenatsi. He managed in a brilliant way to embody the idea of turning the cultural factor into a political and ideological one. The fundamental idea of his historical and political concept is the idea that the Armenian people are the same age as the most ancient civilized peoples of the world, the Armenian statehood was formed together with the first states on earth, and its restoration is the natural right of the Armenian people (Mirumyan and Arevshatyan 2007, 260-261).

In various ways and arguments, Khorenatsi proves that the origin of the Armenian people dates back to the Old Testament patriarchs. He tells the story of the heroic deeds of the ancient Armenian leaders and kings, who, at the cost of their own blood, won freedom for themselves and for their people. From them originates the Armenian kingdom, its moral and legal basis. And this means that the Armenian statehood, like the statehood of the most ancient civilized peoples, has a divine origin, fully corresponds to the highest divine law. Therefore, from the point of view of natural law, the Armenian state is lawful and eternal. From this Khorenatsi concludes that the current dependent position of Armenia, the loss of national sovereignty is a historical injustice. Therefore, the restoration of the lost political independence, national statehood is nothing but the assertion of natural justice.

Khorenatsi consistently holds the idea that patriotism and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of the freedom of one's native land are the highest virtues both for leaders and for the whole people. Therefore, as one of the most ancient and civilized

peoples of the world, having won freedom and created its statehood at the dawn of human history, the Armenian people have a natural right to sovereignty and an existence worthy of sovereign peoples. Khorenatsi, in solidarity with the statement of the former Armenian Catholicos Sahak Partev, argues that it is better to have our own, albeit a bad state, than a good one, but someone else's: "Is it possible that I change my sick sheep for a healthy animal, whose very health is a scourge for us." (Khorenatsi 1990, 206).

The political concept of Khorenatsi is not limited to statements about the need to recreate the Armenian state. It also touches on such important topics of national self-preservation as the relationship between the state and the family, the political and legal basis of society, the relationship of the state and people with the church, the problems of war and peace. Khorenatsi is not limited to a simple narration of historical events in the life of the Armenian people. His merit lies not only in this, although many historians tend to consider Khorenatsi precisely as a chronicler, which significantly diminishes his role in the development of the spiritual life of the people.

The main content of his work is that he assesses historical facts through the prism of national interests, while using the historical memory of the people with the sole purpose of strengthening the national consciousness of the Armenian people and directing it to the future, aiming at solving specific national problems. In this regard, Khorenatsi must be considered the founder of the national ideology, which was to play the role of a vector in the development of political reality.

Throughout the history of the Armenian people, there has been a close relationship between the national ideology and the political orientation of the culture of the people, which was often compensated by the performance of ideological functions by the Armenian Gregorian Church. In certain periods of the further development of political reality, each of these phenomena assumed responsibility for the fulfillment of the most important task of the self-preservation of the Armenian people. During this period of Armenian culture, the church began to play the main role in solving this problem. After the abolition of the Armenian kingdom, she took over state and political functions.

For quite real reasons, church, religious, ideological and political relations acted as facets of a single process, which in a sense were identical. Moreover, in specific historical conditions, the ecclesiastical and religious factor often not only set off, but also replaced the ideological one. Ultimately, the position and status of the church itself depended on this. In specific historical conditions, this meant the need to develop an ideological and political doctrine that would not only ensure national and ecclesiastical independence, but also neutralize possible aggressive encroachments from neighboring countries. As a result, the entire medieval period of the history of the Armenian people was twice marked by the creation of the statehood of the kingdom of Bagratuni and the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia, and also allowed the Armenian people to preserve their national identity and not undergo assimilation.

The processes of secularization of public life in Europe in the 18th century influenced many other regions of the world, including the Armenians. In the 18th-19th centuries, the process of overcoming the traditional way of the church community and the self-consciousness of the Armenians inherent in it began and proceeded at an accelerated pace. Secular motifs, saturated with national interests, were introduced into

the national consciousness through the creativity of members of the Mkhitarist Congregation, Stepanos Nazaryan, Ghevond Alishan, Grigor Artsruni, Raffi and others. This process proceeded most intensively in the second half of the 19th century, when the traditional Armenian parties Armenakan, Gunchak and Dashnaktsutyun entered the political arena. Since that time, they have become not only the main actors in political life, but also the bearers of a new national ideology.

Their significance in strengthening the national self-consciousness of the Armenian people is so great that it leads many modern researchers to the idea that it is to these parties that the people owe the formation of the national ideology. However, it should be noted that the main role of the national parties is not to create an Armenian national ideology (this is the prerogative of the national intelligentsia), but to give it a new content, consonant with the historical period being experienced. The predominance of the role of the political concept of culture and the Armenian Apostolic Church during this period is obscured, and the political component of the national ideology comes to the fore.

With the formation of traditional Armenian political parties, the idea of the inevitability of the creation of a new Armenian state in the historical homeland and its transformation into a nation-state was strengthened in the national self-consciousness of Armenians. The substantiation of this idea by political parties was accompanied by a desire for a harmonious combination of national and universal values. Thus, an attempt was made to create the necessary prerequisites for the return of the Armenian civilization to its origins, that is, on the one hand, for the restoration of statehood, and on the other, for the transformation of the Armenian people into a particle of progressive humanity. This explains the fact that the programs of all political parties reflect the assertion of democracy, freedom and equality of all Armenians in demands that are in tune with the ideas prevailing in many European countries.

Since the end of the 19th century, many ideas of a religious-messianic nature have been ousted from the spiritual life of Armenians. This forced even representatives of the conservative trend, formed on the basis of the value system of the Armenian Apostolic Church, to transform their views. They switched to the positions of national conservatism, which no longer gave priority to the church, as the main bearer of national values, but to the Armenian nation itself. Similar changes have also been made to the liberal current, which has entered a period of crisis since the end of the 19th century, but since the first quarter of the 20th century, the Ramkavar-Azatakan party has acquired an ideological system based on the priority of national values.

Thus, since the beginning of the 20th century, the new national ideology has turned into a dominant value system, which, although it proceeded from various strongholds (socialist, liberal and conservative), was at the same time unified in its approaches to the political and national goals and objectives of the Armenian nation and the resolution of the Armenian question, that is, the liberation of Western Armenia and the restoration of Armenian statehood. As can be seen, with the advent of Armenian political parties, the national ideology of the Armenians acquires an offensive character. Its emphasis is shifting from the problems of the nation's self-preservation to the problems of conducting a broad national and liberation struggle and the final liberation of the entire Fatherland.

In this regard, one should especially dwell on the issue of the perception of the concept of Motherland by the Armenian national ideology. At various historical stages, commensurate with the realities of national life, it was of a variable nature. From the very beginning of the formation of the national ideology, Western Armenia was perceived as the Motherland. After the Armenian Genocide in 1915-1923 and the re-establishment of the Armenian state in Eastern Armenia in 1918, Armenian ideologists, speaking of the Motherland, already meant a United, Indivisible and Independent Armenia. As for the Armenian state, the provisions of the national ideology perceived it both as the main goal and as a means for the liberation of the people.

In any, including the Armenian, national ideology, the main political goal is the desire to form a national state. However, the political realities in the life of the Armenian people gave its ideology a certain peculiarity. The restoration of statehood only in the Eastern part of the historical Motherland forces the national ideology to consider it, including as a means to achieve the main goal of ensuring the organic political unity of Eastern and Western Armenia. After the Genocide of 1915, the problem of "Hay-Dat" (Armenian Court) was added to this task, that is, the restoration of the historical justice of the recognition of this fact by the world community, as well as compensation by Turkey for the damage caused by it during this tragic period for the Armenian people.

It seemed that the formation of statehood in 1918 would allow the Armenian people to fight for the solution of these problems. However, the life span of the First Republic of Armenia turned out to be very short. It gave way to the semi-independent Armenian Soviet Republic, which, in turn, became part of the Transcaucasian Federation, and later part of the USSR. Statehood and national independence of the Armenians was blocked in many ways (Payaslian 2007 171-198). Thus, a new period began in the shadow development of the national ideology, which began to be expressed in the form of a new political concept of culture.

The profound social and economic changes that took place in Armenia during the Soviet period significantly increased the well-being of the people. In a short historical period, Armenia has become an industrialized republic with a powerful scientific potential and a wide network of educational and cultural institutions. Spiritual culture began to develop rapidly. Through the efforts of many party and state leaders devoted to the national idea, it was possible to formulate a new political concept of the culture of the Armenian people. On the one hand, it supported and used in the interests of the Armenian people the stereotypes imposed on them, on the other hand, under the pretext of developing the culture of the national outskirts, it strengthened its national identity. In this issue, the Armenian Soviet intelligentsia was able to use even the class orientation of the culture of the peoples of the USSR (Payaslian 2007, 199-227). The Armenian Soviet intelligentsia directed its efforts towards the preservation of the Armenian peasant traditions, which was identical to the preservation of the traditional national foundations of the people in the conditions of the unfolding propaganda of internationalism. It was precisely the preservation of national identity that allowed the Armenian people to carry through the decades the age-old aspirations for the liberation of their historical Motherland, to maintain hope for the restoration of historical justice and the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the world community, as well as the

entry of Artsakh into Armenia. In the 60s of the twentieth century, the people of Armenia experienced a period of their spiritual rebirth, which prepared them for a new phase of the struggle to solve these problems already in the period of the Third Republic (Mirumyan 1995).

The Soviet period in the development of Armenia is also notable for the fact that it ensured the implementation of state guardianship over the national system of values. In fact, the Armenian people throughout the Soviet era restored the long-lost ability to self-government. The functioning of the network of party and state bodies of the republic made it possible to introduce the Armenian people to the elementary norms of state building, the absence of which in 1918-1920 had a detrimental effect on the fate of the national state. The ideological and political system of values of the people, albeit indirectly, but oriented the Armenians to the need to assert political independence and create their own sovereign state. Thus, a holistic vision of the process of strengthening the self-consciousness of the Armenian people allows us to single out seven stages in the formation and development of the Armenian national ideology.

The first period can be called the initial stage of self-identification of the Armenian people, culminating in the adoption of Christianity in the 4th century.

The second period covers the 4th-5th centuries and basically completes the process of self-identification of the people with such important events in the history of Armenians as Christianization and the invention of the Armenian alphabet. However, the creation of the Khorenatsi national ideology of the Armenian people is considered an important result of this stage.

In the third period from the 5th to the 14th centuries, thanks to the functioning of the main postulates of the national ideology, as well as the active role of the Armenian Apostolic Church and the political component of the culture of the Armenian people, he twice managed to recreate his statehood.

The fourth period, covering the 14th-19th centuries, can be characterized as a stage in the struggle of the Armenian people for the preservation of their identity. The main role in this struggle belonged to the Armenian Church, thanks to which the people managed to survive not only in the conditions of the loss of statehood, but also the change in the demographic situation in their historical homeland by the presence of a significant array of foreign population. Of particular note is the fifth period of the revival of the national ideology, which begins with the formation of the Armenian national parties and ends with the creation in 1918 of the Armenian independent state.

The sixth period covers the years of the existence of the Armenian Soviet Republic, during which the Armenian people, despite the loss of independence and other negative phenomena, received the opportunity for peaceful development, retained and developed the ability to self-government. During this period, the function of preserving national identity was taken over by the Armenian national culture and, in part, by the Gregorian Church.

Finally, the seventh period begins with the formation of a new independent state in 1991 and continues to the present. It can be noted as a stage in the renewal of the self-identification of the Armenian people as a civic nation, which should culminate in the formation of a modern national ideology.

Challenges of the formation of a new Armenian national ideology

As a result of the Karabakh movement that broke out in 1988, and later becoming the Pan-Armenian National Movement (PANM), for decades a rigid system of ideological postulates led to a sharp rise in national consciousness. Stimulating and unifying these processes at the first stage of the Movement were the ideas of historical justice coming from the depths of centuries, the requirements for the triumph of law and international legal norms for regulating national and social relations, and focusing on universal values and criteria (Ter-Petrossian 2018, 13-21). However, the lack of a developed ideological and political concept and program, the ideology of the PANM affected both the Movement itself and the behavior of various social groups. It is no coincidence that in connection with the first real threat of punitive sanctions from the side of the central authorities, some groups dissociated themselves, and, first of all, representatives of the intellectual and creative elite and the former party state nomenklatura from the Movement, which was gaining a new round of development (Ter-Petrossian 2018, 13-21).

This was largely facilitated by the idea of creating the PANM as a political organization. Many citizens saw in this political act the claim of newly minted figures to political power. On the other hand, this led to a completely natural dissociation of the created party from the masses involved in the Karabakh movement (Ter-Petrossian 2018, 35-59). Since May 1988, the PANM tried to build on the Movement, which was no longer considered as a goal, but as a ready-made social base, or even a means for solving political problems. At the same time, there was a gap between political leaders and the movement itself. The gap deepened more and more and reached its climax in connection with the coming to power of the PANM and the proclamation of the independence of Armenia. This was largely facilitated by the fact that high expectations from the success of the PANM, its political victory, initially strengthened among the broad social strata. But the victory of the forces of democracy did not lead to rapid social changes, economic success, and the most complex and intractable problems appeared.

All this after 1990 gave rise to nihilistic moods and tendencies in the national consciousness, which is typical for crisis and transitional periods of social development. Such phenomena include, for example, the negative attitude of many citizens to the acceleration of state-building processes, to the political elite, to emerging social relations, to new value orientations, etc. It seemed that the national ideas that mobilized the Armenians in the initial period of the Artsakh movement were to be further developed in the future (Ter-Petrossian 2018, 35-59, 79-129). This would provide a real opportunity to transform the political concept of Soviet culture into a new national ideology. However, the further course of events turned the Armenian society off this path and slowed down the process of formation of the modern national ideology of the Armenian people.

The devaluation of ideas, slogans, under which the formation of the Karabakh movement took place, led some citizens to think about the wrongness of the chosen path. This path, littered with nationalist slogans, did not lead to the expected results. The consciousness of many members of society began to look for a way out of the

current situation in non-national, universal values. Some returned to the old idea of the saving mission of a strong personality, others to the revival of individualistic concepts, ultimately rejecting such traditional universals as the state, nation, national and state ideology, politics, religion, etc.

The statement of the First President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan regarding the national ideology, which he called a fictitious phenomenon, a false political category[1], is well known (Zolyan und Zakaryan 2010). Distancing from ideological postulates actually meant distancing from the previously dominant ideology of socialism and nationalism of the rival Dashnaktsutyun, but not ideology in general. There was a simple substitution of the named ideologies by another ideological system by liberalism. In fact, liberalism, regardless of the intentions of its promoters in Armenia, was objectively put forward as an alternative precisely for the national ideology, since the ideology of socialism had already discredited itself. However, despite the negative attitude towards the national ideology on the part of many leaders, the statements of the first president played a positive role in activating the scientific research of this phenomenon in Armenia, and also made other political forces of the country think about it and continue to search for a theoretical basis for the formation of a modern Armenian national ideology.

As discussed above, the process of liberal and conservative rapprochement is currently being updated. However, neither conservative liberalism, nor any of the other value systems in itself can be considered as a ready-made universal toolkit and serve as a tool for national and state development. No concept can be imposed on social reality, superimposed on it, it must be derived from the results of a deep and comprehensive, systematic study of real political processes. Each nation in its own way comes to universal human values and it is hardly correct to artificially introduce it into one or another given framework of the movement. In this regard, to consider this or that world model of national and social development as the only correct one, in my opinion, does not seem appropriate.

Neither the years of Perestroika nor the Karabakh movement, being saturated with new approaches to reality, nevertheless led to a reorientation of values and the formation of new values. Of no small importance were, firstly, the absence of national and political culture and thinking, sustainable traditions of national, historical and national and value creativity, and, secondly, the resulting vacuum in social and political consciousness due to stormy and, in a certain sense, destructive processes . In general, in Armenia, as in many post-Soviet countries, there was a process of socio-political and value disorientation of various social strata and groups. The country has established a situation that is characterized by the principle of social parallels. In conditions of indefinite balance in the transitional Armenian society, two systems of values, old and new, functioned in parallel.

Being formed for a long time not only at the level of consciousness, but also at the subconscious level, the area of value orientations during the period of social changes is relatively less subject to fundamental shifts. However, the old system of values, like

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[1] The Armenian Center for National and International Studies. 2021. "Ideology is a powerful political weapon." https://acnis.am/en/editorial/42-2021-en; MFA of the RA. 1994. "A referendum is the best way to adopt the Constitution." 25 April, 1994. https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/1994/04/25/ltp/1580.

many other things, did not work in the new conditions. In society, there was a need to form a new system of values, which should have been done first of all by representatives of the intelligentsia. However, the latter conceded, for a number of objective and subjective reasons, their traditional positions to other social groups and took a passive position.

Meanwhile, the newly appeared civil forces as a layer of business people and entrepreneurs, political parties, public and religious organizations began to put forward their own criteria for value systems, which gradually infiltrated the public and national consciousness, acquiring the significance of social norms. As a result, instead of the mono-value Soviet system, a multi-value system began to be created, the elements of which, although they existed earlier, did not possess intrinsic value. Nevertheless, in our opinion, it is the Armenian intelligentsia that should develop a new system of values. It will have to give a theoretical, methodological, ideological and political understanding of the transition to a new system of values, conduct a comprehensive analysis of it and identify the place and role of various social groups in its creation. Only after the formation of such a value system will it be possible to form a modern national ideology, because without a value orientation, any ideology loses its meaning. In this regard, the current situation in Armenia can be characterized as an internal fermentation of minds, or as a process of searches, a clash of principles and real life needs, a breakdown, a collapse of the usual value orientations, during which sprouts of new guidelines and principles, criteria emerge. and norms of activity, behavior, lifestyle, moral and professional values, etc.

Cultural, historical, spiritual, moral and psychological traditions and values created over millennia require appropriate understanding and inclusion in the system of modern knowledge, the establishment of norms, the creation of a powerful ideological, theoretical, cultural and spiritual basis for the further development of the nation. We are talking about the creative transformation of the system of values inherited from the Soviet system, but not from its indiscriminate criticism, but by considering the past, present and future of the nation as links in a single chain, from which not a single link can be removed mechanically. In fact, society is faced with the need not only to create a national ideology, but also to correct the self-consciousness of the nation, which appears before the world community in a new capacity as a politically self-determined community. The people of Armenia, like all Armenians living in many other countries, will have to realize and comprehend the fact of the creation of statehood and all the new circumstances arising from this. The completion of the process of such a transformation of national self-consciousness, which is not least connected with the formation of a new value system, will create fertile ground for the emergence of a phenomenon that is at a higher level of self-consciousness of the national ideology.

An appropriate ideology is necessary for the spiritual, linguistic and ideological unity of all Armenians in the world. Both state structures and all political and public organizations, including opposition ones, are obliged to participate in its creation. However, in the end, only the national intelligentsia can become the creator of the national ideology, and all social and political structures should be interested in strengthening their positions.

The presence in the public consciousness of individual national ideas, their mechanical addition does not give grounds for asserting the existence of a national

ideology. The latter should take the form of an orderly political concept that has a programmatic character. The development of such an ideological system requires a comprehensive and scrupulous study and analysis of the historical past and the present, a theoretical understanding of the spiritual experience of the past from the point of view of modern national and political tasks. The absence of such an approach is a great omission of the political forces of society and political science in general.

At present, the question of the correlation of national and state ideologies has become actual in Armenia. This problem is in the field of view of all political forces of the society. The national ideology can exhaust itself in the case when the nation is identified with society, or these two systems coincide in volume, but not in content. On the example of the history of the Armenian people, one can be convinced that in the history of mankind there are cases when there is a clear discrepancy between these two phenomena. After all, only one third of the Armenians managed to recreate statehood in a small part of their historical homeland.

On the other hand, with the formation of a nation-state, naturally, the national fades into the background, giving way to the public. This is especially true in the case of Armenia, where the majority of the population found themselves in a difficult social, economic, domestic and psychological state. This is evidenced by numerous public opinion polls in Armenia, which reveal the priorities of the majority of Armenians in public life. Among such priorities for the majority of Armenian citizens is the overcoming of social and economic problems. Naturally, these circumstances somewhat shifted the emphasis in political life towards resolving these problems, perhaps even to the detriment of national priorities. However, as the crisis phenomena in society are overcome, the probability of returning to the initial state will increase.

In general, the identification of the nation with society in practice means that with the declaration of independence, national tasks are considered solved, and needs are realized. According to this logic, in such conditions, the national ideology loses its relevance, and from this it follows that the nation no longer has national interests: they are replaced by state and public interests. And if we accept this point of view, it turns out that two-thirds of the Armenian nation mechanically drop out of the national process. It is clear what negative consequences such an approach can have for the ideological and political unity of the nation.

The Armenian people continue to have unresolved national tasks, in connection with which the issue of creating a system of ideas that makes it possible to comprehend the national existence and substantiate the next program goals of the Armenian nation is even more relevant. In modern conditions, the national factor again restores its shaken positions and gradually becomes dominant. This is evidenced at least by the fact that the Armenians of the world took an active part in the discussion of the issue of establishing relations with neighboring Turkey (Oskanian 2013).

In those historical periods when there is no state ideology, the national ideology assumes the function of a guide for the entire nation. It retains its functional significance as long as the state is not identified with the nation. The national ideology can function effectively even in the case when the state ideology, although it exists, is aimed at solving, mainly, purely social, economic and general political problems. However, in general, state and national ideologies manifest themselves at different

levels and can neither be identified nor, moreover, opposed. From this point of view, the approach adopted by many researchers, according to which the national ideology acts as a strategy, and the state ideology as a tactic, does not stand up to criticism. Both ideologies, one way or another, are called upon to comprehend both the strategic and tactical tasks facing the Armenian nation.

Until recent years, there is still an active discourse in Armenia about the absence of a democratic systematized state ideology, and the development of a national ideology is in its infancy. In this regard, they are approximately at the same stage of development. However, this does not mean that political activity in the country takes place without the presence of ideological guidelines. The emergence of a national ideology does not contradict the formation of a state ideology. Two options are possible here: 1) the development of a national ideology precedes the state one and becomes the basis for communicating national content to it, 2) the creation of such a state ideology that would include the main provisions of the national ideology, more precisely, the main ways and program guidelines for solving national problems.

Regardless of which of the above options may work, the decisive role of state ideology can be traced, which is a necessary attribute of any state system and greatly enriches and concretizes the national ideology. National ideology performs the functions inherent in any ideology. It should cover those practical spheres of the life of Armenians where it is needed. And the need for the existence of a national ideology arises both in the part of the Armenian people that has gained statehood, and far beyond the borders of Armenia in the Armenian diaspora. In the conditions of statehood, any political party involuntarily pursues mainly party goals. Other tasks, including national ones, are naturally relegated to the background or are subordinated to party interests, brought into line with them. In practice, this leads to their identification, as a result of which party interests are very often presented as national ones. Such manipulations, whether consciously or unconsciously, are usually accompanied by reference to the national character of the given political party. Parties can be considered as such only if they have a systematically developed national ideology and program. At the same time, the factor of the existing statehood should act as the initial and determining factor, and not the final one, which is legitimate for the previous stages of the history of the Armenian people.

The situation is somewhat different with traditional political parties, which over the course of decades, with varying degrees of intensity, have made great efforts to maintain the ideas of national unity and revival, the restoration of their own statehood in their historical homeland. However, from the moment of their creation, their activity proceeded mainly far beyond the borders of Armenia and in the absence of statehood. The factor of future statehood was the starting point, but at the same time the final one in the ideology of traditional parties. With the proclamation of the Republic of Armenia, a fundamentally different situation arose, requiring a rethinking, a revision of the previous attitudes. In particular, this concerns ensuring their influence on the territory of Armenia itself. The Dashnaktsutsyun party managed to correct its tactical tasks to the greatest extent. Although not everything went smoothly for her, as, say, in the mid-90s of the last century. At the present stage, this party almost always had 6-8 percent during almost all election campaigns.

With the formation and development of statehood, a new problem arose for all political parties to find their social base. In the past, it was of secondary importance, since then it was about the fate of the entire nation, and the parties had to fight for the realization of the age-old aspirations of the Armenian people. In the post-Soviet period, there was a strong differentiation of the country's population. There were many layers with their own needs and interests. Serious, sometimes insurmountable, contradictions began to emerge between different social groups. The activities of the parties in Armenia were gradually directed towards the search for those social strata of society on which they could rely in their political activities. Thus, the program guidelines of political parties were enriched with provisions covering the interests of an increasing number of citizens of Armenia. This circumstance makes it possible to enrich the national ideology with new elements and turn it into a dynamic system of ideas.

The transformation of some political parties into carriers of national ideology is largely hindered by the fact that they are still caste-based. Basically, they pursue narrow group goals and are focused on solving momentary problems. Opportunistic political games very often impede the serious ideological and political development of parties. Therefore, some of them slide into clan squabbles among themselves, where it is no longer law that rules, but elemental force.

Criticism of state authorities has become the main breeding ground for the activity of some political parties, the main means of their self-affirmation. In their activities, there is a lack of a constructively creative beginning, ignoring the positive results in the activities of public structures. The critical and nihilistic political attitude of some parties pours out on the pages of their printed organs, which in fact have become the main form of work with social strata and a means of influencing public consciousness. An accusatory and nihilistic attitude, as the main means of political struggle, can at best awaken only the instincts of people, but not their consciousness. For the proper impact on the public and national consciousness, reasonable means are needed. These can be detailed, substantiated general political concepts, scientifically verified national, political, social, economic, training, educational and other programs. The above concepts and programs should form the basis of the national ideology, and the role of opposition political forces in this matter is significant.

Modern democracy is characterized not only as respect for the rights of the majority, but also as respect for the rights of the minority. This perception of democracy includes both the idea of the necessity and legitimacy of the opposition, and certain requirements for it. The fair demand of observance of the proclaimed democratic principles on the part of the authorities no less presupposes the observance of the rules of the democratic game on the part of the opposition. First of all, this concerns a constructive attitude to the processes in society and a positive attitude.

The formation of the political identity of the Armenian people in modern conditions should contribute to the activation of the process of forming a new national ideology. After Armenia gained independence, the crisis of the former Soviet political identity began, and there was a need to choose a qualitatively new, alternative concept of society, basic principles and values. After the final approval, they should acquire a fundamental and lasting character, rather than the ideas formed by electoral cycles. Such an identity in Armenia began to lay the foundations only since the late 1990s,

when the Armenian society seriously thought about the effectiveness of Western liberal standards. The semantic and symbolic elements of patriotic content, which prevailed in society at the initial stages of the Artsakh movement and were somewhat forced out after the victories of the Armenian forces in the Karabakh war, again came to the fore. It can be argued that during this period a relatively holistic vector of understanding the past of the Armenian people appeared in Armenia. Pronounced anti-communism, largely implanted from outside, gave way to a more restrained attitude towards the former Soviet reality, which made it possible to more realistically assess both the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods in the history of the Armenian people.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, there has been a change in attitude towards the first post-Soviet decade, which in itself has become history and the subject of interpretations. The costs of political, social and economic transformations were recognized as unjustified: degradation of public authorities, falling living standards, etc. On the other hand, such recognition did not mean that the state should return to the institutions and practices of the Soviet era. The main achievement of the first post-Soviet decade was the course taken by society towards the democratization of public life. Thus, the new symbols (anthem, coat of arms, flag, national holidays, state awards, and others) began not only to emphasize the national and patriotic components, but also continuity with all the historical stages of the development of the Armenian nation, and in no way any ideological components.

After the declaration of independence of Armenia, the issue of merging the absolute values of the national ideology, which are the nation and the Motherland, was not completely resolved. The idea of the incompleteness of the national and liberation struggle, the ultimate goal of which is the reunification of all parts of the historical homeland of the Armenians, crystallized in the minds of the Armenian people. However, another idea of building a strong state capable of counteracting modern challenges has acquired no less importance. The consideration of the state as a means to achieve the ultimate goal of the national liberation struggle of the Armenian people at the present stage is losing its relevance. The modern national ideology of the Armenians is aimed at the all-round social, economic and political development of statehood, which will allow Armenia to take its rightful place in the world community.

This circumstance no longer allows us to consider the Armenian state both as an end and a means of the national and liberation struggle of the people, that is, as a core element of the national ideology. The formation of a state, even in a small part of the historical homeland of the Armenian people, forces us to transfer the consideration of this factor to a different plane. The actual provisions of the national ideology are those ideas that give the Armenian people the status of the bearer of one of the oldest civilizations in the world. Thus, a kind of transformation of the system of national values from negative to positive takes place. The Armenian people no longer appear as being subjected to constant trials and ready for various retaliatory measures, but as a nation that has reached a normal political state, striving to realize its positive role in the development of mankind (Holslag 2018; Kambeck 2014). It will have to appreciate the value that it can give to the world, and in return receive an adequate attitude from the community of nations. Such an orientation of the national ideology makes it possible to

unite not only the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, but also all Armenians living in other countries of the world.

The theoretical basis for the formation of a new Armenian national ideology can be various concepts put forward by prominent representatives of the Armenian national and liberation movement. They can be used by modern intellectuals to formulate national ideas, designed to form the basis of the future national ideology. It is necessary to identify those urgent real, not imaginary tasks that are capable of uniting all representatives of the Armenian nation, citizens, the diaspora, civil society, public authorities and the opposition (Paturyan and Gevorgyan 2021). Ideas about the need to resolve them must penetrate deeply into the consciousness of Armenians, affect the deep layers of national psychology and function up to the mass and everyday consciousness. Only such penetration of ideas into the public consciousness, in which all the aspirations of the Armenians will be subordinated to the solution of crucial problems, will become evidence of the formation of the main provisions of the national ideology.

Ideology or concepts of national development Garegin Nzhdeh

To solve this problem, an increasing number of Armenian researchers have recently turned to the concepts put forward by Garegin Nzhdeh (Hovsepyan 2007). The main provisions of Nzhdeh's concept of national development boil down to the affirmation in the minds of Armenians (especially young people) of faith in the strength and heroism of the nation, a sense of dignity and pride in their people, an unshakable desire to restore historical justice and recreate the Armenian state in its historical homeland, emphasizing the uniqueness of Armenian culture, made an invaluable contribution to the development of world civilization (Nzhdeh 2006). According to Nzhdeh, the history of the Armenian people is rich in examples of nobility, heroism and self-sacrifice of the representatives of the nation, and the Armenian culture, both Christian and pre-Christian, has repeatedly saved the people from assimilation and physical destruction. This is the uniqueness of the cultural factor of the people, to which it is necessary to attach the Armenian youth in every possible way.

The concept of Nzhdeh was developed in the historical conditions when the people did not have their own national state, when the nation was divided, and a significant part of it was scattered in many corners of our planet. In addition, there was no unity of national ranks in the communities of the Armenian diaspora. In such a situation, naturally, the question arose of the need to protect the Armenian people from the loss of their historical memory and assimilation. According to Nzhdeh, a people that does not honor their ancestors cannot exist independently for a long time (Nzhdeh 2006, 249-250).

It should be noted Nzhdeh's special attitude to liberal values, which, in his opinion, consigned to oblivion the national foundations, values and traditions of the Armenians. The meaning of Nzhdeh's teaching is to enable an Armenian living in a foreign land to remain an Armenian. In general, it can be seen that the implementation of Nzhdeh's concept in countries with a presence of the Armenian population preserved her national identity.

The propaganda of the idea of the uniqueness of the Armenian nation by Nzhdeh is in no way identified with its superiority over other peoples. Or the idea of returning their historical homeland does not mean the capture of living space for the Armenians. Such comments on Nzhdeh's concept were especially common in Soviet times. Soviet researchers almost always put an equal sign between fascist Nazism and the nationalism preached by Nzhdeh. There were, of course, good reasons for this. It is well known that he collaborated with the ruling fascist circles in Germany for a fair amount of time. However, it should be noted that the concept of Nzhdeh has nothing to do with fascism. His theory is not directed against anyone, but stands up only for the spiritual and physical liberation of the long-suffering people. In general, Nzhdeh's concept is defensive and by no means offensive.

Defining the uniqueness of the cultural and value system of the Armenian people, Nzhdeh did not oppose it to world values. In his opinion, a true patriot and nationalist cannot disrespect the results of the creativity of other peoples; a true patriot cannot divide peoples into value-forming and culture-destroying peoples, realizing that only through the mutual enrichment of cultures is progress possible for both the whole of humanity and a particular nation. His teaching is deeply national in content, and therefore carries universal human values.

In addition, Nzhdeh considered fascism to be the ideology of the weak and intoxicated by the anger of people, while he presented his theory as the religion of the strong. The main content of Nzhdeh's concept is not to promote the exclusivity of the Armenian nation, but to the need to form a spiritually and physically strong nation, whose eyes are confidently turned to the future and which is able not only to stand up for itself, but also to serve as an example in creativity and in spiritual activity for others.

Nzhdeh and his associate Hayk Asatryan brought to the fore, in my opinion, a very important factor for the formation of a new national ideology of the Armenian people, the need to reveal the positive components of the Armenian value system, which allows not only to deepen the processes of national identification of the Armenian people, but also to comprehend the possibility of building a strong statehood. Armenianness should be understood as the ability to perceive the Armenian civilizational type and its inherent positive role content. Armeniancy is not purely national, or, moreover, narrowly national. It was inherent in the Armenian people from the very beginning and was a synthesis of the national with the universal. However, it was confused after the liquidation of statehood and the subsequent self-isolation, dictated by the need for self-preservation of the nation.

In former times, Armenian political thought did not address this topic, not because it had a poor idea of the history of its own people and its culture, but because it did not have the favorable ground of an independent state (the First and Third Republics of Armenia). Its creation is not only a manifestation of the self-organization of the nation and its highest form, but also the conquest of its developed self-consciousness (Khudinian 2002). This is what makes the Armenians restore their historical memory and realize their place in the world community. According to Hayk Asatryan, future ideologists should deeply analyze the historical path passed by the Armenian people. However, according to him, history should be considered not as a simple narration of

facts and events, but to try to reveal its soul, and this should become the cornerstone in revealing the essence of Armenianness (Asatryan 2004, 99). Obviously, many provisions of Nzhdeh's concept are still relevant and can be used to create a new Armenian national ideology. This is largely facilitated by such factors as the persistence of tension both in the Caucasus region and in the world as a whole, the still unsurmounted post-Soviet ideological vacuum in Armenia, the contradictory processes of globalization, the reassessment of values in society, the outflow of the population from the country, the ongoing disunity of the Armenian diaspora and other reasons. However, one should also take into account the fact that in the world and, in particular, in Armenia, such realities are being established that should leave their mark on many ideas in Nzhdeh's concept. In particular, we are talking about changes in the public consciousness of Armenians that have affected the deep layers of social psychology, the deepening of international integration processes that relate to almost all spheres of public life, Armenia's involvement in the international legal system that determines the scope of its duties, the low standard of living of most citizens of the country, an unenviable demographic situation and, finally, twenty years of experience in state building. In this regard, the main theses of Nzhdeh's concept, which is certainly useful for the formation of a national ideology, should be slightly corrected.

Firstly, it concerns the idea of the revival of the national state in the historical homeland of the Armenians. In my opinion, in this case, the question should be on a somewhat different plane than the re-creation of the state within the former historical borders. The problem of preserving in the memory of the people its former greatness and dignity comes to the fore, and the ultimate goal can be considered the recognition by the world community of the legitimate rights of the indigenous population regarding their former homeland. It is necessary to somewhat distance the ideological and political components of this problem from each other. After all, in the conditions of an aggravated demographic situation, even a limited expansion of borders at the expense of Western Armenia may cast doubt on the very existence of the modern Armenian republic. Therefore, the emphasis in such an approach should be placed on issues that contribute to the deepening of the process of political self-identification of the Armenian people through the restoration of historical justice.

Many modern political scientists tend to consider the Karabakh problem as one of the most important ideologemes of the future national ideology. However, in my opinion, this problem fully fits into the idea of the legitimacy of restoring historical justice in the life of the Armenian people. In general, the desire to achieve this goal will allow the people to get rid of the dominance, the inferiority complex that manifests itself in them, psychologically cleanse themselves, believe in themselves and take their rightful place in the world community of nations.

Secondly, the idea of the moral and moral values of the nation prevailing over the material ones will help to protect the younger generation of Armenians from turning into a pragmatically thinking consumer basket. However, in the process of implementing this idea, several problems may arise. First of all, such an attitude to reality should be expected from those representatives of the bureaucracy who for a long time were mostly engaged in illegal enrichment. Or another circumstance in world practice, the emphasis of ideological work on spiritual and moral values, is very often

used by the ruling circles to channel people's dissatisfaction with their social position along the channel they want. This has already happened in the former USSR, when social and economic problems were smoothed over with patriotic slogans. It is also necessary to somewhat soften the anti-Western accents of Nzhdeh's concept and direct the theoretical provisions of the future national ideology to exclude simple copying of Western standards in public life and preserve its national image. Therefore, in general, the priority of the spiritual principle in practical politics requires a more subtle and balanced approach than simple propaganda of national, moral and ethical values.

Thirdly, it is necessary to creatively develop Nzhdeh's idea of the cultural and national uniqueness of the Armenian people in relation to modern conditions. On the one hand, the integration processes unfolding in the world, the restoration of a multipolar world order do not allow this idea to be absolutized, which in fact will lead to the self-isolation of the Armenian nation. Moreover, in the conditions of the existence of an independent state, the ideas of integration are of paramount importance. On the other hand, the active promotion of national values and the inculcation of the national spirit among the Armenian youth in no way contradicts the development of international integration. Such work is intended to create an organic link between the world and Armenian civilizational factors. Be that as it may, ideologues should beware of the dangers of isolationism, which are already strongly encouraged by Turkey and Azerbaijan (Aleksanyan 2016, 22-43). Moreover, the neutralization of such aspirations can be achieved by expanding Armenia's involvement in various integration projects. Any national ideology is impossible without defining the unique role of this community in world history. For example, political Zionism for the Jewish nation, which allowed it not only to maintain its physical existence, but also its identity, and eventually create a statehood (Avineri 1981; Don-Yihya 1998). It was this ideology that became the ideological basis for the leading political forces, regardless of their location in Israeli political life (Doron 1983; Reinharz 1993).

The uniqueness of the fate of the Armenian nation lies in those constants, the inviolability of which allowed it to go through a very difficult, in many respects similar to the Jewish, historical path. In my opinion, the disclosure of the uniqueness of the Armenian nation is associated with the identification of precisely the civilizational factors of the identification of the people.

Today, the world community wants to see in every nation a positive partner who brings more benefits than problems. Of no small importance for the formalization of such an approach is the pragmatism prevailing in Western countries in relations between countries and peoples. The attitude of the world community to this or that nation largely depends on what it can give to the world, be it material or spiritual values. In the modern world, factors such as the size of the territory of the state, or the size of its population fade into the background, giving way to quality resources. These include not only technological, but also spiritual resources.

The Armenian society, as well as the whole nation, faces the task of harmoniously fitting into the general civilizational world processes. Before humanity, the Armenian people should appear not as a nation that is notorious and focused only on its own problems, but as a creator, a creator, bringing to humanity its values and ideological guidelines that helped it not only survive, but also make a great contribution to the

treasury of world culture. This approach, in my opinion, should become the core of the Armenian national ideology.

Meanwhile, the scientific research of some researchers leads to the opposition of national ideology with globalization. Very often they advocate the construction of so-called fortresses in the face of the danger of unfolding globalization processes (Lalayan 2008, 9). At times, they are dominated by the propaganda of the ideas of the exclusiveness of the nation. It is especially unacceptable that the philosophical concept of Nzhdeh is given as the ideological basis of such theoretical constructions. However, when considering any concept, it is necessary, firstly, to take into account the peculiarities of those historical periods when they arose, and secondly, not to deviate from the general context of the concept and not violate the interconnection of its provisions.

Recognition of the priority of national values, moral and moral norms and traditions can be achieved by no means by self-isolation. As discussed above, there are no antagonistic contradictions between nationalism and globalization. Moreover, there are no contradictions between national and universal values. At the same time, it is the general civilizational language and its categories that are understandable to the world community. Therefore, the ideological and political substantiation of the significance of the special features of the civilizational content of the spiritual life of Armenians can become a decisive factor in the formation of a new national ideology of the Armenian people and the allocation of a special place for it in the world community of nations.

The thesis put forward by some researchers about the existence of the phenomenon of Armenian civilization deserves attention. Currently, it is under development and, of course, is more related to the field of cultural studies. However, regardless of the degree of development of the idea of Armenian civilization, it helps to understand and evaluate from a social and political point of view those aspects of the history of the Armenian people that allowed it not only to preserve its originality, but also surprisingly form a civilizational community of all centers of the Armenian Diaspora, regardless from their location. Armenian civilization is the longest civilization in time, immanently oriented towards social harmony, justice and wisdom.

The promotion of the cultural and civilizational factor in the national ideology in no way contradicts the desire rooted in the national consciousness to restore historical justice regarding the lost Motherland and the condemnation of the Armenian Genocide by the world community. On the contrary, these problems receive a new sound and stand on a civilizational basis, more understandable and acceptable for developed countries, directly or indirectly influencing the formation of norms of relationships for modern humanity. The solution of these problems is linked not with the manifestation of indulgence towards the miserable and offended Armenian people, but with the observance of the elementary norms of the world community's coexistence and the creation of conditions for preventing such uncivilized and barbaric steps from any member of this community from now on. Thus, the age-old resilience of the Armenian people is directly linked to the establishment of a just and democratic new world order, that is, it acquires a positive character and is entirely directed to the future. The resolution of pan-Armenian problems, in fact, enriches the normative, legal and political base of the future human civilization.

Conclusion and discussion

The cultural and civilizational aspect of the national ideology incorporates the understanding of both the culture and history of Christian Armenia, as well as pre-Christian. Naturally, the Christian religion is given its due, the historical role of which in the fate of Armenia can hardly be overestimated. However, this cannot detract from the significance of those traditions that were laid down in the period of Antiquity or long before it. It was they who ultimately determined the vector of development of the Armenian civilization. Such an approach helps not only to preserve and develop the millennium-old traditions of the Armenian people, but also to pass them on to a new generation, looking to the future with confidence and rightness.

This approach largely unites the aspirations of the citizens of Armenia with the Diaspora. At first glance, it seems that it is the Armenian diaspora that seeks to focus on the historical past of the Armenians, and is also determined to restore historical justice. However, the bulk of the Armenian diaspora is concentrated in industrialized countries with effectively functioning democratic institutions. They, like many citizens of these countries, deeply understand the civilizational motives in the relationship between peoples. Therefore, in the minds of Armenians living outside of Armenia, the desire to appear before fellow citizens as representatives of a worthy nation that has made a significant contribution to the development of world civilization remains.

Of particular importance in the national ideology should be the idea of ensuring a high level of well-being for Armenians, regardless of their place of residence. The set of measures aimed at solving this problem should include both the establishment of free competition in market relations within the Armenian society and the principles of mutual assistance among Armenians all over the world. In addition, raising the standard of living is closely linked to the problem of democratization of the political life of Armenia. It is this circumstance that is designed to ensure the disclosure of the creative abilities of individuals, instill in them a sense of dignity and pride in the Fatherland, and also turn the eyes of many foreign Armenians and arouse their interest in their historical Motherland.

It is impossible to achieve in public life the priority of the moral principle over the material one by propaganda alone for a long period. Otherwise, a new generation of citizens will be brought up with a slavish psychology and servile moods, incapable of heroism, courage and self-sacrifice. History knows many facts when, for ideological reasons, citizens were ready to lose even elementary living conditions. However, the same history, at least of the former USSR, proves that the people are not able to drag out a miserable existence for a long time, even for the sake of lofty ideas. First of all, the political elite of the country should be ideologically convinced and ready for self-sacrifice, which should mobilize the nation by its example. The Armenian people often proved their wisdom and ability to unite around worthy leaders. According to Nzhdeh's fair expression, the assertion that the Armenian does not trust the elite is not true, on the contrary, he is inclined to trust only fair, honest, sincere, not in words, but in deeds, leaders devoted to the Motherland and people.

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POWER TO THE FACULTY APPROACH IN THE BOLOGNA PROCESS: HOW DOES THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO ACCREDITATION OF JOINT PROGRAMS ENHANCE INNOVATION CAPACITY? LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE WESTERN BALKANS FOR PROJECTS IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

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Abstract

The article analyzes how the application of the new system for the accreditation of joint Master's programmes helps to improve the quality of training in accordance with requirements in the context of Europeanization and globalization of the educational space. The processes of democratization taking place in the European space, the active formation of public institutions, the strategy of integrating the countries of the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership into the European community, including the European educational space, put forward new requirements for higher education, in which the need to ensure a high quality of education is clearly visible, meeting European standards.

In the context of the formation of a knowledge society, higher education in the field of political science is becoming a priority in the development of the countries of the Eastern Partnership and the European Community. The development tasks of this sphere are ambiguous, manifesting themselves in complex and contradictory relations with society. Experiencing the influence of modern trends in social development, the sphere of higher education in the field of political science becomes at the same time their active participant, driving force and catalyst.

In an environment of growing globalization, which is manifested in the intensification of competition on a global scale, there is a strengthening of the positions of the EU member states. The decisive factor in overcoming the secondary position of Europe in the market of educational services is the unification of the efforts of all European countries aimed at achieving the

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
competitiveness of higher education. The embodiment of this idea is the Bologna Process, which aims to create a common European education area.

Introduction

The Bologna Process (BP) has started as internal process of EU countries in 1999 and has developed a global impact in HE. Using the recent published analysis of "The Bologna Process and its Global Strategy" (Moscovitz and Zahavi 2020) this article will present the experience of an international higher education (HE) consortium developing and implementing a joint master's programme at 9 universities in 7 countries since 2015[1]. This will illustrate how the Bologna model operates and give some ideas for a development of the arguments about the conditions for policy implementation.

The article[2] compares models of implementation along the experiences of a consortium implementing a joint master's programme in seven countries and ten university partner institutions. It will be analysed how the "European Approach for Quality Assurance of Joint Programmes" (Yerevan 2015) can be seen as a new approach to intervene in the national HE policies in the field of programme accreditation (impact on ministries, accreditation agencies, HE institutions (HEIs)). This includes new mechanisms that allow a bypassing of national regulations with getting accreditation from another Bologna country based (and EQAR registered) accreditation agency. It includes several elements into the deliberative but more top-down working regime approach from Hila Zahavi

1. It allows the universities to become acting and active actors with joining an international consortium – they need not ask any authority to do so.

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[1] European Political Science MA (EuroPS) - Erasmus+ Programme KA2 Capacity Building Project No. 561485-EPP- 1-2015-1-AT-EPPKA2-CBHE-JP in Higher Education 2015-2017. For further details about the project http://euro-ps.org/ delivers information. The participation of the partner from Italy stopped during the project after it came out that the financial rules for public universities in Italy do not allow additional programmes without extra financial support as the EMJMD programme delivers.

[2] The intended outreach of this article is to give an example about how Bologna (or Europeanization) works as a multilevel governance example. If we can show some originality it might be interesting to use the model of analysis also for further cases, especially multilateral joint programmes (JP) which have used European Approach (EA) accreditation (as the FRONTEX joint degree programme of universities from the Baltic States to Spain or an Economics consortium led by Erasmus University Rotterdam) to develop more theoretical power.

The observations about several multilateral JP´s shows that Europeanization can work better outside the EU than inside (PoSIG example of Slovenia). Experiences about the accreditation of the multilateral MA Advanced Border Management for FRONTEX show that EU member states can be very creative in complicating the implementation of EA accreditation as well, so Slovenia is maybe not the only example for that. Maybe neighbourhood countries and applicants for membership negotiation with the EU show more motivation to implement EA accreditation.

2. The accreditation is managed by an EQAR listed agency after a procedure based on ESG[3] in one of the countries represented in an international consortium.
3. It puts pressure on the responsible regulatory institutions at national level to recognise this accreditation after the procedure is finished. (Otherwise, they would proof their missing capacity to implement the Yerevan 2015 declaration about joint programme accreditation as agreed by the responsible ministers).

One must think how these elements can help to develop the regime theory of Moscovitz/Zahavi 2020 as framework for further Bologna research and strategy for further policy development. The "European Approach for Quality Assurance of Joint Programmes" (EA) is changing the resources of the actors responsible for the BP. While the regulatory reform capacity about HE is in the hands of the national authorities (legislative, executive) the implementation of JP's is in the hand of HEIs. The case of the joint master's programme Political Science – Integration & Governance (PoSIG) shows that it where the involved universities who have initiated the JP and stressed the national authorities to implement their Bologna commitment from Yerevan 2015. Looking at these universities it where groups of young faculty member with strong international background who run the project and in many cases have pushed the university management. Young and international embedded faculty are the innovators and driving force for modernization of curricula and HEIs but also successful national Bologna implementation. EA accreditation of JP therefore can be an instrument for a faculty based, bottom-up reform in the BP.

In a first step we will present the BP as it was established in the 1990's, the motivation behind and how it gained global relevance. In literature this was analysed as development of an international regime based on a specific set of normative policy positions.

The second step will present the EA as anew instrument of the BP. Its setting and also the case study about PoSIG as a multilateral joint programme (JP) will show that with the Yerevan declaration 2015 a new step in the development of the BP took place with shifting the innovator role for national BP policies from central to decentral, to HEIs and their faculties.

The globalisation of the Bologna system as international soft power regime

Bologna as EU internal process (Klemencic 2020)

The Intentions of the Bologna Declaration[4] are described best in its own words as "strengthening the international recognition and attractive potential of our systems, increasing the international competitiveness of the European system of higher

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[3] Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education Area (ESG)
[4] Bologna Declaration. 1999. "The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999: Joint declaration of the European Ministers of Education". *The European Higher Education Area*. Accessed January 1, 2023. http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/Ministerial_conferences/02/8/1999_Bologna_Declaration_English_553028.pdf.

education" and as "a world-wide degree of attraction". Recognition of degrees and mobility between the member states was one of the prior motivations behind.

The properties and instruments of this initiative (a policy field dominated by the national legislation and regulation competences of the member states) seemed to be weak: Joint objectives as voluntary commitments but no binding rules, catalogues of recommendations for implementation supplemented by implementation progress reports which created transparency of the process (Crosier and Parveva 2013, 34-37).

The expert driven Bologna Follow Up Group and its committees initiate policy exchange meetings and prepares the Bologna Minister conferences happening every second year. The European Commission supports this BFUG work and initiates activities as Erasmus, Erasmus Mundus and Erasmus+ to bring incentives for implementation to the HEIs in the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and its external partners.

Bologna as global approach

In Bergen 2005 the Bologna ministers agreed to open and attract the EHEA "to other parts of the world" and had the support of reforms in neighbouring regions in focus. The London conference 2007 addressed this to the global context with intensification of policy dialogues and further recognition of qualifications. Leuven/Louvain 2009 established the Bologna Policy Forum as an approach for going global and to establish the EHEA quality assurance (QA) measures (ECTS etc.) as global benchmarks. "Higher education has become strategically important for the European Union in creating both 'minds' and 'markets' for the European knowledge economy" (Keeling 2008, 222) and intellectual environment of the Lisbon strategy 2000 (to make the EU until 2010 the most competitive and productive economic sphere in the world). This shift from a regional to a global approach was criticized as a hegemonic instrument or imperialising power, even the resources for such a strategy where limited but effective because of their creative design (Moscovitz and Zahavi 2020, 10)[5].

Bologna as international, deliberative and multilevel governance model

While Europeanization & policy diffusion along joint principles are standards in the EU internal formation in main fields of integration (single marked, agriculture etc.) the Bologna process as a multilateral process included also non-EU member states into this development (Klemenčič 2020, 1-5; Moscovitz and Zahavi 2020, 6-21; Zahavi and Friedman 2020, 22-38; Asderaki 2020, 39-56). The adaption of national HE policies and institutions to the EU model in these countries might follow different motivations depending on the status and geographic distance of a country. Countries in the neighbourhood (like Western Balkan) have aspirations to join the EU and want to proof their reform capacities, others are intending to become associated or special partners

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[5] For example, with its regional strategies as Bologna in the EU Neighbourhood policy (EC2017) and the installation of structures and instruments (NEO's, CBHE, Mundus).

(as Georgia and Ukraine). But even beyond that neighbourhood the Bologna process defunded into HE policies.

Seen from an international relations perspective Hila Zahavi and Yoav Friedman explain this capacity of the *Bologna process as and international regime* with principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures covering expectations (Zahavi and Friedman 2020, 22-38)[6]. Successful international regimes as the Bologna process become "player[s] with a life of [their] own" (Zahavi and Friedman 2020, 23) which leads to questions about the resources for their power.

One resource of this power is connected to the specific EU governance model of *Open Method of Coordination (OMC)* leading to declarations of the Bologna minister conferences every second year. This includes experts of all participating countries and of different levels of HE in working groups and its institutionalization in constant conferences as the Higher Education Reform Experts (HERE) and connects the policy preparing Bologna Follow Up Group (BFUG) with the problems, standards, needs and feedbacks of the HE systems. Seen under institutional aspects the structural resources of the EU institutions to steer this process are not very strong but effective with connecting to the jointly developed normative understandings.

Defining a platform as infrastructure and language for joint understandings of HE made the BP to a global provider of a *Public Good* in the field of HE and in that sense the EU could develop a capacity as hegemon for global developments (Zahavi and Friedman 2020, 28). Functionally this public good of "a uniform pedagogical and administrative language facilitates international academic collaboration" minimizes the chaos in international HE and leads to "collaboration in the name of better competition" (Zahavi and Friedman 2020, 28).

From the perspectives of all member states their participation in the BC enables their HE systems to support their respective societies in the globalisation process.

Internationally recognized HE has increasing importance for economic developments in a competitive global environment. Seen from the young generation of academics this strengthens their role in society but also on the international labour market[7].

Normative dimensions of Bologna and impacts on the HE reforms

Another resource (=motivation for participants) is the *normative dimension of HE* where a universal set of principles following modern scientific thinking is promoted. The Bologna Process has established a global thinking about these as "Bologna Philosophy" or "European Values" in HE: Humanistic tradition, importance of academic freedom in research and in publishing as ethical basis for research and teaching (Jongbloed, Enders and Salerno 2008, 303-324).

- Representatives from HE worldwide find a backing of these values in different activities connected to the BP, independent from the situation in their country or region.

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[6] Using Krasner's approaches, they define international regimes as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations coverage in a given area of international relations" (Krasner 1982, 186).
[7] Including problematic developments as brain drain for less competitive countries.

- The inclusive character of the diplomatic activities (Policy Forums, HERE etc.) and incentives coming via Erasmus/Mundus (CBHE, mobility grants) made students, staff and HEIs to cooperative partners in an epistemic community that supports this progress at different levels of the policy community and at HEIs.

The European Qualification Framework (EQF)[8] defined tree academic cycles of education and supports the recognition and mobility of grades within the EU and partner countries of the BP with the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS).

The EQF and even more the ECTS also brought a *change of the pedagogic paradigm* in many academic teaching cultures with a new humanist focus on students:

- The *leaning outcomes of students* at the end of a programme are defined in dimensions of knowledge, skills & competences (note: in the context of the EQF, competence is described in terms of responsibility and autonomy, hence does not follow the common perception of the term competence). Experts from member states were participating in this multilateral policy making process and states started processes to bring their national models of qualification in relation to this framework. This led to several conflicts and intensive discussions in all fields of HE when implementation policies of the member states reached HEI and initiated curriculum reform processes[9].

- Beside the needs and interests towards more comparability, better access and increasing relevance (also for the labour market) of the EHEA the shift to learning outcomes puts the students into the focus of academic educational reform. Seen from a humanist perspective this shift from the normative dominance of the teacher to this new student-centred approach was a positive development. Nevertheless, several examples showed that many administrative and technical misunderstandings in the implementation led to a negative image of "Bologna" as the reason for the decline of academic life (Reinalda 2013; Corbett and Henkel 2013; Münch 2013; Savigny 2013; Berndtson 2013; Schönwälder and Bloemraad 2013; González-Ferrer and Morales 2013).

Inputs from using the European Accreditation Approach for a multilateral Political Science Master

The Bologna declaration *Yerevan 2015* had established an *"European Approach for Quality Assurance of Joint Programmes"* and the PoSIG consortium used this new procedural instrument for its accreditation process. It means that one EQAR registered QA agency can run the accreditation procedure for an international consortium. The accreditation regimes of the signatory states of Yerevan 2015 must accept and

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[8]EHEA. 2005. "Qualification Frameworks/Three-Cycle System." Accessed January 1, 2023. http://www.ehea.info/page-qualification-frameworks.

[9] See As an example of resistance to reform, several articles in ECPR that were published in "European Political Science, Volume 12, Issue 4, December 2013." Accessed January 1, 2023. https://link.springer.com/journal/41304/volumes-and-issues/12-4. About the case of Bologna implementation at Austrian HEIs see Franz Kok und Markus Pausch (2013).

implement the results of this accreditation without any separate accreditation procedure.

After several years of experience with student and staff exchange with partners in the Western Balkan region University of Salzburg (PLUS) together with nine partner universities from seven countries applied successfully for a "Erasmus Community Building HE" (CBHE) project to develop and establish a Joint Master in Political Science in 2015-2017.[10]

After joint preparatory work in the consortium including 90 professionals from all participating universities (administrators and managers, but mainly academics) *a joint curriculum* with more than 60 jointly developed course syllabi and *an institutional contract* covering all needs for the management of a multilateral joint programme were established. The accreditation process for PoSIG with AQ Austria (the Austrian EQAR-registered QA agency) started in autumn 2016 with the submission of a self-evaluation report to an international expert panel, followed by their site visit in December 2016. Finally, the accreditation was granted with a decision by the agency's board in February 2017. The programme welcomed its inaugural cohort of students in October 2017 and celebrated its first graduates in 2019[11].

Experiences from the implementation of PoSIG accreditation in the represented countries

To support the partner universities in the accreditation of the joint programme was part of the CBHE project design delivered to EACEA in February 2015. To manage this foreseeable complex, aim the support by the European Consortium for Accreditation (ECA) as external expert was planned in that time. Expert support by ECA and their involvement in the development of the *Yerevan 2015* paper together with AQ Austria experts opened this historic window for experience to the PoSIG consortium. The multilateral approach of the planned joint programme and its international and multilevel management approach made the project to a suitable pilot for the new Bologna instrument.

However, as documented in the Bologna Implementation Report 2020 also by 2018/19 "[t] The commitment to implement the European Approach has not been treated as a high priority in many national systems. There is a slight majority of countries where there is no legal obstacle to using the European Approach for quality assurance of joint programmes. 30 systems now permit the European Approach for quality assurance of joint programmes to be used. These include the countries where quality assurance is primarily undertaken at institutional level, and therefore the European Approach would have a less significant impact." (Eurydice 2020, 79)

The report continues: "Since the Yerevan Communiqué, only Georgia, Malta, Moldova, Poland and Slovenia have amended legislation to permit the European Approach. This action is also foreseen in Azerbaijan. The majority of the 20 systems

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[10] Erasmus+ Programme KA2 Capacity Building Project No. 561485-EPP- 1-2015—1- AT-EPPKA2-CBHE-JP in Higher Education.
[11] Further details about the programme are available from http://posig.info/.

that reported that the European Approach to quality assurance of joint programmes is not permitted by their legislative framework have a quality assurance system that is based on programme-level accreditation. This means that these are countries where the European approach could be particularly beneficial to quality assurance of joint programmes." (Eurydice 2020, 79)

According to the Bologna implementation report 2020 the EA accreditation was not permitted by legislation in Albania and North Macedonia.

Figure 1. Countries allowing the European Approach for Quality Assurance of Joint Programmes, 2018/19 (Eurydice 2020, 79)

The PoSIG accreditation procedure performed from 2016-2018 shows that there is a variation of policies how the EA can be implemented, even in countries like Albania and North Macedonia where the BFUG data indicate that this would be impossible.

In the following table several variables are listed to show the conditions for the implementation of the EA in the PoSIG accreditation as it was observed by the lead partner of the consortium as coordinator of the procedure and local coordinators at participating HEIs (*=public university, **=private university):

Country	Austria	Slovenia	North Macedonia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Albania	Kosovo
Higher Education Institution	**University of Salzburg***	**University of Ljubljana***	**Ss.Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje***	**University of Sarajevo* Sarajevo School for Science and Technology***	**University of Tirana* European University of Tirana***	**University of Business & Technology** FAMA College***
Available information and awareness on EA Accreditation: Y/N if Y high/mid/low						
University Level:	N	N	Y- low	N* N**	N* Y**	UBT: N FAMA: N
National Accreditation body:	Y - high	Y-low	Y-low	Y – low* Y - low**	N* ASCAL is aware of EA accreditation **	UBT: Y – high FAMA: Y – high

Ministry – if relevant:	Y - high	Y-low	Y- mid	Y – low* Y – low**	N* Ministry is aware**	UBT: Y – high FAMA: Y-high
Experience with joint programmes: **Y/N if Y High/mid/low**						
Ministry – if relevant:	Y - high	-	Y- mid	Y – mid* Y – high**	N* Y**	UBT: Y-mid FAMA: Y-mid
National Accreditation body:	Y - high	Y-low	Y-low	Y – low* Y – low**	N* Y**	UBT: Y-mid FAMA: Y-mid
University Level:	N	Y-mid	Y- low	Y – mid* Y – low**	N* Y*	UBT: N FAMA: N
Support and opportunities **positive/negative, yes1 with high capacity, yes2 with low capacity, no, no* but no official denial**						
University level:	Y1	Y1	Y2	No* Y2**	Y2* Y2**	UBT: Y1 FAMA: Y1
National Accreditation body:	Y1	Y2	Y2	No* No**	Y2* Y2**	UBT: Y1 FAMA: Y1
Ministry – if relevant:	Y1	-	Y2	No* No**	Y2* Y2**	UBT: Y1 FAMA: Y1
Confirmation of EA accreditation:						
Unexpected Formal requirements for confirmation of EA accreditation:	N	N	There was no process of confirmation	N* N**	Y* Y**	UBT: N FAMA: N
With/without – EA-documentation?	Y	N	It was submitted, but was not formal requirement	Y* Y**	N* N**	UBT: Y FAMA: Y
Translation from English to national language?	N	Y	N	Y* Y**	Y* Y**	UBT: N FAMA: N
Executive decision by accreditation body or also by board?	B (Senate acting as Board for self-accreditation)	National accreditation procedure in front of the National Accreditation Agency (NAKVIS)	National agency for accreditation	Y* Y** (Cantonal Ministry of HE both)	Decision of Board of Accreditation: No. 07, date 30.03.2018* Accreditation Decision for PoSIG in Albania no. 54, date 27.11.2020**	UBT&FAMA National Quality Council (NQC) of Kosovo Accreditation Agency
Additional evaluation of the JP?	N	N	Y, yes using the standard national procedure	N* N**	Y* Y**	UBT: N FAMA: N
Fees for national implementation of the EA?	N	N	Y, fee as for any national programme	N* N**	Y* Y**	UBT: N FAMA: N

In particular, on PoSIG-accreditation (2016-2018) the situation in the participatory countries was as follows:

- **Austria:** PoSIG was approved by the Austrian Quality Assurance Agency (AQ Austria). Nevertheless, for the Austrian partner no national accreditation or approval would have been necessary due to the self-accrediting status of the Austria universities.
- **Albania:** The ministry in charge accepted the outcome of the EA accreditation as a form of pre-accreditation for both Albanian partner institutions by June 2018 (one public, one private). Nevertheless, after one year the study programme had to undergo national accreditation, what was in fact not a full accreditation but a form of study programme evaluation after the first year of programme implementation.
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina:** Both partner institutions received a letter of "consent for the implementation of the study programme" from the ministry in charge in July 2018; no further steps were necessary.
- **Italy:** The Italian partner had to withdraw from the consortium at an earlier stage of the CBHE project due to legal restrictions regarding the funding of study programmes (no possibility to use synergies with other programmes but proof of additional staff capacities for the whole programme).
- **Kosovo:** The Kosovo Accreditation Agency has approved the result of the EA-accreditation for both partner institutions in July 2017; no further steps were necessary.
- **North Macedonia:** A process for full national accreditation had to be started and was successfully finished by April 2018 (i.e., no direct ratification of the EA-accreditation; but usage of the AQ board decision in the accreditation procedure).
- **Slovenia:** Even though Slovenia is labelled as "European approach permitted by legislation" in the Bologna implementation report (EC et al, 2020, p. 79) for the process of PoSIG accreditation the situation was different: A then new law on Higher Education in Slovenia included a regulation about the membership of national accreditation agencies in EQAR as a condition for an "easy" confirmation of an EA accreditation. As not all relevant quality assurance agencies of all relevant countries were registered in EQAR the national accreditation agency of Slovenia, NAKVIS, required the University of Ljubljana to undergo full national accreditation.

Regarding the analysis of Bologna implementation in the Western Balkan region as it was reported 2013 by an expert team (Zgaga, Klemenčič, Komljenovič, Miklavič, Repac, and Jakačič 2013) the differences in the HEI landscape, the governance of HEI and the national policies has continued (Klemenčič and Zgaga 2015). The PoSIG case made these differences even more visible for the consortium. Although the institutional development and capacities of the accreditation systems have improved meanwhile.

Several observations during the accreditation process made by the consortium show the **challenges and strategic resources** for all actors involved in the accreditation process.

Timeplan/foreseeability: Compared to the perspective of single procedures for the nine remaining HEIs in the involved six countries the EA accreditation allowed the composition of a single ESG based self-evaluation report and the institutional agreements for its implementation. Best cases for the implementation are PLUS as self-accrediting public university in Austria and the legally given option for implementation by approval in Kosovo. But even formal delays resulting from translation and second evaluation procedures with a max delay in Slovenia of 2 years are the variations that might also have occurred without using the EA accreditation procedure. Therefore, the role as pioneer not only brought much work to the coordinating partner in the consortium but also new experiences as part of an internationally recognized consortium to all partners.

Challenges in the management of the multilateral consortium: Compared with other JP consortia PoSIG developed with 9 private and public degree giving universities from 6 countries a very multilateral JP with high complexity. The legal frame for EA in all 6 countries had to be identified and compared. National accreditation procedures in these countries with ESG based but diverse tracks and requirements for documentation and periods of board meetings had to be managed. The involved academic coordinators and quality managers from all partners had diverse backgrounds and experience in curriculum development, accreditation, and study programme management. Big public universities mostly had complex internal procedures and regulations. External experts had concerns regarding the multilateral governance approach used for PoSIG since academic programme cooperation usually is limited to a smaller number of HEIs.

Strategic Bologna bias: The strong involvement of faculty at the participating HEIs and the international relevance (status as EU CBHE project) of the joint preparatory work of academics in the preparatory project established the accreditation of PoSIG to an example about the fulfilment of European standards and the commitment of the HEIs and the involved national bodies (agencies[12], ministries[13]). The fact that an international consortium with high academic reputation, the visibility of the preparatory standards (Erasmus+ project) and the involvement of the consortium lead management and ECA as consultant produced a high risk for no decision or a negative decision pushing the rectorates and national authorities for accreditation in several countries the multilateral consortium could implement the curriculum and the necessary institutional agreements as it was accredited by AQ Austria.

Normative Bologna bias: The specific history of the PoSIG consortium with experiences for exchange of students and staff for several years had built up a strong

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[12] Accreditation agencies where mostly informed (only one not) and where acting cooperative. Only one agency was acting as veto player after being not contracted as procedure leading agency. The start of the PoSIG accreditation process was presented at 13 May 2016 at the CEENQA meeting in Cracow. From that time all involved agencies knew about the project and could prepare for implementation.

[13] Ministries where surprised that at the beginning of the AQ Austria coordinated process they had to confirm the eligibility of the involved HEI from their country. It came out that signatures in Yerevan 2015 did not trickle down to administration – EA issues we always had to negotiate with the political management of ministries (except Austria). Where legal clarifications or implementation where discussed this was refused with "once we made a law we do not want to do anything else…". The fact that EA accreditation leads to a new variation in the national accreditation regime was recognised as surprise.

commitment of the involved Political Science faculties. Mostly young members of faculties found the opportunity to implement academic standards in science and teaching known from international exchanges also at their home university. The ongoing Bologna reform elements at universities were pushed by this faculty-based initiative and university management (at some public universities) could not ignore the initiative although in many cases hindered the implementation with administrative and technical instruments. With the resources of the EA accreditation process and with being part of an international consortium, the faculty could implement the new JP curriculum and proof its innovation and Europeanization capacity also for further career options. The Erasmus CBHE project here had an enormous impact on the community building of the faculty as capital for innovation[14].

Conclusion and discussion

The PoSIG *faculty approach* in developing and implementing a multilateral JP with using EA accreditation shows that national BP policies do not necessarily have to be top-down organized. The joint language of Bologna about academic teaching and its normative commitment to a modern science based and student-centred academic teaching can be implemented by a community of academics sharing these "public good". This brings international embedded faculties into the role as innovators in the BP. Their character as multilateral epistemic communities in their field of study supports not only their individual academic career but is also a relevant resource for the HEI and the national HE policies. In some cases, they have the potential to push these higher-level actors in the policy field. *International publicity* in the academic field and in the accreditation relevant milieus make such projects and their implementation visible and increase the attention to the capacity of the accreditation policies in the involved countries. *With the EA accreditation of JP the **BP** as global relevant international regime has an **additional bottom-up based actor available as supporting resource***. The power of that resource is depending on the international embedding of faculties in the scientific community and incentives necessary to invest energy and commitment of academics also into academic teaching (as CBHE does). Where these conditions are given, national institutions must expect further pressure from new emerging JP's.

EA accreditation can be seen as strategic resource for the internationalization strategy of small HEIs and countries or in transformation. It can be used as instrument for the internationalization of compared to the international market *small but excellent HEIs capacities*. Even small HEI's with small but not a full discipline covering excellent academic capacities can be relevant contributors to a JP consortium[15]. This

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[14] Yunus, Muhammad. 2021. "Designing the future: role and responsibility of Higher Education Institutions." In: *Erasmus+ Capacity Building in Higher Education Grantholders′Meeting (Online-25/01/2021, 14:00)*. Accessed January 1, 2023. https://www.beyond-events.eu/index.php?eventid=69&roomid=180.
[15] One could argue about at least 30 ECTS credits excellent courses one HEI has to offer to become part of an multilateral JP consortium. This is the equivalent of one term of academic studies. Consortia and accreditation have to decide if students once have to be enrolled in a JP partner university to allow a

might be an opportinity of special importance for small countries with a diverse HE landscape. The potential for this strategic approach is increasing with internationlization of faculty and the us of multilateral cooperation as a resource. At the same time such strategy needs the will to expose the academic capacity to international benchmarks. Many countries discussion about brain drain could find a new instrument to encourage local academic excellence of teacher and of students. In disciplines with academic excellence this will be easier than in others.

Within the *EU Neighbourhood policy and Eastern Partnership strategy* the field of HE was highly successful and met the needs of academics and HEIs for orientation and participation in international developments of science and education. States in post war and break away situation (Western Balkan, Caucasus, Central Asia) since the 1990's are open to adopt instruments of the BP to demonstrate and allow independent national strategies in HE beyond the dominance of former big players as Russia and interests of China with its infrastructure-based approach (Silk Road Strategy). Although EU foreign policy is still weak compared to the instruments and resources of these other big players in that "Region of Change" (RoC). The participation of the mostly small countries between these spheres in the Bologna process shows that there is a rising interest of the academia and the HE policies to connect to the values and principles of the EU model of HE. Beside the internal discussions about the Bologna implementation within the EU member states the BP and its international influence shows a higher level of EU soft power impact in the field of HE. Where the internal perception is dominated by the changes and needs for adoption from outside Bologna is seen as a positive landmark for development in that RoC. The request for such approaches increased dramatically since 24 February 2022.

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participation of this HEI in the degree giving. If they do not have to be enrolled for this purpose also less contribution to the programme can be usefull.

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THE WELFARE STATE CRISIS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE FAR-RIGHT IN SWEDEN AS A RESULT OF INCREASING MIGRATION

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Abstract

This article attempts to reveal the main causes of the crisis of the welfare state and the rise of the far-right in Sweden as a result of increased migration. The article clarifies the features of the Swedish model of the welfare state, which essentially became the basis of the Northern European model, which is considered the most complete expression of the essence of the social experiment of the northern countries. Sweden has a reputation for being an extremely open and overly tolerant country towards migrants from different parts of the world. At the height of the migratory crisis, no other country in Europe had received as many asylum seekers in proportion to its population as Sweden. For many left-wing sympathizers, this was confirmation that their state was a true 'humanitarian superpower'. Unusually generous migration policy has led to a change in the political climate and allowed more radical political forces to emerge. Stereotypes have been disrupted and relatively homogeneous Swedish society is gradually becoming multicultural. There is even a change in the attitude of Swedes themselves towards the entry, integration, permanent residence and naturalization of migrants into Swedish society.

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Introduction

Sweden is one of the developed democratic Scandinavian countries with a stable economy and a strong social system. The Swedish welfare state has gone through a certain trajectory of development and has become a model for other Scandinavian and later European states. Distinctive features of Sweden are social dialogue and partnership, a developed civil society, democratic forms and public administration, economic and political stability, and a high level of social security. It should be noted that many comparative studies focus more on the economic aspects of the welfare state in Sweden, or on its social and cultural features, but less attention is paid to the historical and political analysis of the Swedish concept of the welfare state, the genesis of the Swedish model as an integrated social strategy, designed to overcome complex political and economic crises.

"The Swedish model, which has been adopted to a greater or lesser extent by other Scandinavian countries, has thus become one of the symbols of Nordic politics. It cannot be seen only as a specific form of social and macroeconomic policy - on the contrary, it is a very complex model based on a combination of social, economic, political and societal assumptions."(Brunclík, Havlík and Pinková 2011, 39). In addition to a strong and stable welfare state, providing a high level of well-being for its people, Sweden is also considered to have one of the most liberal and open policies towards migrants. The integration of migrants into Swedish society has been the subject of much debate and is one of the main political challenges, that Sweden is facing in recent years. In presented article, we focus on two basic research questions, namely: *Is there relevance between the increase in the number of migrants and the collapse of the Swedish welfare state? Has the increase in the number of migrants contributed to the radicalization of the political scene in Sweden and to the negative attitudes of the Swedish population towards migrants?*

On the example of Sweden, we will point out the mutual relation between migration and the new challenges of the welfare state. We will try to find out whether the increase in the number of migrants has an impact on the radicalization of an otherwise stable Swedish political scene and also on the role of the media in this process. Finally, we will focus on the attitudes of the Swedish population towards migrants. The analysis is based on the theoretical basis of the classification of the welfare state of the Danish sociologist Göst Esping-Andersen. His typology of the welfare state is considered to be one of the most important in the given area.

Recently, a significant exponential increase in the number of scientific studies and publications focusing on the issue of migration and its relationship with the welfare state can be observed. We see the connection mainly in the context of the European migration crisis, at a time when there was an increase in migrants heading to Europe. In identifying the relationship between the welfare state and migration and vice versa, we relied on the following publications: G. P. Freeman (1986): Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State, F. Boräng (2012): National Institutions - International Migration. Labor Markets, Welfare States and Immigration Policy, M. A. Eger (2010). Even in Sweden: The Effect of Immigration on Suport of Welfare State Spending, K. Borevi, K. K. Jensen, and P. Mouritsen (2017): The civic turn of immigrant integration policies in the Scandinavian welfare, which address the issue of mutual correlation between the welfare state and migration and their interactions.

Migration expert Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen, working at Aalborg University in Denmark deals with the migration issue. M. Glavey (2017) analyses migration in the publication New Migration Realities: Inclusive Narrative, Czech authors M. Brunclík, V. Havlík, and A. Pinková (2012) in the publication Scandinavia: Policy changes in the Nordic countries.

We will also draw attention to the fact why an electorally successful radical political party was not established in Sweden in the past, the theoretical basis will be provided by the right-wing party expert Jens Rydgen. Subsequently, we will focus on the rise of the far-right in Sweden, the problematics analysed mainly by the authors, J. Rydgen, and S. Meiden (2016), D. Corine (2018), J. Bartlett, J. Birdwell, and J. Benfield (2012).

Last but not least, we will try to clarify the attitudes of Swedes towards migrants, using the study by F. Ahmadi, and I. Palm (2008) Diversity Barometer 2018, published by the University of Gävle on the basis of research carried out since 2005. We will also reflect the study by K. Holloway, and A. Leach (2020): Public narratives and attitudes towards refugees and other migrants Sweden country profile conducted by the National Institute of the Open Media Society.

The basic methodological approach in the preparation of the paper was the analysis of the relevant literature, explanation and interpretation of individual attitudes and statements and their comparison. Statistical data were drawn from official website Statista Research Department (2021).

Welfare state and its possible collapse

Migration policy and the welfare state are closely interlinked and show a high degree of interdependence. The existence of a functioning welfare state has contributed in part to the large number of migrants heading to Sweden as a destination country. According to G. Fredman, for many migrants, a strong welfare state and the benefits resulting from it are much more important in their decision-making than the stable market and job opportunities associated with a good financial reward (Freeman 1986, 51-63). Opinions that the labor market is a driving force for migration have their origins in the past. Specifically, in the period when the labor market was diametrically different from the current one and showed other dimensions, resp. based on a different economic reality.

A study by M. Johansson and M. Persson (2007) points to the declining impact of the labor market on migration in Sweden. This study already states that less than 50 percent of migrants have found employment in Sweden. It was also found that a higher proportion of those who were unemployed before migration, remained unemployed (Johansson and Persson 2007).

The rising numbers of unemployed at the time of the European migration crisis in Sweden are the clear evidence that the increased number of migrants has also meant some pressure on the Swedish welfare state, albeit only temporarily. It is true that the support and security of the unemployed depends on the existence of a functioning welfare state.

Sweden is one of the countries with a high employment rate, although the youth unemployment rate in Sweden (18,9%) in 2016 was close to the EU average (18,7%), at the same time it was two and a half times higher than adult unemployment. About one in ten young people were unemployed in Sweden in 2016. However, it is true that the long-term unemployment rate in Sweden was the lowest among the EU Member States in 2016, which leads us to believe that the above numbers of unemployed will show an increasing trend even among migrants. It is a fact that at the time of the European migration crisis, Sweden was one of the European countries that accepted one of the highest numbers of migrants. According to Frida Boräng, the generous and universal institutions of the welfare state influence the norms and values of society and therefore have a positive impact on the reception of migrants as well as asylum seekers. It can therefore be stated that the welfare state plays an important role in migration policy.

Based on the above, we consider it necessary to state the classification of the welfare state. Among the authors who deal with this issue and created appropriate typologies are Herold L. Wilensky, Charles N. Lebeaux, and Richard Titmuss. The typology of the welfare state of the Danish sociologist Göst Esping-Andersen, on which we based our analysis, is also considered to be one of the most influential. G. Andersen divided the welfare states into three basic types:

1. The social democratic type is based on the principles of universalism and decomodification of social rights, which extends to the middle classes and strives for equality of minimum needs. The universal system includes all layers and classes, but the doses are graduated according to the usual results. Social security is financed mainly by taxes. This regime is based on high population taxation, an active employment policy, a high participation of women in the labor market and a generous social policy. The most prominent countries in this type are Sweden and Norway.

2. In liberal type of welfare state, the needs of its inhabitants are met primarily through the family and through the market. State interventions in the social field are minimal and come into play only when the family and the market fail. The level of social benefits is focused only on basic existential needs, the family is supported mainly by tax breaks. Social benefits are provided largely on a property basis and are targeted at low-income clients. The social system leaves room for the market, especially in the area of childcare services. The most typical representatives of this model are the USA, Canada and Australia, in Europe the United Kingdom.

3. In the corporatist (conservative) type, the state is ready to replace the market as a source of social security. The emphasis is on maintaining status differences and the non-distributive effect is therefore negligible. The system focuses primarily on the protection of persons who are not employed due to disability, job loss, retirement, etc. Social benefits depend on the period of insurance and the amount of insurance paid. In this system, the traditional division of roles between men and women is supported. Representatives of this type are especially Austria, Germany, France and the Netherlands (Mitchell 2010, 10).

We agree with the author, who included Sweden in the first group of countries. He described Sweden as a social democratic type of state, in which the priority role is to provide social security to all residents without distinction. Funds for this are obtained by the state from high taxation, which is supported by high employment rates, women's participation in the labor market as well as generous social policy. In Sweden, all these attributes are met.

Sweden is considered an egalitarian society and applies this principle to the redistribution of funds and social benefits among the population, including migrants. It is a universal type of welfare state that applies its liberal values both in generous social policy and in equal access to employment opportunities for all, regardless of gender, race, religion or ethnicity.

"A modernizing welfare state promotes social inclusion and integrates society through equal treatment." (Borevi, Jensen and Mouritsen 2017). It is egalitarianism that is a hallmark of Swedish society and is equally applied in the egalitarian approach to migrants. Out of 100 points, 83.8 belong to Sweden, making it the number one spot in the EU in the gender equality index. Its score is 15.9 points above the EU score (the EU achieved 67.9 points out of 100 points) (European Institute for Gender Equality 2020). Sweden maintains its leading position, despite the fact that there has been no enormous increase in the score since 2010. The Gender Equality Index in each EU country is evaluated annually by the European Institute for Gender Equality.

Since the establishment of the Swedish modern welfare state, there have been changes in the political and economic climate. Sweden's national economy is much more sensitive to changes and the effects of the world economy. At the same time, there is an increased migration of people, which is more intense than ever before, which also contributes to the change of national, social, economic and political systems. All these changes also have a direct or indirect impact on the Swedish welfare state and its functioning. To find out if it is possible to see the connection between migration and the future of the welfare state, we asked ourselves the following research question: What is the relevance of the relationship between the increase in the number of migrants and the collapse of the Swedish welfare state?

Two waves of opinion come to the fore.

One of them talks about the natural change of the Swedish welfare state that would take place regardless of the influx of migrants into the country. Its reform and a degree of innovation were required by the existence of a new political and economic reality. The Swedish welfare state was originally based on the premise that society as a whole is responsible for social security and the well-being of it for each individual. This situation has been difficult to maintain in the long run.

In addition, Sweden, like other developed European countries, is struggling with an aging population. This unfavourable demographic development, with the increasing share of pensioners in the economically active population, puts the welfare state model under increasing pressure (Brunclík, Havlík and Pinková 2011, 43).

However, the collapse of the Swedish welfare state took place already in the 1970s at a time of economic crisis. During this period, there was a decline in public finances, which was subsequently reflected in a reduction in funding for the Swedish social system and thus for the support and development of the welfare state. The Swedish

welfare state succumbed to another crisis in the 1990s. An example of this trend is the fact that the rate of social security recipients in the country increased from 5.9 to 8.1 percent in the period of 1989-1994 (Tepe 2005). It is true that even in this period, migrants came to Sweden, it was mostly labour migration, but their number was not as enormous as it was in 2015-2016 during the European migration crisis.

According to the second group of opinions, the increase in migrants coming to Sweden has caused the collapse of the existing welfare state system. Increasing pressure in the form of a growing number of migrants has subsequently led to the necessary change in the Swedish social system. The integration of immigrants into the work environment as well as into society thus poses a major challenge, as they are mostly people with a relatively low level of education, only certain skills, and zero/weak knowledge of the Swedish language. According to a 2016 OECD report, after one or two years of induction programs, only 22% of newly immigrated men were employed. For women, this represents only 8% (Bevelander and Irastorza 2016).

It is evident from the above that the proportion of migrants among the unemployed and those dependent on the social system of the state is higher than among native Swedes. It is also true that migrant women are predominantly housewives, based on their culture and religion. They often came as part of a family repatriation program and therefore did not intend to enter the labour market. They were allowed to enter the country by the Swedish migration policy, which also supported the arrival of other family members who were also dependent on state aid. From this point of view, it can be said that the migrants themselves and their family members have contributed to the instability of the Swedish social system and to the weakening of its values and strength.

Thus, with the arrival of migrants, Sweden gradually transformed from a homogeneous society to a linguistically, ethnically and culturally heterogeneous society. "In recent years, therefore, successive and relatively large waves of immigration have forced the Swedish government to adopt new legislation to protect other minority groups from discrimination and to create economic incentives for both employers and workers to integrate new immigrant populations." (Eger 2010, 204).

In addition, Sweden is a supporter of gender equality and fights hard against any such form of discrimination. Therefore, it also provides assistance to refugees who are persecuted in their country because of their social orientation or because of their gender[1].

Based on the above, we dare to say that if the rules of migration policy are tightened, the influx of migrants to Sweden will decrease. As a result, there will be less pressure on the Swedish welfare state, which will be less burdened by the payment of unemployment benefits as well as various social benefits, which are increasingly received by incoming migrants.

"Modern Swedish social policy still successfully prevents poverty and still redistributes income among the population at a relatively high level." (Lundberg and Åmark 2001). Although migration and the functioning of the welfare state interact, migration cannot be considered as the only factor that can lead to a change or collapse of the welfare state.

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[1] Such a definition of a refugee has been adopted in the Swedish Aliens Act by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Sweden and the migration

Recently, the perception of migration has changed, as has the reasons for migration itself. The labor market is no longer the main driver of migration. Rather, social and environmental factors become the motivation for migration. Of all European countries, Sweden has the highest share of refugees in its total population, currently estimated at 9,9 million (Dessimirova, Grondin and Williams 2017). The overall population growth is very positive compared to other European countries. However, this is an increase caused mainly by migration. Since 2012, the annual growth of the population in Sweden has been increasing. In 2012 it was 0,74%, in 2019 the growth reached already 1,078%[2]. The highest growth increase was in 2016 (1,256%), which was at the time of the European migration crisis, when a larger number of migrants came to Sweden and, as the result repatriation program, also with other members of their families. Sweden has always been seen as an open, welcoming, and inclusive society, based on liberal values and social cohesion, taking diversity into account in terms of migration policy. "Sweden has long been considered a universal welfare state and a pioneer in equality and equal access to social benefits for the whole population, including migrants." (Schütze 2019).

In the mid-1990s, more than 10 percent of Sweden's population was born abroad, and 13 percent were either born abroad or born in Sweden with two parents born abroad. At present, 13 percent of the Swedish population is born abroad, and 16,7 percent were born abroad, or were born in Sweden with two parents born abroad. 20 percent have at least one parent born abroad (Eger 2010, 205). The largest numbers of immigrants living in Sweden were born in Finland, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Poland, and Iran.

Sweden's migration policy has shown a high degree of stability and has always been considered one of the most liberal without the existence of restrictive measures against migrants, as has been the case in other European countries. Recent research shows that it is easier for migrants and their descendants to feel a sense of belonging in countries where the political discourse is more open and inclusive. It has also been shown that a political environment, in which the tone of the immigration debate is more negative, damages immigrants' faith in democracy (Simonsen 2019). For these reasons, Sweden has become a destination country for many migrants and asylum seekers from both European and non-European countries. Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen is of the opinion that Swedish migration policy shows a certain degree of otherness, which is the result of a different perception of the national identity of Swedes as such.

In Swedish politics, the identity of a nation is presented as modifiable and is formed in the processes of collective bargaining. At the level of the individual, national identity is seen as something one can choose. In other words, immigrants can become part of a dynamic Swedish nation through their active decision to belong to it. This migration policy was based on a philosophy that strives for a balance between pluralism and universalism and allows each individual the same inclusion and

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[2] The World Bank Group. 2023. Population growth (annual %) - Sweden. Accessed March 10, 2023. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=SE.

opportunity depending on their ability, regardless of gender, skin colour, religion, sexual orientation or ethnic origin.

The system on which the reception of migrants worked and their integration into the country was already satisfactory and reached a high level even before the crisis. This system provided migrants with social assistance, gave them almost immediate work permits to support their self-sufficiency. Among other things, they were provided with comprehensive support in finding a job, providing long-term housing, as well as help to learn Swedish. The nature of migration policy in Sweden is based on a firm concept of human rights and equal treatment for all without distinction. At the same time, it supports the non-violent non-nationalist integration of migrants while preserving their cultural diversity and religious freedom. All this leads to Sweden being, so to speak, in a tolerant extreme, which means that it often limits the values of traditional Swedish society. This situation persisted mainly until 2016. Until then, Sweden had the most generous laws against migrants, throughout the EU (Waldenström 2020). However, the situation began to change as early as 2016. Migration laws were tightened, and the number of migrants gradually decreased (Table 1). "Until 2016, Sweden had the most generous asylum laws in the EU. During 2016, it tightened its asylum laws and immigration fell to approximately to 116,000 immigrants in 2019."[3]

Table 1. Number of immigrants in Sweden in 2014-2019

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Number of immigrants	126 966	134 240	163 005	144 489	132 602	115 805	82 518

Source: Statista 2023

In 2015, Sweden was forced to increase its spending on asylum seekers due to the enormous influx of migrants. This was the most spent money so far to support this area. "Sweden spent 6 billion euros in 2015, or 1,35 percent of its GDP on 162,877 asylum seekers, representing 1,6 percent of the population." (Tomson 2020). In the last period of the 21st century, immigration from countries such as Finland, Iran, Iraq, Poland and Somalia have dominated. This influx has led to an intensified debate on migration, in which migration has been portrayed as a social and political challenge. Changes have been made in migration policies that have led to the adoption of restrictive laws and measures, such as closed borders, limited temporary residence permits and opportunities for family reunification (Schütze 2019).

Since 2017, there has been a gradual decline in migrants, but there is no relevant evidence that this reduction is the result of tightened rules of migration policy. Nevertheless, the Swedish group of immigrants is one of the largest among other Scandinavian countries. In 2020, the decline is already quite remarkable and reaches a lower value than it was in the period before the crisis. The reason may also be the situation in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, which significantly restricted the movement of people around the world and thus of the migrants themselves.

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[3] Statista 2023. "Immigration to Sweden from 2012 to 2022." Accessed March 10, 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/523293/immigration-to-sweden/.

Tightening migration policy rules has become a necessity. Excessive migration caused the creation of enclaves in which only migrants or a minimal number of the Swedish population lived. In fact, the proportion of the population in some cities has changed to the detriment of the original Swedish population, which has ultimately had a negative impact on the migrants themselves. An example is the city of Malmö. It is the fastest growing city in Sweden. Its population has increased by 43 percent since 1990, growing even faster than the capital Stockholm. More than 30 percent of the people in Malmö were born outside Sweden and come from 182 different nationalities (Kirk 2018). In cities such as Malmö, which is one of the cities with the highest concentration of foreign-born inhabitants, as well as in the suburbs of these cities, uncontrollable segregation of migrants has begun. Neighbourhoods like Rosengard, Holma and Kroksback began to be considered as dangerous.

The concentration of newly arrived refugees and migrants in areas with a high density of immigrants raises legitimate concerns in hindering their socio-economic integration. "More than 95 percent of children in local schools are of foreign origin." (Kirk 2018). At the same time, the neighbourhood may have problems providing funding, services and infrastructure. Therefore, many countries apply the regulation of the geographical distribution of migrants when accepting migrants, which is intended to prevent segregation and to facilitate the inclusion of migrants. Sweden is no exception.

Migrants are also becoming a potential solution to decline of the population, which occurs mainly in rural areas. This typical problem of developed countries such as Sweden. The Swedish Government's position in pursuing a restrictive migration policy was not based on hostile rhetoric. The government pointed to the need for tighter border controls, which it justified as necessary for better treatment of migrants and asylum seekers. Nevertheless, the country has been able to absorb high levels of immigrants without widespread serious social and political tension.

"In response to the increase in migrants, the Swedish government introduced border controls, followed in mid-2016 by a highly restrictive asylum and unification law. It was a major political shift. The number of migrants as well as asylum applications has fallen, but the Swedish public's concerns have grown." (Skodo 2018).

The change of the political climate and the rise of the far-right

The political atmosphere in Sweden has always been favourable to migrants and enabled them to integrate freely and fully into Swedish modern and pluralistic society. One of the reasons may have been the absence of an electorally successful right-wing party in Sweden. There is no tradition of a long-standing political culture in Sweden that would lead to high voter support for radical right-wing populist parties[4], as was the case in other parts of Europe in the 1990s. Jens Rydgen, a leading expert on right-wing

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[4] The only exception was the New Democracy political party, which was founded in 1991, when it also entered the Riksdag. In the following elections in 1994, it did not win a single mandate in the parliament. At the same time, it was the only period when a right-wing populist party was in the Riksdag. The Social Democrats gained further representation only in 2010.

parties, says why Sweden did not have an electorally successful radical political party in the past, based on four main explanations:

1. The social class has become increasingly important in Sweden than elsewhere. The voters of the working class strongly identified with their social class and the Social Democratic Party, which prevented their radical right-wing mobilization.
2. Social and economic issues still divided most policies in Sweden, and issues of a social and cultural nature, including migration, were of little importance to voters.
3. Voters as well as major mainstream political parties still perceived clear political alternatives within the left-right division.
4. The radical right-wing alternative, the Swedish Democrats, was seen as too extreme (Rydgren and van der Meiden).

In Sweden, during the short period 1991-1994, the populist right-wing party - New Democracy (NY Democrats) - was represented in parliament for the first time. But it was not until 2010 that a new populist right-wing party - the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) - gained more continuous representation. The high level of extremism did not allow the Swedish Democrats to attract a wider range of voters. The party therefore decided to adopt a more moderate program (Havlík 2011).

The strategy of the mainstream parties was to isolate the Swedish Democrats, which means that all other parties actively distanced themselves from this party, and at least in the short term, its parliamentary success was not reflected in stricter migration rules, but rather the opposite (Borevi, Jensen and Mouritsen 2017). Due to the extensive factors that caused the extreme increase in immigrants to Sweden, which was also reflected in the increased interest of migrants in the benefits offered to them by the existing welfare state, the status of populist parties has strengthened. At the same time, these new challenges have led to three serious facts, namely: 1) the tightening of migration policy rules, 2) concerns about Swedish identity and culture, 3) the rise of populist parties on a political scene such as Sweden.

As mentioned earlier, Swedish homogeneous society has gradually transformed and become multicultural, based on linguistic, cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity, which has found itself in a new reality. The fears of the Swedes themselves began to come to the fore that their country would remain open, tolerant and based on liberal values. Of course, while preserving Swedish culture, national traditions and language, which are an integral part of them. Addressing these concerns has become increasingly urgent, even for the Swedes themselves. To some extent, this need was related to the growing number of migrants in Sweden. Migrants who came to Sweden came mainly from outside European countries, that means from a different culture, language, mentality, religion (they were mostly Muslims). All of these facts have raised some concerns as to whether migrants will be able to integrate into a society as diametrically different culture compared to Swedes. At the same time, whether the Swedish liberal approach as well as the nuances of Swedish culture will be acceptable to them.

The general Swedish principle of gender equality is that everyone has the right to work and support, to balance careers and family life, and to live without fear of abuse or violence. In approaching migrants and their integration into Swedish society, Swedes also relied on this principle. Nevertheless, the growing number of migrants in

Sweden caused a turnaround on the political scene, when one of the important problems of Swedish society until then became an almost marginal topic and that was migration. Until then, it replaced typical topics such as the economy, public services, and pensions. Security and integration of migrants have become central topics.

For the first time, immigration has become an everyday affair in the Swedish election campaign. Law, order, and migration have become dominant topics, says Henrik Oscarsson, a political scientist at the University of Göteborg (Corine 2018). Populist anti-immigration political parties took advantage of the situation and used the topic of immigration and the integration of migrants to raise their profile and increase their popularity. Migration became an important topic during the election campaign and also became part of the programs of many political parties.

The first parliamentary elections to the Swedish Rigsdag, after the acceptance of the highest number of migrants in Swedish history and the partial tightening of migration policy rules, took place on 9 September 2018. The result showed that migration was no longer a marginal issue. The Swedish Social Democratic Party became the winning political actor, but with the lowest number of votes since 1920, when their result did not exceed 30%. Their reached 28,26% (IFES 2018), and compared to the previous elections of 2014 recorded a decrease of 13 seats. In second place, with 19,84% (IFES 2018), was the opposition political party - the Moderate Party, which also lost 14 seats compared to previous elections. Even the Green Party, a coalition partner of the incumbent political party of Kjell Stefan Löfven, the Social Democrats, whose main program was ecology, lost 4,41% (IFES 2018), which is 9 seats less compares to previous elections´ result. The Swedish Democrats saw an increase in the share of votes from 12,86% in 2014 to 17,53% in 2018. In the number of seats, the party won 13 more than in previous elections and became the third strongest political party. They hoped the result would be much higher, but it still represents the highest gain of any party in the Riksdag (Deutsche Welle 2018) (Table 2).

Table 2. Partial results of the Riksdag elections in 2014 and 2018

Year	2014		2018	
Political Party	*Mandates*	*%*	*Mandates*	*%*
Social Democratic Party	113	31,01	100	28,26
Moderate Party	84	23,33	70	19,84
Sweden Democrats	49	12,86	62	17,53
Green Party	25	6,89	16	4,41

Source: IFES 2014; IFES 2018

Swedish Democrats party was led by Per Jimmie Åkesson, who has been the party's leader since 2005. Åkkeson, continued to remove the most visible and unacceptable signs of xenophobia and racism from the Swedish society in the party's program, which it had actually transformed into a modern and legitimate populist party (Widfeldt 2015, 213-214). Supporters of the party are united in topics such as solving problems related to immigration, Islamic extremism and multiculturalism, which they perceive too one-sidedly as a threat to state borders and their cultural identity. Swedish Democrats have more support, about twice as much among men than women. They

also have more support among people born in Sweden than among people born abroad (Vilkénas and Olofsson 2018). We believe that the far-right Swedish Democrats have seen increased support precisely because of Swedes' fears of immigration. Following the tightening of the rules, the number of migrants heading to Sweden has fallen, but fears of pressure on the social system as well as fears of rising crime have contributed to the far-right electoral victory in a politically conservative country such as Sweden.

There are certainly problems in Sweden. Especially in the peripheral areas of large cities, as presented by Jerzy Sarnecki, Professor of Criminology at Stockholm University. But there are no statistics showing that the recent increase in crime has been linked to an increasing number of migrants[5]. According to an official survey by the Statista Research Department, the most important problems that plague Swedes are health and social security (47% of responses). The second problem that worries Swedes the most is the environment, climate and energy problems (39% of responses). The third problem is the education system, which is important for 26% of Swedes. Crime ranked fourth and gained 21%. Migration has been identified as the fifth most serious problem for 20% of Swedes. Other problems included housing, the economic situation, pensions, unemployment, but with significantly lower percentages[6].

Nevertheless, opinions that migrants are more involved in crime resonate among some Swedes, and to some extent this has also contributed to increased support for the far-right, which was only a marginal political entity, without stronger voter support. There are, however, no official statistics showing that migrants are more involved in crime than the Swedes themselves. The principle of egalitarianism and equal treatment of all, which are the basic pillars of Swedish society, are a barrier to carrying out similar surveys.

The influence of the media on the radicalization of the Swedish political scene

The media play an important role in shaping public opinion, which is one of the main sources of information, whether it is print, audio, or various types of social networks. The problem arises with the so-called alternative media. These can then influence the attitudes of the population as well as the public opinion of the whole society in a negative way. Critics of such media emphasize populist, low-quality, sensationalist ambitions, and the sometimes-hateful content found in some of them. This raise concerns that they may contribute to increased polarization, mistrust, and racism in society. Proponents, on the other hand, claim that such media provide original perspectives and new voices on key issues such as crime, immigration, and Islam, which are not covered by the mainstream press (Nygaard 2020).

Interestingly, right-wing alternative websites are the most widespread in Sweden, where they are also gaining significant support. Those who have heard of Swedish

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[5] Government Offices of Sweden. 2022. "Facts about migration, integration and crime in Sweden." *September 21, 2022*. Accessed March 12, 2023. https://www.government.se/articles/2017/02/facts-about-migration-and-crime-in-sweden/.

[6] Statista. 2023. "What do you think are the two most important issues facing Sweden at the moment?" Accessed March 12, 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/565816/most-important-issues-in-sweden-as-perceived-by-citizens/.

alternative media give them a high degree of credibility from 4,10 points for Fria Tider to 5,06 points for Nyheter Idag. In contrast to the public SVT, which received support of 6,59 points (Newman et al. 2019, 111). Although the SVT received the highest number of points compared to the points received by the alternative media, its support is still low. The relatively low support of the state SVT in comparison with alternative media is also related to the decrease in the use of traditional mass media for obtaining information. Swedes get up to 84% information online, 64% from TV and 46% from print media (Newman et al. 2019, 111). We believe that the high prevalence of alternative media, as well as their credibility, is conditioned by the liberal values on which Swedish society stands. The mainstream media, in an effort to defend the existing political culture, try to eliminate social phenomena that divide society and negatively affect public opinion, where we can include the topic of migration. Ultimately, they create space for alternative media, which in turn show higher support for controversial topics. Although these are predominantly small media in terms of their scope, the impact of their information can be significant in shaping the views of public.

Mainstream and alternative media often give a different view of the problems that plague Swedish society and ways to solve them. This difference can also be seen in their attitudes towards migrants. An example is the promotion of the city of Malmö. Alternative right-wing media sharply highlight the change that immigration has brought to the city, especially in terms of crime and violence. It even called some of his areas, such as Rosengard as 'no-entry zones'. This claim, however, was rejected by the Swedish police. The mainstream media, on the other hand, describe Malmö as a city of diversity through migration (Holloway and Leach 2020, 6).

Alternative media are often linked to right-wing populist entities. The situation is the same in Sweden. The Swedish Democrats are working with Fria Tider and Nyheter Idag, through which they also addressed their supporters in the election campaign. Their mutual cooperation in promoting a negative attitude to migration has led to the strengthening of these alternative media and has also helped the Swedish Democrats as a right-wing anti-migration political entity to strengthen their position on the Swedish political scene, as evidenced in the September 2018 Rigsdag elections.

Swedish Democrats perceive migration as a negative phenomenon that harms Swedish society, as evidenced by the following statement. "We (Swedish Democrats) want a serious migration policy. We welcome those who contribute to our society, abide by our laws and respect our practices. On the other hand, those who come here to use our systems, to commit crimes or to harm our citizens, are not welcome."[7] The alternative media have to some extent 'popularized' the Swedish Democrats, which has ultimately led to a strengthening of radicalization on the Swedish political scene. It should be added that radicalization has recently intensified across Europe. With the support of right-wing populist parties such as the Swedish Democrats, great care must be taken to avoid an increase in extremism. It is clear that Sweden will also become part of the growing trend of populist parties, which has recently become characteristic, especially for the political scenes in the Scandinavian countries.

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[7] Sverigedemokraterna. 2023. "About us." Accessed March 12, 2023. https://sd.se/english/.

Swedes' attitude to migration

Swedes have always been free, open and welcoming to ethnic diversity in accepting migrants. They sought the full integration of migrants into Swedish society and culture, taking into account their differences and origins. Migration and everything connected with it was not a topic that would appeal to a large part of the public. It also had only a marginal place at the time of the election campaign, and it was not at the forefront of the programs of individual political parties. The change came only in connection with the European migration crisis, which caused an enormous influx of migrants to Sweden. Subsequently, it led to the need to change Swedish migration policy.

The creation and implementation of migration policy depends on the current distribution of political parties in the political spectrum as well as on the proportion of representation of individual political entities and their influence on government policymaking. The direction in which migration policy will go also depends on whether the left-wing or right-wing government is in power. It is very important for the government to show a high degree of stability and parliamentary support, which will enable it to take decisions in such a serious area as migration policy, especially at a time of high influx of migrants, as was the case during the European migration crisis. It was then that politicians, government, opposition, parliamentary and non-parliamentary political entities turned their attention to migration, which caused a change in the dominant philosophy of migration as well as in the attitude of Swedes to this issue, which became an important part of their daily lives.

A shift in the perception of multiculturalism and migration on the part of the Swedes can be seen recently. It has become more negative than ever before. Their attitude towards migrants is different than in other European countries. Swedes do not see migrants as a threat to the Swedish labour market, nor are they less concerned about the economic impact of migration. Rather, they associate migration with the threat of crime and criminal offenses. Even according to the Diversity Barometer from 2018, opinions on migration are often given unilaterally and create negative attitudes towards migrants, which are often irrelevant. "The media, authorities, scientists and opinion leaders present relationships that are full of conflict. Unfortunately, this focus means that all well-functioning relationships between people in neighborhoods, schools and workplaces receive less media attention. Thus, the image of public opinion disseminated by the media does not cover all aspects of multicultural relations." (Ahmadi et al. 2020).

The national institute Open Media Society conducted a survey on the attitudes of Swedes to immigration and ethnic diversity. The survey shows that younger respondents show a more positive attitude towards people of foreign origin. Swedes with higher education and those who lived in cities, as well as those who had personal contact with foreigners, were also more positive (Holloway and Leach 2020, 6). These results are also confirmed by the AudienceNet surveys from 2015, 2016 and 2017, which analysed the attitudes of Swedes towards migrants over the period. The fact is that attitudes towards cultural diversity and migration are becoming more negative compared to the results of similar studies carried out between 2005 and 2014. "In 2011, only 8% of Swedes believed that migration was the most important issue the country is

facing. that changed to up to 44% in 2016." (Holloway and Leach 2020, 6). It is therefore clear that there is a change within Swedish society, which is then reflected in the attitude of Swedes towards migration, immigration as well as multiculturalism and cultural diversity. Despite the high degree of openness of Swedish society, the Swedes themselves have recently become more vigilant and closed-minded.

Attitudes towards immigration are related to the country's economic situation, but it is not the only factor that affects it. Attitudes towards immigration and diversity can also be influenced by factors such as security concerns, perceptions of cultural differences, values and emotional responses (Mayda 2006). An important study that maps Swedes' attitudes towards cultural diversity is the Diversity Barometer (2018), which has been carried out since 2005.

Since 2013, it is under the responsibility of the University of Gävle[8]. The sample consisted of 613 randomly selected individuals. Data collection took place from May 2016 to July 2018 via post. The diversity attitude index reached its lowest level in the history of measurements. Now it had a value of 1,7. In 2016 it was 1.8 and in 2014 this value was even 2,5. Since the period before the migration crisis, the index has fallen by 0,8, which is a significant decline in the conditions of such an open society as Sweden. It is therefore possible to observe a negative development of this indicator. People over the age of 50 and women with both lower and higher education contributed to this result. On the contrary, people under 30 showed a positive attitude resulted in improving the index values. The reason may be that the young generation is more in contact with migrants, within school, extracurricular activities, social networks, work, etc. It is well known that increased contact and knowledge about immigrants from other countries can eliminate xenophobic attitudes as well as eliminate prejudices. It is the media and political propaganda that contribute to the strengthening of such prejudices and xenophobia (Strömbäck, Andersson and Nedlund 2017).

In the following section, based on the results of the Diversity Barometer (2018), we will try to explain the change in the attitude of Swedes to migration and cultural diversity (Ahmadi et al. 2020). Swedes do not see the arrival of migrants as a threat to their labour market, which can also be seen in their attitude to providing job opportunities. Most Swedes support equal access to employment opportunities for both Swedes and foreign-born people. 8 out of 10 respondents are in favour of this approach. Equality and equal treatment intersect throughout Swedish society, as can be seen in the research results. However, it is still true that 23% would rather choose a Swede as a colleague, while in 2016 it was only 21%. We are therefore seeing a little increase. There is also a noticeable departure from an egalitarian approach in terms of providing social rights for people from other cultures. Nevertheless, the monitored indicator still shows higher values than in other European countries, is more than 50%. Previously, the majority of the Swedish population agreed that all people should have the same social rights, regardless of where they were born or where they came from. In 2016, there was a significant deterioration and only 55% expressed their consent, while in 2014 it was 77%. In 2018, it is 61%, there was a partial increase, but it still does not reach the value as in the previous period. We see the main reason for the decline in this

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[8] No research was carried out in the period 2015-2017.

indicator as one of the consequences of the European migration crisis, which has hit Sweden very hard.

A certain shift can also be seen in terms of the perception of different types of religion. From a religious point of view, the diversity index gained the worst possible value in history, namely 2,5, while in 2016 it was 2,4 and in 2014 it reached the value 2,3 (the higher the value, the more negative the perception). The increase in this value was mainly observed with men over the age of 50 with lower or secondary education. Swedes' attitudes towards diversity have become more negative in relation to other cultures and religions, especially Islamic culture. They also express the view that not all religions are based on the same values, referring mainly to Islam. The terrorist attack in April 2017 in Stockholm, where 4 people were killed 4 and 15 injured, may have contributed to these views. The perpetrator was Uzbek Rakhmat Akilov, an asylum seeker. In 2018, the SVT reported that up to 58% of men convicted of rape or attempted rape in Sweden in the last five years were born outside Sweden[9].

The Swedes are strict supporters of the incoming population integrating into Swedish society, preserving elements of their own identity, but also recognizing the fundamental values on which Swedish society stands. They consider it necessary for all migrants who want to stay in Sweden to learn Swedish in order to facilitate adaptation and maintain the unity of Swedish society. As many as 71% of respondents think that Islamic private schools are against integration. This indicator also increased, as in 2016 only 54% respondents supported this statement. This is probably due to the fact that they realize that if immigrants do not learn Swedish, it is a great handicap for them, which prevents them from achieving higher education or obtaining a more qualified job. The difference is also noticeable in the perception of the position of women in the society. Gender equality is strongly rooted in Sweden. The position of women is therefore freer and more balanced with that from Muslim countries. The majority of the Swedish population is of the opinion that the position of Muslim women is worse than that of Swedes, they are more oppressed (66%, while in 2016 it was 61%). Attitudes towards women and their rights are diametrically opposed in Sweden and in immigrant countries, which is the reason for the increased indicator.

An indicator that assesses housing and the willingness of Swedes to have people from other cultures or religions reaches positive value. As for the issue of housing, the residential index is stable and reaches the value of 2.0. In 2016 it was 1,8. It is true that up to 37% of respondents would prefer Swedish neighbours. And 3 out of 10 would consider moving if someone from the Middle East moved into their apartment building, 2 out of 10 would consider moving if the the potentail neighbor is from Africa.

As many as 45% (2018) of Swedes consider people from the Middle East to be a threat to preserving Swedish culture. In 2014, it was 43%. 71% also think that Islamic private schools prevent integration, compared to 54% in 2016. We can observe an increase in both indicators. The reason is the Swedes' concern about preserving their uniqueness and Swedish culture.The above statement is confirmed by the following: "In today's globalized society, behind all its insecurity and fear, people tend to seek

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[9]In Sweden, there are no official statistics that would confirm a higher proportion of crime among migrants than among Swedes. The principles of equal access to all, which are the basic pillar of Swedish society, prevent them from carrying out similar surveys.

security in the old local culture." (Ahmadi et al. 2020). Concerns about Swedish culture and language can also be seen in the changing attitude of Swedes as to whether people coming to Sweden should preserve their language and teach it to their children in the context of diversity. There is still a majority, 56%, who are of this opinion (60% agreed in 2016, 61% in 2014). Those, who reject this claim have increased, but it is still a relatively stable value, 24%. A significant deterioration was noted in the attitude of Swedes to leave people born abroad the opportunity to develop their own culture. It was 46%, while in 2016 it was 49% and in 2014, 57%. Men over the age of 50 had a rather negative attitude.

The fact that Swedes often associate migration with the provision of social benefits can also be seen in the following indicator. The negative statement that many are coming to Sweden to take advantage of social benefits has polarized Swedish society. Four out of ten agree with this claim, while four out of ten reject this claim. The attitude I do not agree with the position, but I do not refuse either, worsened in the observed year. In 2018 it was 22%. We see a connection with the growing number of migrants in a given period as well as the media coverage of this problem. However, the Swedish public continues to show a more positive attitude towards immigration compared to other Scandinavian as well as other European countries.

Conclusion and discussion

Sweden has become a destination country for many migrants, thanks to its liberal and not too restrictive migration policy and quality social system. This was fully reflected in the European migration crisis when Swedes took the lead in receiving migrants and asylum seekers from other European Union countries. One of our research questions was: *What is the relevance of the relationship between the increase in the number of migrants and the collapse of the Swedish welfare state?*

We can state that, based on our findings, a clear answer to this question is not possible, as several factors affect the collapse of the Swedish welfare state. It is undeniable that increasing migration was one of them. The economic crisis, demographic changes in the structure of the population and their consequences for changes in attitudes towards migration and ethnic diversity also contributed to the collapse. Last but not least, a change in political and economic reality. These extensive factors have partly contributed to the need to change the Swedish welfare state, and their influence may have contributed in part to its collapse.

It is clear that even a high-quality and strong welfare state, such as Sweden, is under pressure after an increased influx of migrants, which will ultimately lead to its disintegration if it is not changed. So, the collapse of the welfare state, or its necessary change, is a natural part of it in certain time intervals and is dependent on the mutual correlation of many factors. Migration, as one of the factors, contributed in part to the need to transform the existing Swedish welfare state system, but it was not the only factor. Secondly, we tried to find out whether there is a connection between the increase in the number of migrants and the strengthening of the position of radical political parties on the Swedish political scene. Last but not least, we examined the

extent to which this affects the attitude of Swedes towards migrants. Our second research question was: *Has the increase in the number of migrants contributed to the radicalization of the political scene in Sweden and to the negative attitudes of the Swedish population towards migrants?*

It is true that it was migration that strengthened the position of the far-right in Sweden. The Swedish Democrats, as the main leaders and supporters of the cessation of migration to Sweden, have begun to address this hitherto marginal issue for Swedish society. Their populist and distorted presentation of migration as one of Sweden's biggest problems has meant that migration has become a central problem for Swedish society as a whole, as well as for the political scene, which has radicalized under its influence. The growth of such anti-immigration forces in Sweden reinforces negative attitudes towards diversity as well as the segregated integration that characterizes the current situation in Sweden. On the contrary, it will weaken the position of typical political parties. The presentation of migration by the anti-immigration populist political party, the Swedish Democrats, as well as the right-wing alternative media, with which they are in close contact, strengthened the negative attitudes of Swedes towards migrants. The diversity attitude index reached its lowest level in the history of measurements.

Despite some deterioration in the attitudes of the Swedish population towards migrants, their attitudes are still less negative than in other parts of Europe. Many studies suggest that feelings of helplessness contribute to negative attitudes. As a result, intolerant communities and groups are emerging that feel marginalized.

Sweden's migration policy remains open and one of the most responsive to migrants and asylum seekers. Swedish society needs to change and adapt to new challenges, these changes will depend on current political forces and their decisions. Nevertheless, their identity, culture and language will remain decisive for the Swedes and perhaps much more than ever before.

Acknowledgements

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IMMIGRATION OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS TO ARMENIA DURING THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR 2022-2023: PULL-PUSH FACTORS

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Abstract

This article is devoted to the identification of push and pull factors of immigration of Russian citizens to Armenia in the context of the projections of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the Armenian society. Secondary analysis of statistical data and the sociological surveys, as well as the results of in-depth interviews, made it possible to identify the political, social and economic push factors that determine emigration from Russia (sanctions applied against Russia, partial military mobilization, worsening of economic situation, restrictions on freedom of speech and the risk of persecution); pull factors that attract and retain relocants specifically to Armenia (Armenia's liberal migration policy towards Russian citizens, favorable conditions for foreigners to do business in Armenia, the availability of financial and banking services for Russians, relatively affordable prices for housing, goods and services,and security, Christianity, hospitality and knowledge of the Russian language etc.), as well as factors pushing migrants out of Armenia (the challenges of providing an acceptable standard of living, the lack of well-paid jobs, cooperation between the special services of the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation, the threat of Azerbaijani aggression).

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Introduction

This article is one of the first attempts to give a comprehensive assessment of the pull-push factors of the migration of Russian citizens to Armenia in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine, taking into account the changed political, social and economic conditions. In this regard, we consider our study as the beginning of an important scientific work. As a result of this study push factors forcing Russians to leave Russia, factors pulling them to Armenia as well as push-factors, forcing them to leave Armenia and their integration process in the Armenian society were studied. The study shows that urgent adoption of migration regulation and social integration strategies is required.

Under the conditions of the armed conflict in Ukraine, and then due to the war in Ukraine since 2022, the phenomenon of migration leads to a gradual change in all spheres of life in the recipient country, including changes in the political, economic and social situation. The transformation affects the ethnic composition of the population and its cultural norms, creating conflict risks in the recipient society.

The research context

War is a disaster because it forces the inhabitants of the warring countries to leave their place of residence, home, motherland and take refuge somewhere else in the hope of preserving their life and welfare. The Ukrainian crisis created a radically new social and political situation, which summarizes not only the post-Soviet history of the last decades, but possibly also the entire trajectory of world politics after the Cold War (Zubok 2023; Welfens 2022, 5-10, 45-52). All the political processes taking place in the modern world, and especially in the post-Soviet space, are influenced by the ongoing military operations in Ukraine (George and Sandler 2022).

Armenia, which during the 44-day Artsakh war of 2020 had around 4 thousand victims [1], was attacked again on September 13, 2022 by the Azerbaijani armed forces. Despite the fact that a significant part of the administrative territory of Nagorno Karabakh is occupied by Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh is facing post-war economic, social and political crises. In fact, Armenia also became a refuge for tens of thousands of people who consider their reasons for leaving Artsakh more influential and significant than the difficulties they face in Armenia. This is a situation where people flee their country due to war and settle in a country, which is also in the situation of war. Moreover, Armenia is still in 'neither war nor peace' conditions, surviving under the threat of resumption of war at any moment.

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[1] "Through investigation of the criminal case it was found out that the total number of the military personnel and civilians killed in the Republic of Artsakh and in the Republic of Armenia in the result of the aggressive war unleashed by Azerbaijan is 3822. As of 21.03.2022 the location of 187 servicemen and 21 civilians is unknown" (Investigative Committee of the RA. 2022. "Information about Military Personnel and Civilians Killed during 44-day War as well as those whose Location is Unknown." March 21, 2022. *Accessed January 21, 2023*. https://www.investigative.am/en/news/view/44orya-paterazm-texekatvutyun.html).

The Republic of Armenia is on the list of countries that accept immigrants as a result of the military conflict in Ukraine. During the first six months since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia or the so-called "special military operation" (Nagy 2023, 47-50; Voitsikhovkyi and Bakumov 2023, 134-139; Gill 2022, 121-123), about 1,000 citizens of Ukraine and Belarus, and about 40,000 citizens of Russia, moved to Armenia (Statistical Committee RA 2022). During the first week starting from September 21, 2022, when the partial mobilization of reservists was announced in Russia, the frequency of flights from Russia to Armenia almost tripled[2].

According to the data of the RA Police, during the first ten months of 2022, 19,630 people applied for Armenian citizenship, of which 14,661 are Russian citizens[3]. The vast majority of applicants, 97%, were Armenian. A sharp increase in applications for RA citizenship was recorded a week after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war. If in January and February 2022 643 and 892 people applied for RA citizenship, respectively, in March - 1670, April - 2154, May - 2180, June - 2378, July - 2645, August - 2363, September - 2449, from October 1 to October 27 2256 people applied[4].

The push-pull factors of migration

Migration is one of the multifactorial phenomena of modern life. In recent years, the increasing intensity of migration processes is caused by wars, political and economic crises and migration policy. Their various aspects are comparatively analyzed in many researches.

In modern studies, it has become necessary, in addition to the study of migration volumes, directions, the composition of migration flows, factors, and the description of migration stages, to make a transition to a deep and comprehensive research of migration patterns and mechanisms, social models, to diagnose and predict migration processes, on the basis of which migration policies can be implemented. Concepts of migration theory have expanded over time and become multi-content, but describing different groups of migrants seem to be no longer sufficient to identify this multi-faceted phenomenon (Lee1966, 47-57; Hartmann-Hirsch and Amétépé 2021, 41-59; Ojiaku, Nkamnebe and Nwaizugbo 2018, 1-17; Bansal, Taylor and James 2005, 96-115; Pham 2018, 161-175; Prieto Rosas and Gay 2015, 1-27).

Current historical and social realities require terms describing new groups of migrants. Among them are the term 'relocants' that are in a similar situation as a refugee, as well as those that are widely used today (Oswald 2007). Russian citizens who move to Armenia and other countries due to the outbreak of war in Ukraine are called relocants because they move their families and businesses to other countries where they can live for a relatively long time without an entry visa. These people cannot do business in their homeland because of the war in Ukraine and sanctions

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[2] Presidential Decree No. 647 of 21.09.2022 "On Declaring Partial Mobilization in the Russian Federation." Accessed January 21, 2023. http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202209210001.
[3] Source: Muradyan, Tirayr. 2022. "19,630 Foreigners Apply for Armenian Citizenship; Most from Russia." *Hetq, November 28, 2022*. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://hetq.am/hy/article/150617.
[4] ibid

against Russia. Such factors push them to other countries, where there are other pull factors for living and working (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk 2022; Dicken and Öberg 1996; Marois, Bélanger and Lutz 2020).

The push and pull factors of migration were studied by Everett Lee in the framework of his Push-Pull Factors econometric model (Lee 1966). According to this model, each area has different migration factors that determine the migratory activity of people in the form of immigration and emigration. In this regard, Lee considers the factors that condition the migration process and include the following factors: "1. Factors associated with the area of origin, 2. Factors associated with the area of destination. 3. Intervening obstacles, 4. Personal factors." (Lee 1966, 49-50). According to Lee, there are two groups of factors affecting a person at the places of departure and arrival: positive and negative. In addition, there are obstacles between the points of departure and arrival, which are called intermediate factors (distance, cost of housing, border and customs control between countries, etc). The last group of factors influencing migration includes personal characteristics and life situations. According to Lee, economic factors (unemployment, low incomes and high taxes), social and political factors (poverty, discrimination, restrictions on freedom of conscience and religion, wars), unfavorable climatic conditions can become repulsive factors. The high level of economic development, high incomes, security, access to jobs (including the informal sector, which is more influential in the case of illegal immigration), etc. can be distinguished among the pulling factors. Push factors also include personal circumstances such as the reaction of potential immigrants to the host country's policies toward them, the economic conditions for doing business, and the attitudes of the host society (Lee 1966).

Marie McAuliffe, doing a comparative analysis of the driving forces of migration, singled out the following pulling factors: the host country's resettlement policy, how immigrants are accepted in the given country, the economic conditions of the host country, the presence of the relevant community, diaspora (McAuliffe 2017, 103-104). Later, Sture Öberg developed this theory by classifying the concept of hard and soft factors. Among the hard factors are humanitarian crises, armed conflicts, natural disasters, and the soft factors are poverty, social inequality and unemployment (Öberg 1996).

Research methodology

In this article, the push-pull factors determining the migration of Russian citizens to Armenia in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and war are analyzed. Both the economic difficulties faced by Russian relocators in Armenia, as well as the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and war on Armenian society have been analyzed.

During the research, a secondary analysis of official statistics, the Ministry of Economy of the RA and the State Revenue Committee of the RA, the International Republican Institute (IRI), Modex Analytics, OK Russians research website, and Hetq Media Factory data was carried out in order to reveal the social portrait of Russians who moved to Armenia. In order to analyze the push-pull factors of migration, 26 in-

depth interviews were conducted with those relocants who settled in Armenia after February 24, 2022.

Analysis of push factors from Russia

According to the results of various researches, the vast majority of Russian relocants are people aged 22-39 who work in the field of information technology. According to a survey conducted by Hetk Media Factory, 40% of the respondents left Russia because they or a family member were of conscription age. One third of the respondents stated that the restriction of digital and technical services directly affected their work, which became one of the main reasons for relocation. Meanwhile, only 10% of the respondents lost their previous job and have not yet found a new one[5].

The social profile of Russians moving to Armenia differs significantly before and after partial conscription. According to the results of in-depth interviews, immediately after the outbreak of the war, politically active citizens came to Armenia, who have a strongly negative attitude towards the war and Putin's regime, they were afraid of administrative sanctions, criminal prosecution and arrests. Middle-income people who worked for international companies and could switch to telecommuting also left Russia in the early stages of the conflict. Starting from September 21, 2022, when partial conscription was announced, young male Russian citizens moved to Armenia to avoid military service and partial military mobilization.

Summarizing the circumstances contributing to emigration from Russia, the following push-pull factors can be distinguished:

1. Sanctions applied by Western countries against Russia, due to which:
    a) *Russian companies and their employees moved to Armenia, the main purpose of which was to preserve jobs and incomes,*
    b) *Russian citizens were afraid that they would no longer be able to leave Russia,*
    c) *Russian citizens did not want to put up with the impact of sanctions.*
2. Fear of war and fear of military mobilization.
3. The risks of deterioration of the economic situation in Russia, when there is a devaluation of the ruble, a reduction in the volume of production and trade, a reduction in income, etc.
4. Restrictions on freedom of speech in Russia and the risk of persecution.
5. Political position against the war.

The following quotes from in-depth interviews best describe the situation and the fears of the interviewees:

- "I am against the war, my relatives are in Ukraine."
- "Dictatorship, threat and danger are everywhere in Russia."
- "I'm afraid of my phone being tapped and being prosecuted."

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[5] Source: Hetq Media Factory. 2022. ""We stopped feeling ourselves in our country": why Russians are relocating to Armenia." *June 20, 2022*. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://mediafactory.am/en.

- "People in Russia just went out to peaceful demonstrations chanting "No to war" (Нет войне), but the police fined them for discrediting the Russian army. They changed the slogan and put 8 stars instead of 8 letters. They were arrested again. They replaced the stars with the numbers 3 and 5."

Analysis of pull factors to Armenia

The war in Ukraine and the economic upheavals in Russia caused the migration flows to Armenia to increase. The Armenian government quickly opened its doors to citizens and companies from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus who wanted to move to Armenia for temporary residence. The Ministry of Economy of the RA created a working group whose purpose was to provide assistance to foreign entrepreneurs to settle in Armenia or start a new business here. On January 1, 2022, the Electronic Work Permit System was launched to digitize the process of issuing work permits and residence status to foreigners in Armenia, as well as to avoid long queues at the Passport and Visa Department[6].

Russian citizens have the right to enter RA with their local passports or identification cards. Citizens of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine can enter Armenia without a visa and can stay in Armenia for a maximum of 180 days a year without a residence status. In order to extend the deadline, they usually visit neighboring Georgia for a few days and thenenter Armenia again[7]. Even if they exceed the allowed period, the fine is 50 thousand AMD, which they do not consider a large amount.

Summarizing the pull factors for Russian citizens in Armenia, the following can be distinguished:

1. Liberal migration policy for Russian citizens.
2. Liberal conditions for conducting business activities in Armenia, fast and easy state registration of new business and the tax rates are quite suitable.
3. Access to financial and banking services for Russians, including:
   a) The possibility of converting Russian rubles into Armenian drams or other currencies.
   b) Cards of the internal MIR banking system of Russia are valid in Armenia.
   c) Armenian banking services are available for Russians. Different banks have different requirements, including: temporary registration, business registration, work in Armenian companies, high cost of banking services and credit card service, etc.
   d) Russian citizens can manage their accounts in Russian banks in different ways from Armenia.
4. Relatively short distance between Armenia and Russia.
5. People in Armenia are hospitable and friendly, they treat Russians well.

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[6] The Ministry of Economy of the RA. 2022. "Citizens of the EAEU in Armenia are exempted from the need to obtain a work permit and a residence permit." *December 22, 2022*. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://mineconomy.am/ru/page/2077.
[7] "Law of the RA "On Foreigners." Adopted on December 25, 2006. *The National Assembly of the RA, January 16, 2007*. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=73272.

6. The possibility to communicate in Russian language with almost everyone in state institutions and private services.
7. Armenia is a Christian country.
8. Frequent air flights between Russia and Armenia.
9. Presence of relatives or friends in Armenia.
10. The prices of apartment rent, taxi, food and other goods are relatively affordable, especially for those who move from Moscow and St. Petersburg.
11. Armenia is considered by Russian citizens as a safe and secure country.
12. Favorable weather conditions.
13. Organic and delicious food.
14. Rich cultural life, music and concerts, as well as concerts and performances of artists from Russia in Armenia.

The majority of respondents stated that they made the decision to move to Armenia based on the advice of acquaintances who visited or lived in Armenia, or on the basis of the positive experience of other relocants. Various social and media platforms are created and used by relocatants to share their experiences of housing, cafes and restaurants, transportation, sightseeing and entertainment within their community.

Analysis of push factors from Armenia

Initially, the relocatants planned to stay in Armenia for 3 to 6 months because they did not make long-term plans, hoping to return to Russia as soon as the war ends, sanctions are eased, or the Russian government changes. Many, mostly political activists, who are persecuted by the Russian authorities, consider Armenia as a transit country to move to other Western countries. Armenians who are Russian citizens usually plan to live in Armenia for a long time.

The possibilities of finding a job for relocants in Armenia depend on their professions and qualifications. Those citizens of Russia who work in the field of information technology usually have no problem finding a job. Some are able to keep their jobs, others find new jobs and work remotely for companies in different countries around the world. There are enough vacancies in the Armenian labor market that do not require higher education and knowledge of the Armenian language (cleaning services, babysitting, construction, delivery and waiter jobs, other jobs in the service sector). Those jobs are quickly occupied by relocants. Those professionals who have higher education but cannot work online (teachers, lawyers, economists) cannot find a job in Armenia also because of lack of knowledge of Armenian. For example, with the support of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Armenia, doctors started working in hospitals throughout Armenia. Relocants who left real estate back in Russia receive income from rent. Nevertheless, the majority of respondents mention a significant decrease in their incomes due to the Ukrainian crisis. The exception is the remote workers, whose income has not decreased, and life in Armenia is relatively cheap.

Analyzing the push factors for migrants from Armenia, we can single out the following:

1. The inability to ensure a normal standard of living for them in Armenia and the lack of infrastructure.
2. The circumstance of not finding a profitable job.
3. Armenia's strong connection with Russia's security and other special services, which causes fear of persecution among civil activists.
4. Azerbaijan's aggression towards Armenia, which can start a new war at any time and escalate the conflict in the region.

The following quotes from in-depth interviews best describe the situation and the fears of the interviewees:

- "The Russian FSB is present in Armenia and I am afraid that they are following me."
- "Approximately 60 percent of goods in Armenian stores are produced in Russia. Tax and customs services of Armenia and Russia transfer information to each other, and extradition to Russia works in Armenia. I think that if there is a global crisis in Russia, there is a danger that it will affect Armenia as well. So, here too, it is impossible to avoid serious problems."
- "There are reasons why I don't want to stay in Armenia. The tense situation around Nagorno-Karabakh. If the situation escalates (and it is now), I will immediately leave for Georgia."

The changes in the Armenian society caused by the immigration of Russian relocants

If, as of July 2022, there were more than two thousand information technology companies operating in Armenia, compared to February of the same year, their number has increased significantly. Moreover, 4,653 of the 4,949 Russian citizens working in information technology companies of Armenia were employed in February-July 2022.

The Armenian dram strengthened against the US dollar and the euro, as Armenia's banking sector provided significant growth in almost all indicators. Private companies were able to attract new customers, for which they began to revise their marketing strategies. The entertainment market began to transform to meet the needs of relocants. This, in turn, contributed to the deepening and expansion of the network of joint working areas. Such economic and social activity led to the fact that the sale and rental prices of apartments in Armenia increased by 7 percent in March-May 2022[8]. The increase in rent of apartments and prices of consumer goods had a negative effect on the middle class and socially disadvantaged population of Armenia, forcing them to review the cost structure, as well as the future budget and life planning.

The Russian language invaded everyday life in post-Soviet Armenia, and private businesses began to require employees to speak Russian in order to attract new customers. As a result, Russian is spoken much more often in the Armenian service sector.

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[8] Caucasian Knot. 2022. "How many Russians came to Armenia?" *June 7, 2022*. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/blogs/83781/posts/55084.

Summarizing the above, it can be noted that the migration flow of Russian citizens to Armenia had, has and will have a significant impact on the economic, social and cultural structures of the Armenian society.

Conclusion and discussion

The problem of Russian-Ukrainian relations goes far beyond the framework of relations between only two countries. Affecting many other peoples and states, primarily the European region, each time it acquires an increasingly distinct global dimension. In this regard, the scientific assessment of the level of international cooperation achieved to date on the problems of forced migration of the population of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus allows us to re-arrange the geopolitical accents of the role of Armenia, confirming a significant change in the geopolitical and geostrategic position of the small state, as well as its place in the current world order.

In the current conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war since February 24, 2022, forced migration is a sign of war and crises, which have a negative impact on global stability, as well as on national identity and culture. Of course, the ratio of stability and instability in the post-Soviet space was determined by their own factors, but the impact of the migration destabilizer also had an effect to a large extent. Nevertheless, with all the differences in the qualitative characteristics of the economic and political models of Armenia and Russia, there are common trends and mechanisms for both countries in the context of push and pull factors of migration. The phenomenon of push and pull factors of migration between Armenia and Russia leads to a gradual change in all spheres of life in the recipient country of immigrants, including changes in the political, economic and social situation.

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SECURITIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN EURASIA: TRANSFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE OSCE REGION, EDITED BY ANJA MIHR, PAOLO SORBELLO, AND BRIGITTE WEIFFEN. SPRINGER, CHAM. 2023. XVII, 411 PP. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16659-4.

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Abstract

This book is a comparative study of securitization and democracy in Eurasia in the context of transformation and development in the OSCE region. In various chapters of the book, special attention is paid to the most important general condition for the success of democratization, which is the guarantor of the political stability of the countries of Eurasia, involving the reform of society while maintaining the ability of public institutions to manage the transitional country. Globalization and the transition to an innovative type of development, a deep qualitative shift in the life of modern society, in its structures and mechanisms of functioning clearly indicate the need for a large-scale breakthrough in the methods of political management. The conceptual rethinking of democracy in the OSCE region is also stimulated by international processes that do not fit into the framework of the currently existing unified liberal concepts. Nothing yet supports the conclusion that sooner or later all the countries of Eurasia will adopt liberal values in the form in which they have been formed in the Western world.

The main task of the authors of this study was to analyze the process of democratization of the Eurasian society, which has a complex dialectical character, that is, a constant balancing between stability and development is necessary. This causes the alternation of democratic tendencies, that is, tendencies of liberalization, emancipation of the political, economic and cultural spheres with tendencies to strengthen the influence of state power structures on the development of the Eurasian society.

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The authors of various topics compare the current stage in the development of democracy, which has significant shortcomings, crises of political identity, parliamentarism, the electoral system, etc. This, in turn, leads to the need to concentrate volitional and power efforts in a strictly defined direction in order to resolve the problems and contradictions that have developed in the Eurasian society. Thus, etatization is both an instrument of regulation and a mechanism for self-preservation of the Eurasian society, a guarantor of its further development, ensuring the stability of the political system and contributing to the consolidation of disparate public interests and political forces.

This comparative study examines the main approaches to the analysis of changes in the perception of modern dimensions of security in the OSCE region, as well as the application of a new wave of securitization in Eurasia, theoretical approaches to the study of regional processes of democratization and security associated with threats of war, conflicts and crises (Holbig 2023; Schatz 2023; Dankov 2023; Jones 2023; Poita 2023; van der Zwan 2023; Jerabek 2023; Mandelbaum and Weiffen 2023; Mihr 2023; Burgers 2023; Akilli 2023). The use of a number of provisions of the concept of regional complexes of security and democratization as one of the starting points of this study makes it necessary to analyze the question of how structured the regional dimension of non-traditional security is in comparison with the global one, and whether relations related to issues of non-traditional security form regional complexes in those within the same framework as relations in the field of traditional, military and strategic security, or they create variable regional complexes of non-traditional security, depending on the threats under consideration (Aydin 2023; Ditel 2023; Akisheva 2023; Maralbaeva and Pierobon 2023; Azizi 2023; Schweitzer 2023; Mihr and Weiffen. 2023; Rice 2023). The development of conceptual foundations for understanding these problems can become the basis for a comparative analysis of the specifics of similar phenomena in other regions, as well as for a theoretical understanding of modern inter-regional processes in Eurasia in the field of security and trends in regional transformations (Schade 2023; Ghioldi 2023; Anghelescu and Dzardanova 2023; Malikbayeva and Gabdullin 2023; Kilichova 2023; Zhirukhina 2023; Lamçe 2023; Mahmutaj 2023; Szeląg 2023).

Transformation processes have an ambiguous impact on security: information and technological development, increased interdependence of states, economic internationalization, development of industry, science, medicine, etc. As the pace of transformation accelerates, its consequences are becoming more noticeable: the energy and environmental problem has become aggravated, new dangers caused by the information society have appeared, interethnic, interfaith and other conflicts have aggravated, and the problem of terrorism is acute. As a result, the security space is expanding: it includes not only issues related to military and state security, but also security in almost all areas of human life. Throughout the history of Eurasia, securitization and the need for security have been and continue to be important for

individuals, communities and countries in the OSCE region. Tasks related to security and its provision in Eurasia take an increasingly important place in the modern public dialogue. In this context, the search for theoretical models and principles of scientific analysis of the transformation of regional characteristics of threats, risks and challenges to non-traditional security in the OSCE region seems to be very relevant.

Inter-state diplomacy within the framework of the OSCE Permanent Council has become an integral part of the modern system of international relations and, as the OSCE experience shows, is able to serve as tools for solving the most complex international problems that are beyond the power of bilateral interstate relations (Schade 2023, 3-9). They played a decisive role, and the unique institutions and mechanisms of multilateral diplomacy, as well as the methods of its implementation, had no analogues in the new and recent history of international relations (Schade 2023, 6-10). The gradual transfer of a number of OSCE functions to European and transatlantic international organizations gives rise to the problem of identifying those unique areas for the activities of the OSCE and its institutions of multilateral diplomacy, which it is able to perform more effectively than others. These areas, as the experience of the OSCE shows, are connected with the universal European character of the organization and with those predominantly auxiliary and coordinating functions that it is able to perform more effectively than European and transatlantic organizations, membership in which is not European and universal.

Development aid and the democratic process in the OSCE region is a political and social responsibility towards states (Ghioldi 2023). In the context of globalization, democracy as a way of political governance of society faces unprecedented challenges that call into question some of its very essential characteristics. Functional changes and new developments in political relations in all parts of the world have given impetus to a profound reassessment of democracy, and this raises serious questions about whether democratic institutions are capable of adapting to the modern context (Schatz 2023; Mihr 2023). The serious challenges that democracy faces today are likely to require fundamental changes both within individual countries and globally. The novelty and diversity of the processes taking place in the world are so significant that the historically established forms of liberal democracy often fail even in countries with long democratic traditions (Mihr 2023). An intensive search is underway for forms adequate to the new realities: the projects of democracy of participation, democracy of defense, and communicative democracy are widely discussed. Even the concept of "illiberal democracy" is used (as a kind of combination of democratic elections with authoritarian practices). Such a combination is typical for half of the democratizing countries of the world, where popular sovereignty, realized through free elections, leads to the centralization of power. What emerges as a result is almost no different from a dictatorship, although it has more legitimacy.

In this context, to update peacebuilding in the OSCE region, a comparative analysis with elements of a systematic approach was used, which made it possible to identify common and specific features of modern formats of international peacekeeping, trends and qualitative characteristics of its development (Aydin 2023). A descriptive approach was also used, which provided an analytical generalization of factual information on the peacekeeping activities of institutions of multilateral diplomacy in the processes of

post-conflict settlement in the OSCE region (Aydin 2023). The applied methodological tools made it possible to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the approaches of various international organizations and members of the world community to multilateral cooperation in the field of peacekeeping (Zhirukhina 2023). Here, the study is based on the experience of applied conceptualization of the problems of war and peace, the settlement of modern conflicts, the conduct of multicomponent peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN and other multilateral institutions (Aydin 2023).

In this book, modern comparative studies of social networks in Kazakhstan are aimed primarily at studying the factors of influence of online platforms on feminist and civic activity, as well as the phenomena of communication barriers and ways to overcome them. A large group of studies is occupied by studies of the influence of social networks and virtual reality on the perception of feminist and civic activity in Kazakhstan (Azizi 2023). The problems of the information society in Kazakhstan, however, reveals the insufficiency of a comprehensive social and cultural study of network communication as a factor in the formation of the information society. The chosen topic meets the requirements of searching for a holistic, consistent philosophical view of the problem of the emergence and functioning of the information society in Kazakhstan. Moreover, in terms of a comparative study of the influence of network communication on a social actor and the study of risks and prospects for further networkization and informatization of the Kazakh society, it acquires not only theoretical, but also practical necessity. Thus, the task of political science research lies in the contradiction of the application of traditional theoretical approaches to the formation of social attitudes in a fundamentally new environment of virtual social networks in Kazakhstan. Knowledge of the features of the formation of social attitudes in the social networks of Kazakhstan will allow the development of new methods for leveling the influence of social networks and propaganda.

In recent years, the problem of violence against women and children in the OSCE region has begun to be addressed at the international level. In many countries of Central Asia, their ill-treatment is still often hidden, denied, minimized, tolerated and interpreted as acceptable cultural norms and traditions (Maralbaeva and Pierobon 2023). Violent acts that would otherwise be considered criminal are legitimized when committed against women and children in the private family sphere. Consequently, violence against women, including in the sphere of family relations, poses a serious threat, primarily to human rights. It is proposed to identify as features of criminal violence against women in the Kyrgyz Republic violence associated with the existence of discriminatory customs, forced bride kidnapping and polygyny, which lead to the commission of such crimes as forced marriage, bigamy and polygamy, the public danger of which consists primarily in the fact that an unhealthy primary basis can be created for potential conflicts in the family, developing into violent crimes in the future (Maralbaeva and Pierobon 2023). Violence against women is exacerbated by social pressure to prevent women from reporting certain acts committed against them, as well as by the paucity of educational and other measures to address the causes and consequences of violence. All of the above brings fear and insecurity into women's lives and is an obstacle to realizing their aspirations for equality.

In modern Armenian society, over the past decade, the social and economic structure, the nature of political power, as well as the system of value priorities that determine the specifics of the country's development and the behavior of various social groups have radically changed. In the conditions of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Ditel 2023), an important moment of the ongoing transformations in Armenia is the active involvement of women in social life. In this process, two interrelated trends take place: the growing social need for the use of female labor in various fields of activity and the desire of women themselves for social equality with men.

A comparative study of the phenomenon of the EU and its integration policy is of great value in connection with the growing number of integration associations in the modern world. In this context, the EU still remains the only organization of a deep integration type that has successfully existed for several decades and has survived a colossal transformation of the system of international relations (Mihr 2023). Fundamental shifts in world politics and the economy, as well as the rise of China and India, the return of Russia to the orbit of geopolitically significant forces, another round of escalation of contradictions in the Middle East gave impetus to the formation of a new architecture of international relations, which, most likely, will be built on alliances of mobile configuration (Schatz 2023; Schade 2023; Burgers 2023). Under these conditions, the study of the experience of interaction between the EU and countries that are geographically united in one space, but at the same time have completely different traditions of state, political, social and economic construction, is of particular importance (Ghioldi 2023). Understanding the integration policy of the European Union in Southeast Europe is relevant not only for understanding the regional subjects of international relations and directions for the development of European integration, but also for assessing global trends in the EU's relations with global actors. With regard to South-Eastern Europe, the increase in its transit importance ensured the growth of the interest of various international forces in regional processes. As a result, the EU has ceased to be an exclusive influential external force, although it still remains the only one proposing the concept of a qualitative systemic transformation of the region. However, the question is to what extent the concept of a qualitative transformation with the resources currently at the disposal of the European political elites remains relevant and attractive for Southeast Europe, and to what extent the movement towards rapprochement with the EU is inertial for the Balkan political elites.

In the context of the change in the modern architecture of international relations and the activation in South-Eastern Europe of a number of international actors that have their own history and traditions of interaction with the states of the region, as well as seeing its borders in their own way, the EU is forced to take a realistic position in order to achieve its own securitization. Therefore, for a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of European integration, classical theories are insufficient. A comprehensive study of modern integration processes requires a combination of liberal and constructivist approaches with realist ones. Its combination with constructivist theories makes it possible to study the modern integration policy of the EU in the totality of international relations.

The role of the EU in the Yugoslav crisis was conditioned by the process of transition from European political cooperation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, in general, the transformation from the Community to the Union. By 1997, the EU had developed a comprehensive strategy for stabilizing the region of Southeastern Europe, which required the existence of democratic political regimes and overcoming the acute phase of ethno-territorial contradictions. Therefore, the European consensus on Kosovo in 1999 was ensured not only by the recognition of the leading role of NATO in resolving the Yugoslav crisis, but also by the understanding on the part of the EU that it is in its strategic interests to achieve relative peace as soon as possible and the existence of democratic and loyal political regimes (Szeląg 2023). These interests themselves were seen in the expansion of the association and the assertion of their influence in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

In light of its new role and the successful integration of Central and Eastern Europe, the EU has decided to extend the experience to South Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, Russia sought to secure its own program by building a security community in the region through its Eurasianization versus Europeanization. However, the features of post-conflict reconciliation and state-building of the countries of the region, which Russia did not take into account, and the choice of a competitive integration track, led to a slowdown in integration processes (Lamçe, Eni. 2023). In the context of the changing architecture of international relations, this provoked the stagnation of the Eurasian rapprochement (Malikbayeva and Gabdullin 2023; Mahmutaj 2023). And the application of different Europeanization mechanisms to states with different internal specifics has shown its effectiveness for the EU.

A new stage of economic globalization at the beginning of the 21st century is forcing nation states to seek a compromise between maintaining political sovereignty, control over resources, financial and information flows, and the need to participate in supranational institutions: military and political blocs, economic unions and international development instruments.

Globalization has not led to a decrease in the intensity of regional integration processes; on the contrary, these processes have noticeably intensified. New international macro-regions with close internal political and economic ties began to form. Their development is in most cases stimulated by the activities of larger integration associations. One of the latest and large-scale integration projects is the China's Belt and Road Initiative, which was first put forward by Chinese leader Xi Jinping during his visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in the fall of 2013 (Rice 2023). This initiative is to search, form and promote a new model of international cooperation and development by strengthening existing regional bilateral and multilateral mechanisms and structures with the participation of China.

The Belt and Road Initiative is positioned as an alternative to superpower dominance or rivalry, in opposition to which China seeks to create a community with a common destiny for mankind and a new peripheral policy based on friendship, sincerity and mutual benefit. According to this vision, the Belt and Road Initiative can be seen as a priority of China's foreign policy in order to benefit the rapidly growing Chinese economy and bring it in line with the interests of neighboring countries (Poita 2023; Mandelbaum and Weiffen 2023; Akilli 2023; Mihr and Weiffen 2023).

The post-Soviet space is also important for China from an economic point of view, primarily as a market for its goods, as an area for investment. The European countries of the CIS (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova) is China's 'bridge' to the countries of the EU, which is China's most important trading partner. Also, the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus have significant energy resources, which are so necessary for the rapidly developing economy of China. In addition, the countries of the South Caucasus have both resource potential and an advantageous geographical position with access to the Caspian and Black seas, so China is also actively interacting with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. It is the Belt and Road initiative that is the key direction and basis of China's policy in the post-Soviet space. By developing cooperation with the states of Central Asia, the South Caucasus, the European countries of the CIS in such areas as trade, investment, construction and infrastructure development, culture, science, education, technology and others, China has accumulated significant and valuable experience in successful policy in a new region for itself (Jones 2023; Jerabek 2023).

The Chinese factor has already become decisive in modern world politics. China has actively joined the global processes, showing high rates of development, and has become a central link in the emerging system of geo-economic and political relations. Over the past decade, China has become not only the object of close study and study, but also has become a major actor in economic policy (Akilli 2023; van der Zwan 2023; Poita 2023). However, it is important to note that the presence of China in the Central Asian region causes concern and opposition from other major world powers interested in their geopolitical and geo-economic presence in Central Asia. In this regard, the interaction between the countries of Central Asia and China acquires not only an economic, but also a political dimension, since China has to look for compromise solutions and approaches in order not to enter into direct confrontation with its global partners (Akilli 2023; Dankov 2023; Holbig 2023).

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REVIEW BY:

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Abstract
This book examines the problem of modern Chinese digital authoritarianism, as well as the key global process of modern development, covering various areas of public life. The characteristic features of the global and regional trends in the digitalization of society are identified and described, which modernize the task of adapting political regimes to new network conditions both in China and in other authoritarian countries. This, in turn, raises the question of the need for a comprehensive comparative analysis of cases of legitimation of different political regimes in order to develop a package of recommendations for the effective transformation of the modern Chinese political regime. The most difficult scientific problem is, first of all, the definition of deep transformations of social and political reality under the pressure of forced digitalization. Other problems actualize the chosen research topic: the risks and threats of information wars, politicized fakes, attempts to distort historical memory, which can trigger the processes of delegitimization of the political regime. At the same time, digitalization gives political regimes additional prospects in terms of the use of social networks by government bodies, the transformation of communication models of the ruling parties.
China's digital technologies are research topics in political science and international relations that affect the quality and effectiveness of governance. In this regard, time and reflective ways of theorizing about digital technologies in international relations are important. The author focuses on the analysis of the role of technological continuity and changes in China, which today has practically no proven approaches to studying the impact of digitalization and big data on international relations.

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This book addresses the problem of China's digital authoritarianism, as in modern China, digitalization is a long process of transition to digital technologies, spanning several decades, but in recent years there has been a process of accelerated digitalization. International relations are rapidly transforming through digital transformation and integration. In international relations theories, approaches are being developed to rethink the relationship between digital technologies and such concepts as strength or power, diplomacy, security and global order.

The modernization of Chinese society is a complex, dynamic, contradictory process of economic, political, social and cultural transformation, accompanied by increasing differentiation, universalization and rationalization in all areas of public administration. In the modern knowledge society, it has become obvious that simply borrowing Western technologies, cultural models, institutions, in itself cannot guarantee successful modernization. The most important factor in stable social, economic, political and cultural development is taking into account the social and cultural characteristics of the region. In this context, the purpose of the book is to comprehensively analyze and conceptualize the legitimation technologies of China's political regime, to comprehend the possibility of optimizing them in relation to the conditions of the digitalization process. At the same time, the coronavirus pandemic, which slowed down overall economic growth, even became a trigger for the development of communication technologies. However, the process of penetration of a computer or telephone into all spheres of human and social life began much earlier, in the middle of the last century. It is already obvious that digitalization is changing not only the economy, but also the public and political sphere. At the new round of modernization, tradition is not opposed to modernity, but, on the contrary, becomes its essential element. The traditional spiritual culture of China plays a backbone role in the process of modernization of Chinese society at the present stage.

Citizens get the opportunity to participate electronically in monitoring the actions of the authorities through special digital platforms and applications. True, on the other hand, forced digitalization does not at all exclude the creation of entire 'panopticons' on the basis of a number of political regimes, within which flexible technologies for manipulating consciousness will be practiced, as well as establishing a procedure for mutual surveillance. Thus, the digitalization process is a kind of civilizational fork, creating both cyber-optimistic and cyber-pessimistic scenarios for political regimes. So far, the central and most discussed environment for the application of digital technologies in relation to social processes remains the economy, that is, electronic payment systems, Internet commerce, online banking, cyber-physical systems, digital communications, etc. (Taylor 2022, 87-109). At the same time, China's politics are also becoming heavily digitized. First, it is important to consider how actively digital technologies are used in the development and implementation of political decisions. Secondly, to determine the degree of influence of digitalization, this main direction of innovative development and the global social and technological process, on politics itself as a sphere of public activity. Third, to identify how digital technologies are used to study political processes. There is a growing number of studies on the modalities of using digital technologies in the political process, political communication and public administration.

Two conditional political digital discourses can be distinguished: the digitalization of politics, which is related to the spread of digital technologies to political relations, and the politics of digitalization. It seems that the second discourse is more related to domestic politics (issues of cryptocurrency regulation, cybersecurity, the use of electronic digital signature, etc.), however, at the international level, the level of individual unions, blocs of states, at the global level, political issues of the global and regional development of the digital sphere (Taylor 2022, 1-24, 45-61).

The deeper the processes of modernization spread in Chinese society, the stronger the need to change the authoritarian regime becomes apparent. Therefore, the book assumes that the possibility of changes in the political regime of China under the influence of transformations in the individual and public consciousness is not ruled out. Although the Communist Party is proving its effectiveness so far by continuously adjusting the methods of leadership, as well as continuously improving the conceptual justification for the reforms being carried out. New ideas are formed in the process of practice, arise in response to new challenges of the time. Their legitimacy is ethically and scientifically substantiated. An important role is played by the appeal to tradition, as well as to Western teachings, especially Marxism.

The main focus of our attention was drawn to the conceptual level of digital modernization, the core of which is the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. The presence of such a core is necessary, because without it the ideology disappears, having lost its connection with a high axiological justification. In the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, such a role is played by the concept of the comprehensive construction of a moderately prosperous society and the concept of building a harmonious society. Moreover, the above concepts are not mutually exclusive or replacing each other, but rather complementary. Their internal relationship is due to the need for co-evolution of the economic and social indicators of Chinese society. It is obvious that the digitalization of China's policy can give rise to challenges not only at the national, but also at the international and global levels. At the same time, digitalization as a development tool is called upon and allows solving the problems of global, regional and national development, including political ones. Finally, the introduction of digital technologies in various spheres of human life, society and states requires a successful solution. Thus, the problems of global digital development appear to be a three-dimensional complex that requires study for systematization in terms of the genesis and danger of individual problems.

Comparison of the current situation of China's digital modernization process shows the incompleteness of economic, political, and social modernization. Another difference is the presence of a powerful ideological and theoretical dimension of the modernization of Chinese society.

The authoritarian regime of China and other countries, despite the introduction of modern digital technologies, still uses the principles of political codes with binary archetypal meanings (friend/foe, order/chaos, light/darkness, center/periphery) as the basis of their legitimation practices. It is noteworthy that in the context of digitalization, this pre-digital archaic practice begins to be flexibly combined with the typically technical principles of gatekeeping of the binary network logic of including or excluding a participant with certain values in the communication process. Technocracy

and humanitarian-oriented expertocracy actively participate in this process. Digitization contributes to the fact that power begins to resemble an algorithm. Algorithmically oriented power determines to a person what is important for him and what is not important, what information he has the right to and what not. Panopticism becomes even less noticeable, but also continues to control the behavior of users, punishing them for violations of communication ethics. Those groups that gain access to algorithms acquire political power in modern conditions. The algorithmization of power is best seen on the example of smart city projects.

The legitimation of China's authoritarian regime through the digitalization of the The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is carried out with the aim of socializing the closest representatives of the elite to citizens (Taylor 2022, 25-44). The digitalization process of the CCP is carried out mainly through the development of party network communities, in the life cycle of which the regularity of publics, comments, reposts and likes, which are a digitized version of support for the party's core electorate, is of great importance (Taylor 2022, 63-85). The increasing digitization of the image of the party leader and brand, the symbols of the party itself can also serve as a marker of the digitalization of the party: a) creating digital platforms and communication platforms for users, b) analyzing their behavior and reactions to strengthen their own positions.

China's desire for leadership in the global and regional space attracts close attention of the international community to any internal problems in China, provoking their use for political purposes. In particular, the discussion of the national question in China has become international (Taylor 2022, 111-130). The analysis of the historical, theoretical, normative and empirical base of the study allowed the author of the book to consider digital authoritarianism through the prism of the constitutional principle of authoritarian centralism, which is the basis of the chosen model of state power organization in China (Taylor 2022, 131-135). As a result, the book formulates and systematizes the factors that characterize this model in its development, influencing the current state of Chinese constitutionalism.

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Abstract

The book is devoted to a close analysis of the formation of the modern world (dis)order and the system of international relations, which was significantly influenced by the processes of the systemic earthquake and the struggle for world order, globalization, democratization, the trend of changing the functions and balance of power of states. The current stage of international relations is characterized by dynamic development, the transformation of the role of key states participating in international processes and the redistribution of the balance of power not only in the economic, but also in the military and political spheres. There is a transition to the struggle for world order, in which a significant number of actors in international relations will determine the intensity of the systemic earthquake in global and regional political life.

At the present stage, there is an increase in the influence of regional actors, who are increasingly claiming to strengthen their own role in international relations. One of these states is the Republic of Turkey, which acquires the properties of a link between East and West, North and South. This happens due to the intensification of the foreign policy course, the growth of interaction with many powers, including Russia.

The book analyzes the process of transformation of the modern foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey within the framework of the ideological and value approach, which, in particular, includes soft power tools and a set of stable ideologemes used both in domestic and foreign policy discourse.

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The transformation of the modern world space is largely determined by the nature of the world order and foreign policy strategies developed by the leading countries. Turkey's position in the world is determined by its ability not only to take into account and effectively respond to the challenges of other actors in the global political process, but also to shape its foreign policy that implements national interests, which implies an understanding of the purpose and essence of the foreign policy strategies of the leading countries (Davutoğlu 2020, 15-128, 17-45). In this regard, it seems interesting and relevant to study the genesis of the theories of a systemic earthquake and the struggle for world order, which gives an idea of the change in the ratio of instruments of domination, hegemony and leadership that determine the systemic nature of the world order, the expansion of resources for foreign policy strategies, as well as the goals and strategies of modern foreign policy Turkey (Davutoğlu 2020, 46-67, 68-87).

The relevance of this book is associated with a significant change in Turkey's foreign policy after the Justice and Development Party came to power. In the foreign policy of the state, priorities have changed, national interests have become more clearly defined. During the reign of the Justice and Development Party, Turkey is pursuing an active regional policy, interacting with neighboring regions, including through soft power tools (Davutoğlu 2020, 129-253, 131-148). There has been a certain diversification of Turkey's foreign policy, which is manifested in attempts to move away from the position of the USA 'junior partner' in the region, in strengthening contacts with Russia and Eastern states. It can be argued that Turkey's foreign policy has become more active in the context of ongoing changes in international relations (Davutoğlu 2020, 88-128). On the other hand, under the influence of ideological and value factors, Turkey's foreign policy takes on the features of conservatism, which largely determines the dynamism of the state's foreign policy.

As a research task, the author defined an attempt to assess the potential of Turkey in the struggle for world order. In this context, Turkey seeks to expand ties with other countries not only in the political, but also in the economic and military spheres. Turkey is actively cooperating with Russia in the Middle East, primarily in the context of settling the Syrian crisis. Russia and Türkiye have a large number of joint economic projects (Davutoğlu 2020, 149-187, 188-223, 224-253). The intensification of cooperation between the two countries in the field of security has gone through a number of serious crisis moments. However, in general, it can be argued that both states are striving to strengthen the polycentric world order.

There are attempts by Turkey to extend its influence in the Islamic world, to the adjacent territories of Central Asia, the South Caucasus and the Balkans. For this, various tools are used: elements of soft power, increased interaction in the economic and humanitarian spheres, mechanisms for resolving and managing conflicts, a systemic earthquake, as well as the formation of a common 'national spirit' based on belonging to one religion and civilization. A particularly sensitive area in bilateral relations is the Turkic-speaking space of the Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS), where geopolitical contradictions between Russia and Turkey remain, which may intensify due to the intensification of Turkey's foreign policy.

Turkey positions itself as a foreign policy reformer, an exclusive and inclusive actor in the process of transforming the system of international relations, which, of course, affects the key actors of modern international relations. In this regard, it is important to understand, among other things, the ideological and value basis of Turkey's foreign policy. Without this, it is impossible to establish and build smart interaction and mutually beneficial cooperation, as well as to predict the possible risks and problems of Russian-Turkish relations and the ties of the Turkish elite with other countries and regions (Davutoğlu 2020, 224-253). Knowing the motives, it is possible to pursue a preventive policy and avoid conflict situations, as well as prevent the spread of Turkish influence on the territory of Russia and in the countries of the CIS.

The main focus of the book is on the study of the prerequisites, stages of transformation of Turkey's foreign policy after the Justice and Development Party came to power, which led to a change in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in power, a transition began from adherence to the state line to the principles of Kemalism to a more conservative one in the country's domestic and foreign policy.

The author's methodology was applied in the book in the analysis of the modern system of international relations based on the systemic earthquake, institutional and model approaches, which was presented in most detail in several parts of the book.

The object of study of this book is the foreign policy of Turkey in the context of the systemic earthquake of modern international relations. The book analyzes the features of the implementation of Turkey's modern foreign policy in the context of the political, ideological and value mechanisms used by the country's leadership. The author also combines elements of structural and functional analysis, as well as historical research, formed within the framework of the Turkish school of studying international relations.

In addition, an ideological and value approach was developed and applied in a comparative study of Turkey's foreign policy. This approach implies the study of Turkey's foreign policy through the prism of not only interests, but ideas and values within the framework of foreign policy ideology, as well as the integration of Turkey's foreign policy into the general system of transformation of the ideological and political field of international relations.

The book clarifies the content of such concepts as 'world domination', 'world hegemony', 'world leadership', 'systemic earthquake', 'exclusive populism', and 'inclusive democracy'. World domination is defined as a mechanism for the exercise of power, based primarily on military force and economic power, used to control other states.

World domination is defined as a mechanism for the exercise of power, based primarily on military force and economic power, used to control other states. World hegemony is seen as the addition of two principles: domination (power and economic resources) and influence (ideological, cultural, informational resources), turning into domination with the inevitable elements of dictate and/or suppression of dissent. World leadership implies the existence of common interests between the leader and his followers, voluntary recognition of the authority of the leader, the formation by the

leader of value orientations that encourage other states to imitate his political and economic structure, political and cultural values, the legitimacy of leadership (Davutoğlu 2020, 149-187, 188-223, 224-253).

Important factors contributing to the active development of expansionist ideas were the features of immigrant culture, as well as the religious factor that determined the strategy of national messianism. The theoretical foundations of the doctrine of world domination were the ideas of the exclusivity and God's chosenness of the Turkish people and political system, including the theory of exclusivity of political values, the theory of racial superiority, the theory of sea power, the model of military and economic power, which became the theoretical basis for the geopolitical strategies of Turkey's expansionist policy.

New systemic earthquakes and the struggle for world order in the 21st century make us think about the reassessment of the role of international law. It is necessary to resolve the issue of the relationship between law and force. The role of law, its moral authority and the moral authority of international organizations, including the UN, the EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the NATO. This inspired suspicion in many that, in fact, international law is only declarative and not a source of power.

International law is currently sanctioned by both hard and soft power. If there is power, then there will be right. Such a situation is unacceptable. The developed countries of the world need to demonstrate their respect for international law, and for this they need to start changing themselves. It must be understood that the international community of the 21st century is not a world of centers of power, but a world of mutually respected peoples and cultures. This world needs a new geopolitical ethics, a new geopolitical morality based on international law.

In the modern world, it is no longer enough to adequately respond to crises and conflicts. We must learn to manage them together. This implies a shift in emphasis to various kinds of preventive measures. In the long term, these include the education of people and entire nations in the spirit of a culture of peace, dialogue among peoples and tolerance.

Finally, a new revolution in values is needed, a new renaissance of the ideas of Justice, Equality and Fraternity, as well as a revision in the spirit of humanism of such concepts as the market, freedom, well-being, self-expression and other liberal ideas. There will be a hard battle for hearts and minds, in which the decisive role will belong to values and ideas. This implies the involvement of millions of people in a dialogue, within the framework of which interaction and mutual enrichment of all cultures and civilizations should take place.

The developed countries, with good political will, are able to create such a structure of international relations in which each country, each people would have the opportunity to ensure prosperity and a decent standard of living, their own well-being and self-expression. It is necessary to clearly implement the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda to change the current world order, the entire philosophy of international relations, as well as fixing these 17 SDGs as the main guidelines for the evolution of the world community for the next seven years. Only in this case it can be argued that the concept of sustainable development can win the status of a key and system-forming theory of global development in the 21st century.

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